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So far as I am concerned, John Sanborn should have come to
Washington, not I.
-Justice Hary A. Blackmun'
The man on the street will say Judge Sanborn was the people's
judge; the lawyers will fondly recall him as a lawyer'sjudge; and
hisfellow judges, that smaller brotherhood of the bar, always will
remember him as ajudge'sjudge.
-Judge GunnarH. Nordbye'
He was a hell of ajudge.
-Judge GeorgeE. MacKinnon3
The city of St. Paul, Minnesota, has produced a remarkable
number of great federal jurists. The late Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and the legendary
Judge Edward J. Devitt all grew up together on the east side of St.
Paul known as Dayton's Bluff.4 The late Judge George E. MacKin-

non, who served as a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, also began life in St. Paul before his family moved "West" with the railroad. 5 And, of course, the Honorable
1. BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMrITEE FOR THE DIsTRICr OF
MINNESOTA, HISrORY OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcr COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MINNESOTA 13 (1989) [hereinafter HISTORY OF U.S. DISTRICr COURT FOR
MINNESOTA].

2. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Memorial Proceedings for JudgeJohn B. Sanborn, 338 F.2d 5, 14 (8th Cir. 1964) [hereinafter Sanborn
Memorial].

3. Telephone Interview with George E. MacKinnon, Senior Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Jan. 11, 1994) (on file with
author).
4. See Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Thomas H. Boyd, Attorney at Law, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A. (June 16, 1997)
(on file with author).
5. See Telephone Interview with Elizabeth MacKinnon, widow of Judge
George MacKinnon (May 18, 1997) (on file with author).
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Walter H. Sanborn, whose appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1892 was credited with bringing the
federal circuit court to the Northwest, chambered in St. Paul for
thirty-six years.6 Notwithstanding the accomplishments of these
great judges, no discussion of St. Paul's contribution to the federal
judiciary could be complete without recognizing the remarkable
career of the HonorableJohn Benjamin Sanborn,Jr.
From his early days in private practice through his fifty years in
the judiciary, John Sanborn "conformed to the highest standards
of public service."7 Before his appointment to the federal bench,
he served in all three branches of state government - initially, in
the Minnesota House of Representatives; later, as Minnesota insurance commissioner and a member of the Minnesota Tax Commission; and, finally, as district court judge for Ramsey County.8 Judge
MacKinnon later remarked that this broad variety of public service
made Judge Sanborn "perfectly suited" for his responsibilities on
the federal court.9
He was also instrumental in the development and success of
the St. Paul College of Law and its successor, William Mitchell College of Law.' ° Judge Sanborn was one of the school's earliest
graduates, and he graduated at the top of his class." Thereafter, he2
served the school for decades as a trustee, officer, and advisor.
His vision and leadership were key in the school's ultimate merger
with the Minneapolis College of Law and
other local law schools to
3
create William Mitchell College of Law.'
Judge Sanborn's greatest contributions, however, came
through his service as a judge. In 1922, he was appointed district
judge on the Ramsey County District Court. 14 Three years later,

6. See Judge EdwardJ. Devitt, Remarks at the Dedication of Sanborn Room
in Old Federal Courts Building 1 (June 28, 1973) (on file with author); Sanborn
Gets It: Walter H. Sanborn Appointed Judge of the Eighth JudicialDistric4 ST. PAUL

Feb. 11, 1892, at Al.
7. Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 9.

PIONEER PRESS,

8.
See THEODORE FETTER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FORTHEEIGHTH CIRCUIT 52 (1977).

9. Telephone Interview with George E. MacKinnon, supranote 3.
10.

See Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 9.

11. See id. at 7.
12. See Gunnar H. Nordbye, A Tribute to JudgeJohn B. Sanborn, 44 MINN. L.
REV.200, 200-01 (1959).
13.

See Kenneth Mitchell, Eighth Circuit Mourns Death of John Sanborn, WM.

MITCHELL OPINION

(St. Paul, Minn.), May 1964, at 7.

14. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 200.
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Judge Sanborn was appointed district judge to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota. 5 In 1932, he was appointed6
circuitjudge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'
Judge Sanborn served until the time of his death in 1964, when he
was recognized as "a judge equal to any of 17the great judges who
have graced the bench of the Eighth Circuit."
I. ANCESTRY AND EARLYYEARS
"Judge Sanborn's roots ran deep in the pioneer history of the
State of Minnesota and the Nation.' ' 8 Sanborn's ancestors were
early colonists who arrived in America less than twelve years after
the Mayflower.' 9 The Sanborn family settled in New Hampshire,
and Sanborn's ancestors served in the Continental army during the
Revolutionary War.2 ° Sanborn's father, General John B. Sanborn,
was one of Minnesota's most prominent military leaders in the Civil
War.2' "Having in his veins the blood of patriots and heroes, mixed
with that of Puritan ancestry, it is not surprising that [General Sanborn]

...

should develop into the strong man, the gallant soldier

and the upright citizen, and achieve the eminence in military and
civic life that [he] attained."22
General Sanborn attended Dartmouth College for one year
before leaving school to read law at the advice of a personal friend,
President Franklin Pierce. 3 In 1854, General Sanborn settled in
Minnesota and began a law practice in St. Paul.24 He soon became
active in city politics and was elected to the Minnesota House of
Representatives in 1859 and later to the Minnesota Senate in
1861.5 As chair of the House Judiciary Committee, he helped reorganize the state government, as well as the state's school districts,
15.
16.
17.
197, 198
18.
19.

See id.
See id.
Charles E. Whittaker, A Tribute to JudgeJohn B. Sanborn, 44 MINN. L. REV.
(1959).
Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 7.
See CHARLES E. FLANDRAU, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOGRAPHY OF MINNESOTA 162

(1900).
20. See Thomas H. Boyd, Walter Sanborn and the Eighth Circuit Court, RAMSEY
COUNTY HIST., Summer 1992, at 22.
21. See HIRAM F. STEVENS, HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA 205-

06 (1904).
22. FLANDRAU, supra note 19, at 163.
23. See STEVENS, supranote 21, at 203.
24.
25.

See id.
See id. at 204-05.
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towns, and counties, all of which helped bring credit and prosper26
ity to an impoverished Minnesota.
When the Civil War broke out, Minnesota was the first state to
offer its troops in defense of the Union. Governor Alexander
Ramsey appointed General Sanborn adjutant and quartermaster
general of Minnesota. 8 Sanborn was later given the rank of colonel
in command of the Fourth Minnesota Infantry Regiment. 29 By the
end of the war, he had been promoted to brigadier general. ° Sanborn's regiment participated in many battles, including the operations that culminated in the fall of Vicksburg." General Sanborn
commanded the Minnesota Fourth Regiment, which was the first
Union Army unit to enter Vicksburg when the city fell in 1863.32 In
honor of his military service, a statue of General Sanborn was
placed in the Minnesota State Capitol rotunda."
After the Civil War, General Sanborn served as an Indian
commissioner and then returned to St. Paul to resume his law practice.' He invited his younger cousin, Walter Henry Sanborn, who
had also attended Dartmouth and was studying law in New Hampshire, to join him in his Minnesota law practice. 5 Sanborn & Sanborn became one of the most successful and prosperous law firms
in St. Paul. 6 The Sanborns practiced together for more than
twenty years until Walter Sanborn was appointed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1892. 37
General Sanborn had been wedded and widowed twice before
he married Rachel Rice on April 15, 1880.38 General Sanborn and
26.

See id. at 205.

27. See RICHARD MOE, THE LAST FULL MEASURE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE
FIRST MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS 8 (1993).

See STEVENS, supra note 21, at 205.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 206.
32. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 52.
33. See Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Thomas H. Boyd, Attorney at Law, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A. (Aug. 28, 1990)
(on file with author).
34. See FLANDRAU, supra note 19, at 163-64. As Indian commissioner, General Sanborn negotiated treaties with Native American tribes. See Boyd, supra note
20, at 23.
35. See FLANDRAU, supranote 19, at 173.
36. See id. at 163.
37. See Boyd, supra note 20, at 23. Back in 1884, John B. Sanborn, Sr., was
also considered a strong candidate for a judicial appointment to the Eighth Circuit. See STEVENS, supra note 21, at 204.
38. Prior to their marriage, Rachel had spent "a period.., in a fashionable
28.
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Rachel had four children: Lucy Sargent, John Benjamin, Rachel
Rice, and Frederick. 9
John Benjamin Sanborn was born in St. Paul on November 9,
1883. 40 He attended Franklin grade school and eventually graduated from old Central High School in 1901. 41 Sanborn was an ex-

cellent student at Central, and he earned athletic honors on the
school's track team.42 At an early age, Sanborn discovered what
would be his lifelong love of hunting, fishing, and the outdoors."
After high school, Sanborn enrolled in the College of Liberal
Arts at the University of Minnesota, where he soon distinguished
himself as "a brilliant scholar."" On June 1, 1905, he received a
finishing school in New York City." Mrs. Sanborn Dies; Mother of Judge, ST. PAUL
DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 1936, at 3. Rachel's father was Edmund Rice, an early Minnesota statesman who has been referred to as "the father of the Minnesota railroad
system." 15 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 538 (Dumas Malone ed., 1935). In
1849, following his service as a first lieutenant in the Mexican-American War, Rice
settled in St. Paul and began a law practice. See id. His law firm - Rice, Hollinshead & Becker - became "the most prominent in the territory." Id. In the 1850s,
a movement was afoot to bring railroads to Minnesota. Rice left his practice in
1856 to lead the effort to develop a plan for the state's railroad system. Although
he later served as president of several railroads, including the Minnesota & Pacific, the St. Paul & Pacific, and the St. Paul & Chicago, Rice amassed his fortune
through real estate investments. In public life, Rice served in the Minnesota Legislature at intervals from 1851 to 1878; he was elected and reelected mayor of St.
Paul; he ran for governor and was defeated by John S. Pillsbury in 1879; and he
served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1887 to 1889. See id. "Tall, well
formed, dignified in bearing, and courtly in manner, he was spoken of in the legislature as 'the Chesterfield of the House.'" Id.
Judge Sanborn's great uncle, Henry Rice, was a famous Minnesota pioneer,
Indian commissioner, and United States senator. See id. at 540. Due to his "remarkable influence" with the Winnebago and the Mississippi Chippewa, Senator
Rice obtained substantial land cessions for the state, and at the same time built his
own personal wealth. See id. In tribute to his national prominence and contributions to Minnesota history, his effigy was placed in Statuary Hall in the nation's
capitol. See id. at 541.
39. See FLANDRAU, supra note 19, at 165.
40. See May Be Able to Fish Now, Jurist Muses, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 20,
1932, at 1 [hereinafter May Be Able to Fish Now]. His birthplace was the Sanborn
family home at 506Jackson Street, St. Paul, Minnesota. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Coolidge Names Sanborn to U.S. District Bench: Judges Booth and Molyneaux Also Advanced, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 1925, at 1 [hereinafter Coolidge
Names Sanborn].
43. See id.
44. Letter from Kenneth G. Brill, District Court Judge, Ramsey County, to
William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Dec. 2, 1931) (on file with author).
He was elected a member of the Chi Psi honors fraternity, served as president of
the Junior Ball Association, belonged to a sophomore society called "Snake and
Skull," and won a place on the Gopher track squad as a hurdler and pole vaulter.
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bachelor of arts degree from Minnesota. 45 Half a century later, the
University of Minnesota awarded Judge Sanborn its Outstanding
Achievement Award.4
While he was a student at the University of Minnesota, Sanborn met Helen Clark of Algona, Iowa. They both graduated in
1905 and on May 18, 1907, they were wed in Algona. 8 The Sanborns did not have children of their own, but adopted the daughter of John's brother Frederick and Frederick's first wife. 9 John
and Helen Sanborn were happily married for more than fifty
50
years.
In 1905, John Sanborn chose to attend law school in St. Paul
rather than continuing on to the University of Minnesota Law
School. 51 At that time, the St. Paul College of Law had been in existence for only five years and had a total of seventy-nine alumni.52
The college billed itself as "A Lawyers' Law School" that prepared
its students to practice law from a practical as well as theoretical
standpoint. 5 The faculty had no "professional teachers" but instead consisted exclusively of "either judges of the Ramsey County
District Court, or St. Paul lawyers, actively engaged in the practice
See Coolidge Names Sanborn, supra note 42; Second Annual Spring Field Games, THE
GOPHER, Spring 1904, at 301-03.
45. See Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 7.
46. See id. at 9.
47. See The 1905 Gopher Board, THE GOPHER, Winter 1905, at 291. They
served together on the literary committee of the Gopher Board. See id. Helen was
a member of the Kappa Kappa Gamma and Sigma Alpha Delta sororities, served
on the Women's Council, was president of the French Club, and participated in
the Thalian Literary Society for the study of modem drama. See id. at 313, 319,
407.
48. See Whittaker, supra note 17, at 200.
49. See Interview with Richard Gross, son of Jean Sanborn (Mrs. William J.
Gross), in St. Paul, Minn. (Mar. 24, 1994) (on file with author). Their daughter,
Jean Sanborn, eventually attended her adoptive parents' alma mater - the University of Minnesota - where she was a popular and talented student. See Telephone
Interview with Elizabeth Biorn, former classmate and long-term friend of Jean
Sanborn (Apr. 4, 1997) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Kenneth
DeWirth, former clerk of Judge Gunnar Nordbye (Dec. 3, 1996) (on file with
author). Jean Sanborn was also a gifted artist who painted throughout her life.
See Interview with Richard Gross, supra.
50. See Ramsey County Bar Association, ANNUAL MEMORIAL EXERCISES 1, 3
(Mar. 28, 1964) (memorial services held in honor of Ramsey County Bar members
who died in the past year).
51. See Whittaker, supra note 17, at 200.
52. See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE
OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1905-1906, at 7 (1905) [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT 19051906].
53.

See id. at 7-8.
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of law." 4 Classes were held in the evenings at the Ramsey County
55
Courthouse, which enabled students to work during the day. Stu-

dents were also allowed to observe proceedings in state and federal
courts.5 6

The curriculum at the time reflected the law school's practical
emphasis. During his first year, Sanborn took elementary law, contracts, agency, torts, domestic relations, criminal law and procedure, and bailments and carriers. 57 The second-year courses included pleading and practice, equity, bills and notes, partnership,
real property, guaranty and surety, damages, evidence, and landlord and tenant." During his third and final year, Judge Sanborn
studied constitutional law, executors and administrators, wills,
Minnesota practice, public corporations, taxation, and insurance. 59
61
He also took review courses to prepare for the bar examination.
He was admitted to the bar in 1906 just a few months before he
graduated "with great praise" as the top student in his class at the
St. Paul College of Law.6'
II. LAw PRACTICE AND EARLY PUBLIC SERVICE
Following his graduation from law school, Sanborn entered
private practice in St. Paul.62 From 1910 to 1912, he practiced with
James E. Markham in the law firm Markham & Sanborn. 5 In 1912,
Sanborn joined the prominent St. Paul law firm of Butler &
Mitchell." The firm's senior partner, Pierce Butler, eventually was
54. Id. at 8.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 8-9. "If observing the actual conduct of cases, and hearing cases
tried and argued by eminent lawyers, are of value to the student of law, no better
place than St. Paul for a law school could be found." Id. at 9.
57. See ANNOUNCEMENT 1905-1906, supranote 52, at 10.

58.

See ST.

PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE

OF LAWFORTHEYEAR 1906-1907, at 10 (1906).
59.

See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE

OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1907-1908, at 11 (1907).
60. See id.
61.

See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE

OF LAW FOR THEYEAR 1908-1909, at 16 (1908).
62. See SanbornMemorial, supra note 2, at 4.
63. SeeJ.E. Markham Dies Here at 81, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, June 25, 1938, at 1.
An established attorney and former corporate counsel for the city of St. Paul,
Markham later went on to a distinguished career as deputy attorney general of
Minnesota. See id.
64.

See HAROLD CHASE ET AL.,

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY 244-45 (1976).
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appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court by President Warren G.
Harding - an appointment largely made possible by Sanborn's
cousin, Walter Sanborn. 5 William DeWitt Mitchell, the other name
partner in the firm, was the son of the Honorable William D.
Mitchell of Winona, Minnesota's famous jurist and eventual namesake of William Mitchell College of Law.66
In November 1912, John B. Sanborn won a seat in the Minnesota House of Representatives from the thirty-seventh district in St.
Paul. 67 During his first term in the Legislature, Sanborn chaired
the workmen's compensation committee and also served on the
committees for agricultural schools, game and fish, the judiciary,
labor and labor legislation, public accounts and expenditures, and
taxes and tax laws.68 He introduced several bills that were passed including a law to raise "the age of majority of a woman from
eighteen to twenty-one years., 69 However, Sanborn's most significant contribution was his management of the passage of a workers'
compensation bill
65. See DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED 49-50
(1964). Judge Walter Sanborn strongly recommended Butler to ChiefJustice William Howard Taft and Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter. See id. Taft, who
considered Sanborn the "strongest of our Circuit Judges," sent the recommendation to President Harding. See id. at 54. The elder "Sanborn saw in young Butler
intelligence, wit, common sense, and drive - in short, the potential of a first-rate
lawyer." Id. at 8.
In 1888 he approved Butler's admission to the bar after quizzing him in
open court, as was the custom in those days. Thereafter he followed the
young man's cases with fatherly interest, and a friendly relationship developed between the two that was to last until Walter Sanborn's death
more than thirty years later.
Id.
66. Id. at 10. The younger Mitchell was later appointed Solicitor General by
President Calvin Coolidge, and eventually became U.S. Attorney General in
President Herbert Hoover's administration. See id. Mitchell had aspired to become an appellate judge himself. See id. When Pierce Butler heard of his own
nomination to the Supreme Court, he is said to have exclaimed, "Billie Mitchell,
not I, should have been named." Id. In 1932, Mitchell was a leading candidate
for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, but was passed over in favor of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. See id. Associate Justice Van Devanter was of the opinion that President Hoover passed over Mitchell because of his need to retain the
prospective candidate as Attorney General. See id.
67. See JULIUS A. SCHMAHL, THE LEGISLATIVE MANUAL OF THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA 520 (1913) (listing election returns). Sanborn and Charles N. Orr received the greatest number of votes - 4655 and 5096, respectively - to defeat
CharlesJ. Andre and Bert F. Morledge. See id.
68. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 69-74

69.

THIRTY-EIGHTH

SESSION

OF

THE

(1913).

Id. at 500.
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prescribing the liability of an employer to make compensation by way of damages for injuries due to accident received by an employee arising out of and in the course of
employment, modifying common law and statutory remedies, in such cases; establishing an alternative elective
schedule of compensation, and regulating procedure for
the determination of liability and compensation thereunder in certain cases.70
In 1914, Sanborn was reelected to the Minnesota House 71 to

represent District 42 in St. Paul. 72 During his second term in the
House, Judge Sanborn served on the committees for banks and
banking, games and fish, insurance, the judiciary, public accounts
and expenses, and the university and university lands, and he
chaired the workmen's compensation committee.
Legislator col
leagues recalled him as possessing "sound judgment, [a] fine
74 and
attractive personality[,] and general fitness for high service."
In 1916, when Sanborn sought his third term in the Minnesota
House, he was considered an "aspirant" for the speakership. 5
Democrats, however, nearly swept state and national elections that
year. 76 Sanborn was defeated by a fellow St. Paul College of Law
graduate, John I. Levine, in "a see-saw race" in which Sanborn lost
the election by 164 votes.77
70. Id. at 1896-99. Decades later, as a federal circuit judge, Sanborn spoke
with pride of the leadership role he played in the legislature as the sponsor of
Minnesota's workers' compensation statute. Interview with Walter N. Trenerry,
law clerk to Judge Sanborn from approximately Sept. 1946 through June 1947, in
Fort Myers, Fla. (Mar. 20, 1995) (on file with author).
71. Half a century later, as a member of a threejudge panel sitting on the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Judge Sanborn was called upon
to decide the constitutionality of the 1913 reapportionment law on which he presumably had voted during his first term in the Legislature and under which he
had been subsequently reelected to the Legislature in 1914. See Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Minn. 1958).
72. See JULIus A. SCHMAHL, THE LEGISLATIVE MANUAL OF THE STATE OF

553 (1915). He and George C. Sudheimer received the greatest
number of votes - 1560 and 1396, respectively - to win the election over Charles
P. Montgomery and John D. Hilger. See id.
73. See id. at 155-58.
74. Letter from Charles E. Adams, Minnesota State Senator, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Feb. 28, 1925) (on file with author).
75. Heavy Casualties Among Old Guard In The Legislature, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Nov. 10, 1916, at 3.
76. See id. Although nominated as a nonpartisan, Judge Sanborn was considered a "prominent downstate Republican." Id.
77. Early Returns Indicate Sanborn's Defeat, But He Comes From Behind, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 8, 1916, at 3; see also Sanborn Is FacingDefeat; Rodenberg May Be
MINNESOTA
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During his first term in the House, Sanborn had resigned his
position with Butler & Mitchell to become an attorney and trust officer with the Capital Trust & Savings Bank in St. Paul. 8 Two years
later, he was elected a director of the Capital Trust and Savings
Bank to succeed Edward C. Stringer. 79 He remained with the bank
until 1917 when GovernorJoseph A.A. Burnquist appointed him to
a two-year term as Minnesota's insurance commissioner. °
At the time Sanborn was commissioner, the insurance department had supervision over all classes of insurance companies doing
business in the state.81 "The commissioner [was] required to examine each domestic company at least once in two years,
and... examine foreign companies whenever in his opinion such
examination [was] necessary.""2 As commissioner, Sanborn also was
"given authority to pass upon securities issued by insurance companies doing business in this state, and to refuse license to do business to companies whose securities [were] not approved."83 During
Sanborn's term, Governor Burquist expanded the commissioner's
duties even further to include those of state fire marshal and chief
state boiler inspector. 4
On August 12, 1918, during World War I, Sanborn resigned as
insurance commissioner to enlist at age thirty-five as a private in
the United States Army.85 He described the time he spent as a soldier as "a few minutes."8 6 Sanborn was stationed at Fort Pike, Arkansas, in the infantry replacement troops at Infantry Central Offi-

Nosed Out, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 8, 1916, at 3; Rodenberg Wins Seat After
Fight, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Nov. 8,1916, at 1.
78. See CHASE ET AL., supranote 64, at 244-45.
79. See Sanborn is Elected to Succeed Stringer, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, July 27, 1916,
at 11. Stringer, a U.S. District Attorney during the Cleveland Administration and
the grandfather of current Minnesota Supreme Court Associate Justice Edward
Stringer, had died "in harness" - stricken in court in the midst of a significant
trial.

See MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF MINNESOTA BAR

ASSOCIATION 260-62 (Aug. 7-9, 1917).
80. See JULIUS A. SCHMAHL, THE LEGISLATIVE MANUAL OF
MINNESOTA 100 (1917) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1917].

THE

STATE OF

81.
82.
83.
84.

See id.
Id. at 231.
Id.
See JULIUS A. SCHMAHL, THE LEGISLATIVE MANUAL OF THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA 399 (1919) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1919].
85. See John B. Sanborn Resigns Office to Wear Khaki, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
July 31, 1918, at 1.
86. John C. McDonald, A Midwest Judge,John Sanborn, Will Play Big Role in
Little Rock Case, MINNEAPOLIS SUNDAY TRIB.,July 20, 1958, at 6B.
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cers Training School. 7 He subsequently was commissioned a first
lieutenant on November 30, 1918, the highest rank conferred on
students in the training school,"' and was honorably discharged
four days later on December 3, 1918.9 On January 14, 1919, "in
accordance with an understanding announced at the time of Sanborn's resignation,"' 90 Sanborn was reappointed to complete his
original term as Minnesota's insurance commissioner. 9'
In 1920, Sanborn was appointed to the Minnesota Tax Commission. 2 The tax commission consisted of three commissioners
who exercised "general supervision over the administration of the
assessment and taxation laws of the state, over assessors, town,
county and city boards of review and equalization, and all other assessing officers., 93 The commission was also "given power to issue
instructions and directions to local assessors," and "[a]ll public officers [were] required to report to it as to the assessment of property and collection of taxes received from licenses and other
sources. "94 In early January 1921, Sanborn resigned from the tax
commission to return to private practice.95
III. SERVICE ON THE RAMSEY COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
On March 2, 1922, while on a trip to Milwaukee, Governor Jacob A.O. Preus telephoned the Minnesota press to announce his
87. See LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1919, supra note 84, at 715.
88. See Sanborn Commissioned, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Dec. 6,1918, at 1.
89. See McDonald, supra note 86. While denying there was a tradition of
military service in his family, see LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1919, supra note 84, Judge
Sanborn was nonetheless a member of the Sons of the American Revolution, the
Society of Colonial Wars, and the American Legion, and he served as senior vice
commander of the Minnesota Commandry of the Loyal Legion. SeeJE. Markham
Dies Here at 81, supra note 63, at 1; Coolidge Names Sanborn, supra note 42, at 1.
Sanborn was proud of his father's military career, read extensively about the Civil
War, and had fond memories of the soldiers' reunions he attended as a boy with
General Sanborn. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supranote 70.
90. Sanborn Resumes Office, ST. PAUL DISPATCH,Jan. 15, 1919, at 10.
91. See LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1919, supra note 84.
92. See Coolidge Names Sanborn, supranote 42, at 9.
93. JULIUS A. SCHMAHL, THE LEGISLATIVE MANUAL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
247 (1921).
94. Id.
95. See Coolidge Names Sanborn, supra note 42, at 1. His clients at that time
included Colonel Thomas Lowry as well as the Twin City Rapid Transit Company,
which he represented in legislative matters. See Sanborn Joins Car Co., ST. PAUL
DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 1921, at 1. Judge Sanborn's cousin, Judge Walter H. Sanborn,
had engineered city approval of Lowry's streetcar line in 1889 while he was serving as a member of the St. Paul city council. See Boyd, supra note 20, at 25.
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appointment of John B. Sanborn, Jr., to replace Judge Hascal R.
Bril96 on the Ramsey County District Court.97 Although he had not
considered himself a candidate and expressed surprise when notified by Governor Preus' secretary, Charles F. Adams, Sanborn enthusiastically accepted the appointment.98
Judge Sanborn was well received by attorneys and parties alike.
He soon gained a reputation as "one of the outstanding figures in
the judiciary of Minnesota; ... a clear thinker, a sound reasoner, of
a naturally judicial temperament, able and absolutely fearless in the
discharge of his duties and [with] the knack, which is rare among
Judges, of expediting business and eliminating non-essentials." 99
He was referred to personally as a "most human judge" 00 who was
known for his tact in upholding the finest traditions of the law and
court, his courage in confronting problems, and his kindness, consideration, and courtesy.101
Judge Sanborn served for three years on the Ramsey County
District Court. 1 2 His first assignment on the court was to preside
over a trial in a civil action brought for damages resulting from an
automobile accident.0 3 Thereafter, Judge Sanborn presided over a
wide variety of cases that involved breach of contract claims, landlord and tenant disputes, mechanics liens, insurance coverage,
taxation, personal injury and negligence claims, sureties, divorces,
debtor and creditor remedies, elections, and real estate transac-

96. The Honorable Hascal R. Brill and Judge Sanborn's cousin, Walter
Henry Sanborn, had been law clerks and young lawyers together in St. Paul. See
Boyd, supra note 20, at 23. On March 1, 1875, after a brief stint on the probate
court, Brill was appointed to the Ramsey County District Court by Governor
Cushman K. Davis. See Proceedings of Minnesota State Bar Association, 8 MINN. L.
REv., 145, 146 (Supp. 1922) [hereinafter MSBA Proceedings 1922]. Judge Brill
served with distinction and was continuously reelected, often without opposition,
until his death on March 1, 1922 - the 47th anniversary of his appointment to the
bench. See id.
97. SeeJB. Sanborn Named To Fill Brill Death Vacancy on Bench, MINNEAPOLIS J.,
Mar. 3, 1922, at 21.
98. See id.
99. Letter from George W. Granger, Attorney at Law, to Calvin Coolidge,
President of the United States (Feb. 28, 1925) (on file with author).
100. Letter from James D. Denegre, Attorney at Law, to Charles B. Warren,
U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 28, 1925) (on file with author).
101. See Letter from H. Vander Meyer, Vice President, The Merchants National Bank, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Feb. 28, 1925)
(on file with author).
102. See Sanborn Memorial,supra note 2, at 4.
103. See Sanborn Ascends Bench, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 1922, at 5.
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tions. 1°4 He enjoyed an excellent reputation as a state district
judge. 10 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court regularly affirmed Judge
Sanborn's decisions, reversing only two of the0 6thirty-two reported
occasions in which his decisions were reviewed.'
104. See, e.g., Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co. v. City of St. Paul, 165 Minn. 8, 207
N.W. 320 (1926) (city's enforcement of special assessment on railroad property);
Friedman Bros. Holding Co. v. Nathan, 165 Minn. 136, 205 N.W. 945 (1925)
(landlord and tenant dispute); Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co. v. City of St. Paul, 165
Minn. 8, 205 N.W. 609 (1925) (city's enforcement of special tax assessment on
railroad property); City of St. Paul v. Bielenberg, 164 Minn. 72, 204 N.W. 544
(1925) (quarry contract dispute between private party and city); Carroll v. St. Paul
Union Depot Co., 164 Minn. 28, 204 N.W. 470 (1925) (negligence); State v. Great
No. Ry. Co., 163 Minn. 88, 203 N.W. 453 (1925) (taxation of borrowed railroad
cars); James B. Clow & Sons v. A.W. Scott Co., 162 Minn. 501, 203 N.W. 410
(1925) (liability of surety on contractor bond); Morton v. Griggs, Cooper & Co.,
162 Minn. 436, 203 N.W. 218 (1925) (billboard contract dispute); Schulte v. Fitch,
162 Minn. 184, 202 N.W. 719 (1925) (challenge to constitutionality of health laws
and regulations); Bowden v. Red Top Cab Co., 161 Minn. 528, 201 N.W. 632
(1925) (personal injuries arising from automobile accident); Olson v. Bolstad, 161
Minn. 419, 201 N.W. 918 (1925) (medical malpractice); Standard Oil Co. v. Day,
161 Minn. 281, 201 N.W. 410 (1924) (liability of surety on contractor bond);
Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Standard Home Bldg. Co., 161 Minn. 143, 201 N.W. 300
(1924) (mechanics liens); Humphrey v. Polski, 161 Minn. 61, 200 N.W. 812
(1924) (insurance coverage dispute); Waller v. Waller, 160 Minn. 431, 200 N.W.
480 (1924) (divorce); Willis v. Continental Cas. Co., 160 Minn. 158, 199 N.W. 899
(1924) (insurance coverage dispute); In re Bridgham's Estate, 158 Minn. 467, 197
N.W. 847 (1924) (inheritance tax); Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 158
Minn. 411, 197 N.W. 833 (1924) (landlord and tenant dispute over sublease);
State v. St. Paul Abstract Co., 158 Minn. 95, 196 N.W. 932 (1924) (taxable property); Goodier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 Minn. 1,196 N.W. 662 (1924) (dispute
over life insurance policy); Rolfe v. Noyes Bros. & Cutler, 157 Minn. 443, 196
N.W. 481 (1923) (libel); Hackett v. Starks, 157 Minn. 411, 196 N.W. 492 (1923)
(building construction dispute); Defender Auto-Lock Co. v. W.H. Schmelzel Co.,
157 Minn. 285, 196 N.W. 263 (1923) (liability of principal for agent); McDonnell
v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 157 Minn. 66, 195 N.W. 538 (1923) (liability of
common carrier); Roach v. Roth, 156 Minn. 107, 194 N.W. 322 (1923) (automobile accident); State v. Rosen, 155 Minn. 412, 193 N.W. 594 (1923) (criminal arson); Troy v. City of St. Paul, 155 Minn. 391, 193 N.W. 726 (1923) (challenge of
building ordinance); City of St. Paul v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 155 Minn.
237, 193 N.W. 175 (1923) (contract dispute); Henning v. McAdam, 155 Minn.
194, 193 N.W. 124 (1923) (mechanics lien); State v. Matson, 155 Minn. 137, 193
N.W. 30 (1923) (constitutional challenge to the Soldier's Preference Act); Lynch
v. Higgins, 154 Minn. 151, 191 N.W. 422 (1923) (real estate contract dispute);
State v. Bloom, 153 Minn. 73, 189 N.W. 582 (1922) (canvassing returns in special
election).
105. Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 10, 1995) (on file with author).
106. See Carroll,164 Minn. at 28, 204 N.W. at 470 (reversing directed verdict
in negligence action); James B. Clow & Sons, 162 Minn. at 501, 203 N.W. at 410
(reversing order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanding
in action involving liability of surety on contractor bond). It was said that Judge
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During his tenure on the bench, Judge Sanborn became
known as being tough on crime.10 7 He believed that individuals
convicted of crimes should be dealt with firmly and in accordance
with the penalties prescribed by the Minnesota Legislature.' 8 This
was particularly true with respect to violators of the liquor laws."'"
On the state bench, prohibition cases made up the majority of his
criminal docket." ° A large segment of the population did not take
these laws seriously."' While Judge Sanborn personally felt that
these liquor laws were foolish, he refused to drink any liquor
throughout prohibition because he had sworn to uphold and enforce these laws."'
In late 1923, Judge Sanborn made it clear to members of the
bar as well as to the community at large that he would enforce the
13
liquor laws as rigorously as any of the state's other criminal laws. 1
Speaking from the bench during the course of a sentencing, he
said:
I was in a great deal of doubt as to the best way to
proceed in handling liquor cases when I was given charge
of the criminal calendar.... I wish to make a statement
so that there may not be any misunderstanding with the
attorneys or accused.
At the outset I was inclined to impose a fine and
workhouse sentence and suspend the latter with one year
probation for the accused as a deterrent to repeating the
offense.
I think this method is effective so far as the individual
is concerned as it is practically certain he will respect the
Sanborn was never reversed during his service on the state district court. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105. This is technically true. The
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed Judge Sanborn only after his appointment to
the federal district court in 1925. See Carroll, 164 Minn. at 28, 204 N.W. at 470;
James B. Clow & Sons, 162 Minn. at 501, 203 N.W. at 410.
107. See Letter from George Heisey, Chief Referee, Federal Bankruptcy
Court, Minneapolis, Minn., to Gunnar Nordbye, DistrictJudge, U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota (July 14, 1964) (on file with author).
108. See Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 10.
109. See Second Woman in Liquor Case to Workhouse, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Nov. 9,
1922, at 1 [hereinafter Second Woman].
110. See Judge McGee, Warned to Give Up Work or Collapse, Ends His Life,
MINNEAPOLIS J., Feb. 16, 1925, at 1 [hereinafter Judge McGee, Warned to Give Up
Work] (noting that "[m]ore than 90 per cent of the time of the [federal district]
court was occupied with liquor cases").
111. See Second Woman, supra note 109, at 1.
112. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70.
113. See Second Woman, supra note 109, at 1.
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probation for the probationary period. But his friends
and others who are inclined to break the law, do not look
on the suspended sentence as a penalty, and are inclined
to treat it lightly, when they see the offender free from the
service of the sentence, and getting off with the payment
of the fine.
So far as the public is concerned they also are inclined to look lightly at this method, for when the offender goes back home, they fail to realize he is under a
severe penalty, which will become effective if he transgresses the rules or violates the law within the probation
period.
The general public and especially those inclined to
violate this law should be made to realize that it was made
to be enforced and should be enforced as much as any
other law. A person who comes in and pleads guilty now
to violation of the liquor law should serve some time in
the workhouse. The punishment must fit the crime and
while there are individual cases where suspension of sentence is proper, this may be determined by the court by
investigation of the case by probation officers.
Many of those accused go into the business through
ignorance of the law and its penalties, and these may be
more entitled to more leniency than those who know and
realize what it means. Second offenders surely do not
come into this class, nor do those whose experience
should give them knowledge of the law and what violation
of it means. If an offense against this law is worthy of punishment, the offender should be punished by serving a
term in the workhouse. 4
Upon concluding these remarks, Judge Sanborn sentenced a
fifty-one-year-old homemaker and mother of three to the workhouse.1 5 Noting her husband's conviction on similar charges a
year earlier, Judge Sanborn stated that this "should have been sufficient notice to the
accused that it was a violation of the law to
' 6
make moonshine."
The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Roach v. Roth"7

114. Id.

115. See id. (describing the sentencing of Mrs. John Stayman on Nov. 2,
1922).

116. Id. at 5.
117. 156 Minn. 107, 194 N.W. 322 (1923).
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4
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provides a glimpse of Judge Sanborn as a presiding trial judge in a
civil matter. The case arose from a head-on collision between a
truck and an automobile." 8 At the point of collision, the truck had
crossed over the center line and into the path of oncoming traffic. 19 Judge Sanborn charged the jury as a matter of law that "the
defendant [truck driver] was at fault, that he violated the law of the
road in cutting the intersection, and was liable for the proximate
result of his violation of the statute, unless the negligence of the
plaintiff proximately contributed to his injury.", 20 Upon receiving

this charge and beginning their deliberations, some of the jurors
questioned whether the law of comparative negligence applied.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court quoted the colloquy between the jurors andJudge Sanborn:
Juror: There is some question regarding placing the
blame equally or partially on both plaintiff and defendant. If we come to award a verdict in any sum of money
in favor of the plaintiff, for instance, if we feel that Roth
was to blame for 75 per cent, and Roach for 25, can we arrive at any amount?
The Court: If you find that [plaintiff] Roach was negligent in any degree whatsoever, then your verdict would have
to be for the defendant. There is no such doctrine as
comparative negligence in this state and if a man contributes even in the slightest degree to his own injury, he
cannot recover anything, even though the other party may
have been guilty of negligence also. So that if you find in
this case Roach was guilty of contributory negligence and
that his negligence either caused or contributed in the
slightest degree to the injuries received, your verdict
would be for the defendant.
Juror: No damage for the machine?
The Court: No damages. Any man that is guilty of contributory negligence cannot recover if that negligence directly contributed to the injuries he received. I have covered that in my charge. If the collision was caused by the
combined negligence of Roach and Roth your verdict
must be for the defendant regardless of the negligence of
118. Id. at 108, 194 N.W. at 323. The crash occurred near the intersection
of Summit and Lexington Avenues in St. Paul, not far from the current location
of William Mitchell College of Law. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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each. 121
Appellant Roach objected to Judge Sanborn's use of the
phrase, "in any degree whatsoever," arguing that it tended to emphasize the presence of negligence in the plaintiff and its effect
upon the final result.2 2 In reviewing this question, the supreme
court acknowledged the difficulties faced by trial judges in avoiding
the use of "language of an opinion or text [which], though accurate, may not be appropriate in a charge to the jury."'1 3 The supreme court commended Judge Sanborn in making an accurate
2
statement of the law that "was not misleading or confusing": 1
It relieved the jury of its confusion and led it to a correct
understanding of the law. It was the trial court's duty to
give the jury help. If it had contented itself with an answer in the negative there would have been no error.
That answer would have been curt treatment of the jury.
The jury needed some emphasis upon the effect of contributory negligence and received helpful explanation.
The court gave the needed assistance without undue emphasis. The charge was not unfair in its tone.... The
charge in a fair way relieved the jury of the confusion in
which it was wandering in its effort to measure the degrees of fault of each. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that there was error.125
More than simply demonstrating Judge Sanborn's knowledge of
the law, this case reflects his understanding of his role as a trial
court judge presiding over jury trials. Judge Sanborn's personal
experience in making the difficult decisions that arise during trials
also contributed to the great empathy and deference he would
later show trial judges when, as a circuit judge, he reviewed appeals
from the district court.
State court proceedings tended to be less formal and trial
judges were subject to a lesser degree of appellate scrutiny than in
federal district court. 2 6 Later, as a federal judge, Sanborn would
remark on the substantial differences between the procedures, ex-

121.
122.
123.
Piepho v.
124.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 110, 194 N.W. at 324.
Roach v. Roth, 156 Minn. 107, 110-11, 194 N.W. 322, 324 (1923) (citing
M. Sigbert-Arves Co., 152 Minn. 315, 188 N.W. 998, 999 (1922)).
Id. at 112, 194 N.W. at 324.

125. Id.
126. See Proceedings of Minnesota State Bar Association, 13
111 (Supp. 1928).
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4
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pectations, and level of appellate review in federal court as op12 7
posed to that which he had experienced as a state court judge.
While he enjoyed both experiences immensely, Judge Sanborn
probably "had more fun on the state side." 28
Shortly after Sanborn's appointment to the trial bench, a senior attorney told him, "Remember, John, no man was ever good
enough to be ajudge."129 Judge Sanborn took these words to heart.
As a judge, he strove to do his best, he was always kind and considerate, and throughout his tenure he maintained his sense of humor and genuine fondness for the people around him.5
Although his service on the state trial court was relatively brief,
Judge Sanborn valued the experience, including the challenges of
trial work and the close and constant association he had with the
Ramsey County bar.'
It was also during this time that he developed many of his 3close
and longstanding relationships with other
2
state court judges.
Nearly half a century later, Gunnar H. Nordbye, who was a
municipal judge in Minneapolis at the time Sanborn was appointed
to the Ramsey County District Court, described Judge Sanborn on
the bench:
As a trial judge, while he always controlled his Court, he
did so with dignity and was gracious to witnesses and considerate and helpful to the members of the Bar.... [Hie
was quick to grasp the real issues of the case being tried or
presented. He was a gentle, courteous man and was possessed of an unusual quality of common sense, analytical
ability, and courage. He had an untiring capacity for
work and a prodigious memory for applicable decisions
and legal precedents. He was firm in his convictions of
what was right and wrong and did not deviate from them
although he always was tolerant of the views of others. 3'
"With these attributes, coupled with his complete integrity and
honesty," Judge Nordbye concluded, "one readily understands why
127. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supranote 105.
128. Id.
129. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Memorial Proceedingsfor
Judge Seth Thomas, 314 F.2d 5, 16 (8th Cir. 1962) [hereinafter Judge Thomas Memoia].
130. See Whittaker, supra note 17, at 198; Nordbye, supranote 12, at 201-02.
131. See Telephone Interview with Earl Larson, District Judge, U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota (Jan. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
132. Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 9.
133. Id. at 10.
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John B. Sanborn [became] one of the great judges of the Na-

tion.,,134
IV. SERVICE ON THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

On February 15, 1925, Judge John F. McGee of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota committed suicide in the
federal courthouse in Minneapolis. 3 5 Judge McGee, who had been
appointed two years earlier, was advised by his doctors just days before his death that he was near collapse from exhaustion caused by
his rigorous work schedule and extremely heavy docket.

36

Ulti-

mately, the realization that he was both physically and emotionally
unable
to continue at this breakneck pace was more than he could
13 7
bear.

On the day following Judge McGee's death, letters, telegrams,
and petitions from Minnesota lawyers and judges began to pour
into the President's and Attorney General's offices in Washington,
D.C., recommending thatJudge Sanborn fill the vacancy created by
Judge McGee's death.'m While other individuals were mentioned
134. Id.
135. SeeJudge McGee, Warned to Give Up Work, supranote 110, at 1.
136. See id. at 2. Judge McGee drove himself relentlessly to dispose of a tidal
wave of prohibition cases while remaining current with the other matters on his
docket. See id. at 1. His "sentence a minute" brand of justice generated a great
deal of publicity, as well as scores of enemies who threatened his life. See id.
At one session of the court 112 sentences were imposed in 130 minutes,
60 of them being for jail terms, while $33,700 in fines was imposed.
Sightseeing buses were pressed into service to [take] prisoners to the
jails. Another day 46 men were sentenced to jail in a two-hour session.
Id. at 2.
137. See id. at 1. In a statement he left before taking his own life, Judge
McGee wrote:
I have, against the advice of my associates and others, held court since I
went on the bench in March, 1923, six days in the week instead of five,
and seven and one half hours a day instead of five, winter and summer
without vacations, the matters heard and submitted piling up except
when taken home nights and Sundays and worked on there....
The fact is that the United States District Court has become a police court for the trial of whiskey and narcotic cases which the state
courts should look after.
Those cases occupy 80 per cent of the court's time and are exciting
and trying on the nerves, with the end not in sight.
I started work in March 1923, to rush that branch of the litigation
and thought I would end it, but it has ended me.
Id.
138. See, e.g.,
Letter from George W. Morgan, Attorney at Law, Davis, Sever-
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as possible nominees, including former Congressman Andrew J.
Volstead 3 9 and then-Congressman Walter H. Newton,'O Judge Sanborn enjoyed the overwhelming support of the local bar.14 ' Additionally, his colleagues on the Ramsey County District Court recommended him "as a fearless, impartial, able Judge, possessing
"4
keen legal acumen and admirable judicial temperament. , 2
Judge Sanborn not only enjoyed a fine reputation for his skill
as a member of the state court bench, but he was also healthy and
relatively young. The St. Paul Dispatch noted the importance of
these qualities: "The collapse ofJudge McGee under the heavy load
of work upon him should demonstrate the importance of appointing a man of vigor and capacity for service to the post. '' 14 Perhaps
the most important point in Sanborn's favor, however, was the lack
of a federal district judge in St. Paul. 44 This situation created significant practical problems for St. Paul attorneys who "were forced
to come over to Minneapolis to reach the judge unless
they delayed
145
their matters until the weekly term day in St. Paul."
Many distinguished members of the judiciary, including Walter H. Sanborn, then the presiding judge on the Eighth Circuit,
ance & Morgan, to James M. Beck, Acting U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 16, 1925)
(on file with author).
139. See Letter from D.E. Tawney, Attorney at Law, Tawney, Smith &
Tawney, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Mar. 3, 1925) (on file
with author).
140. See Letter from Francis Ralston Welsh, Judge, U.S. District Court for
the Fourth Minnesota Judicial District, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the
United States (Mar. 4, 1925) (on file with author).
141. See Telegram from John A. Burns, President, Ramsey County Bar Association, and Milton C. Lightner, Secretary, Ramsey County Bar Association, to
Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Mar. 4, 1925) (giving Sanborn
endorsement of Ramsey County Bar Association Executive Committee); see also
Telegram from John A. Burns, President, Ramsey County Bar Association, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Mar. 2, 1925) (giving Sanborn personal endorsement).
142. Telegram from Olin B. Lewis, Judge, Ramsey County District Court, et.
al., to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Feb. 24, 1925); see also Sanborn For Federal Bench: Seven District Court Colleagues Urge Appointment to Succeed
McGee, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Feb. 25, 1925, at 16 (quoting entire telegram and
noting that all seven district court judges supported the recommendation).
143. Sanborn for FederalJudge,ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 1925, at 10.
144. See Letter from F.W. Root, Attorney at Law, to Thomas D. Schall, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 27, 1925) (on file with author).
145. Id.
146. See Letter from Walter H. Sanborn, Presiding Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to Harlan Stone, U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 26, 1925) (on
file with author). Walter H. Sanborn wrote that his cousin
is a man of the highest character and principles.... He is a broad
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also favored Judge Sanborn's proposed nomination. 4 7 Prominent
native sons Frank Kellogg, Cordenio A. Severance, and Pierce Butler were called upon to exert their significant influence in Washington on behalf of the Sanborn nomination.148 However, one of
Minnesota's senators, the Honorable Henrik Shipstead, apparently
favored Minneapolis attorney George Simpson for appointment to
the federal district court. 149 According to one observer, this split
between supporters such as Kellogg and Shipstead placed Thomas
D. Schall, Minnesota's newly-elected senator and law school classmate ofJudge Sanborn,' 5° in a key position to determine the nomination. 15 One of Judge Sanborn's supporters, St. Paul businessman F.W. Root, summed up the situation in a letter to Senator
Schall:
I have no doubt that Mr. Kellog [sic] will give his earnest
support to Judge Sanborn. This because Sanborn has all
the qualifications and Kellogg may reason, as do others,
that St. Paul should have a Federal judge. Now I feel
quite sure that Dr. Shipstead will support George Simpson. If I am right in the foregoing, then it undoubtedly
means that you [Schall] "hold the winning card." This
has been talked over among the lawyers here and it has
been argued that you would naturally join with Kellogg
for a St. Paul man. This because with so many candidates
minded, unprejudiced man, of sound judgment, gifted with an unusually
powerful intellect, studious and learned in the law, industrious and efficient. If he is appointed United States district judge, in my opinion, he
will be an honor to the district court and his work will meet the commendation of lawyers and litigants. I heartily recommend his appointment.
Id.
147. See Telegram from S.B. Wilson, Chief Justice, Minnesota Supreme
Court, to Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 28, 1925) (on file with
author). Other supporters included Frederick G. Ingersoll, a prominent St. Paul
attorney and member of the State Republican Committee; and both Judge Booth
and Judge Cant of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. See Letter
from Francis Ralston Welsh, Judge, U.S. District Court for the Fourth Minnesota
Judicial District, to Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States (Feb. 27, 1925)
(the author's copy of this letter contains no signature, but another letter from
Judge Francis Ralston Welsh to Harry S. New, U.S. Postmaster General (Feb. 27,
1925) refers to an enclosure of the letter to President Coolidge) (on file with
author).
148. See id.
149. See Letter from F.W. Root to Thomas D. Schall, supra note 144.
150. See Duane Galles, Mitchell to Mark Diamond Anniversary: College's Founders
Were Legal Reformers of Their Day, WM. MITCHELL OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), Apr.
1974, at 5.
151. See Letter from F.W. Root to Thomas D. Schall, supranote 144.
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in Minneapolis, all old friends of yours, you could not favor one above another without leaving a bad feeling with
those you did not favor; but you would avoid this by supporting the St. Paul man, there being 5 strong
reasons as
2
stated above in favor of a St. Pauljudge.
Notwithstanding the maneuvering to nominate him to fill the
vacancy left by Judge McGee, Judge Sanborn actually was nominated and appointed to replace Judge Wilbur Booth in a vacancy
that coincidentally occurred at the same time.
When the Judiciary Act of 1925 created two new judgeships in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,14 President Calvin Coolidge selected Judge Booth to fill one of the newjudgeships. 5 5 The President accepted the recommendation and Judge Booth was appointed to the Eighth Circuit. 6 Judge Sanborn was then
appointed to replace Judge Booth. 57
At forty-one years old, Judge Sanborn was one of the youngest
federal judges in the nation. 5 8 He was also the first native Minnesotan appointed to sit on the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota. 19
152. Id.
153. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 30.
154. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43, Stat. 936 (1925).
155. See id. Judge Booth enjoyed great respect and bipartisan support due
to his distinguished service on the Hennepin County District Court and later, the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota (to which he was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914). See FETTER, supra note 8, at 31.
The strong bipartisan support for Judge Booth - a Democrat - was demonstrated
by the fact that President Coolidge appointed Judge Booth to the Eighth Circuit,
having received recommendations from ChiefJustice William Howard Taft, Associate Justice Willis Van Devanter, and the Republican Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (citing George P. Douglas, Remarks at Wilbur F. Booth Memorial, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 18 (Sept. 4, 1944)). See FETTER,
supranote 8, at 31.
156. SeeFETrER, supra note 8, at 31.
157. See Coolidge Names Sanborn, supra note 42, at 1. The Honorable Joseph
W. Molyneaux, then a member of the Hennepin County District Court, was appointed to replace Judge McGee. See id. Judge Sanborn's good friend Gunnar
Nordbye, then a municipal judge in Hennepin County, was appointed to replace
Judge Molyneaux on the Hennepin County District Court. See id.; Telephone Interview with Thomas Lovett, former clerk for Judge Dennis F. Donovan (Nov. 27,
1996) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Kenneth DeWirth, supra
note 49.
158. See Coolidge Names Sanborn, supranote 42, at 1.
159. See HISTORY OF U.S. DIsTRICT COURT FOR MINNESOTA, supra note 1, at 7.
Upon receiving unofficial notification of his confirmation from Senator Schall,
Sanborn expressed his appreciation to his multitude of supporters: "I am very
grateful to my friends and to the bench and bar of the state for the efforts they
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Upon taking the oath as federal district judge, he immediately
faced the same swell of prohibition cases that had destroyed Judge
McGee. This heavy workload was made even worse when the federal district court, already understaffed with only
three judges, lost
1 60
the services ofJudge Molyneaux due to illness.
In 1925, when Judge Sanborn joined the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota, the court sat in Winona, Fergus Falls,
Mankato, and Duluth, as well as Minneapolis and St. Paul. 61 The
court would sit in each of these locations two months a year, and
hold special
terms one day a week in Duluth, St. Paul, and Min52
neapolis.

During his seven-year tenure as a judge on the U.S. District
Court, Judge Sanborn published more than one hundred opinions.16 These opinions were focused, practical, informed, and
generally short - often only one or two pages long. He tended to
quote pertinent authority rather than present lengthy dissertations
of the facts or agonizing interpretations of earlier decisions. 64 He
applied the law in a straightforward, common sense, and uncomplicated manner.165 His close friend and colleague, the Honorable
Dennis F. Donovan, who later served on the U.S. District Court for
the District of Minnesota,
referred to the "customary clarity of
' 66

JudgeJohn B. Sanborn.'

1

A kind and gracious man in person, Judge Sanborn did not
have made in my behalf.... I feel they have been entirely responsible for my appointment." Senate Confirms Sanborn, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 19, 1925, at 1.
160. See May Be Able To Fish Now, supra note 40, at 1.
161. See STEVENS, supra note 21, at 89.
162. See E. Catherine Neff, Paper delivered to St. Louis County Historical
Society on the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and
Judges Nelson to Devitt (May 23, 1956) (unpublished paper on file with author).
Five decades later, at the dedication of the new United States Courthouse in Minneapolis, Judge Sanborn remarked that as a judge he had presided in almost
every kind of structure, including "a shed." Letter from George Heisey to Gunnar
Nordbye, supra note 107; see also Letter from Michael J. Galvin, Attorney at Law,
Briggs and Morgan, to Thomas H. Boyd, Attorney at Law, Winthrop & Weinstine,
P.A. (Aug. 29, 1994) (on file with author).
163. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
164. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 203.
165. See id.
166. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 101 F.
Supp. 978, 980 (D. Minn. 1952) (citing In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R. Co., 50 F.2d 430 (D. Minn. 1931)). Judge Sanborn's fondness and respect
for Judge Donovan was mutual. Judge Sanborn referred to Judge Donovan as a
trial judge "whose long 'experience with the mainsprings of human conduct' we
regard as unsurpassed." United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666, 671 (8th Cir.
1962); see also Telephone Interview with Thomas Lovett, supra note 157.
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hesitate to impose his authority as a federal judge when necessary
"to maintain the dignity of this court and its reputation as an institution. " 117 Yet he also understood when judicial power must be
subordinated to the policymaking and legislative functions of other
branches of the government, and he deferred to the proper exercise of authority by these branches, even when he disagreed personally with the impact or result of the authority and discretion exercised by those branches.
In United States v. Walters,"" for example, Judge Sanborn de-

clared void under the applicable federal statute a conveyance of
land made by an Indian allottee.9 The purchaser argued that re-

cent congressional amendments to the federal legislation in question had created confusion that caused him to believe the transaction was lawful and valid. 70 Although sympathetic to the purchaser,
Judge Sanborn was forced to reject this argument: "From a moral
standpoint, there is much to this contention, but, if a moral wrong
was committed by Congress in that regard, it is the body to
whom
171
the defendant Walters should apply, and not to the courts."
He understood individual inequities could occur in the pursuit
of broader policy objectives. For instance, he observed that a case
involving liability for freight charges under the Interstate Commerce Act presented "another instance of individual hardship
caused by the policy of the government," 72 as articulated in the
statute, "in order to secure uniformity of charges for transportation
and to prevent discrimination." 77 In another example, Judge Sanborn was forced to dismiss a case where industrial landowners chal-

167. United States v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Minn. 1931); see also
Frederick L. Johnson, From Leavenworth to Congress: The ImprobableJourney of Francis
H. Shoemaker, MINN. HISTORY, Spring 1989, at 168-70 (describing Judge Sanborn's

fair but stern treatment of Francis H. Shoemaker, a congressional Farmer/Labor
candidate and newspaper editor convicted of sending "scurrilous and defamatory
material through the mails").
168. 17 F.2d 116 (D. Minn. 1926).

169. Id. at 118.
170. Id. at 116-17.
171. Id. at 117.
172. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Central Warehouse Co., 14 F.2d
123, 124 (D. Minn. 1926).

173. Id. at 124-25; see also Delmar Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 34 F.2d 221,
222 (D. Minn. 1929) (affirming an Interstate Commerce Commission finding for
a plaintiff regarding a traditional interpretation of tariff law, while acknowledging
that "were this a case of first impression,. . . the contention of the defendant
should be sustained").
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74
lenged the legitimacy of a municipal zoning ordinance:
In spite of the fact that I think that the city has dealt un-

justly with these complainants .... who had improved

their property long prior to the going into effect of this
ordinance, and who had no doubt helped to build up the
section of the city in question, I cannot say that it is "plain
and palpable" that the restrictions placed upon the use of
their property by the city "has no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or to the general
welfare," or that "the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes" is not "fairly debatable." 75
His hands were similarly tied by the law in Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Union State Bank,7 6 a banking subrogation case in which Judge
Sanborn wrote:
While I think that the penalty which the plaintiff suffered
by reason of its error in turning over these checks to [defendant] is too severe, and that, as a matter of ethics, it
was more entitled to the money than the bank, because,
but for the unfortunate mistake, the bank would never
have had it, I am unable to formulate any rule to bring
about that result which would not do violence to established rules of law or be thoroughly impractical in general
operation.17

These cases demonstrate Judge Sanborn's concern for fairness
and his commitment to the straightforward application of the law.
His decisions also reveal a compassionate, as well as pragmatic, side
of the man.

In United States v. Mabel Elevator Co.,'

8

for example,

where the government sought to assess a deficiency against a taxpayer who had filed an incorrect return in good faith, Judge Sanborn wrote:
It comes down to the question as to whether, when a tax174. See American Wood Prods. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 21 F.2d 440, 445
(D. Minn. 1927).
175. Id.
176. 21 F.2d 102 (D. Minn. 1927).
177. Id. at 106.
178. 17 F.2d 109 (D. Minn. 1925). The lawsuit arose because the company
prepared its tax returns on a fiscal year basis with a year end of July 31. See id. at
109. On May 28, 1924, the elevator company was instructed by the government to
complete income and excess profits tax returns for periods after 1918 on a calendar year basis. See id. No return was filed for the period Aug. 1, 1917, to Dec. 31,
1917, and the government assessed the taxpayer $2915.73 for this period. See id.
The company failed on appeal to the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, which disallowed
the deficiency in the tax as determined by the commissioner. See id. at 110.
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payer makes an honest return, which he believes to be in
compliance with the law, the government can assess a deficiency against him.., on the ground that it was not in
strict compliance with the law. This question, it seems to
me, must be answered in the negative... 179
Judge Sanborn viewed jurisdictional restrictions - perhaps
grudgingly at times - as paramount and absolute with respect to
the exercise of his authority as a federal judge. He would permit a
cause of action to advance where federal jurisdiction existed even
though "it is the sort of case that the court should refuse jurisdiction of if it has any right to do so. " 1'° Judge Sanborn faced such a
case in Doyle v. Northern PacificRailway. Co.,18' in which he wrote that

"this court should not refuse to try a case removed to it from 8 a2 state
court which would have tried it had it not been transferred."
Judge Sanborn was concerned with the careful exercise of the
federal court system's authority to maintain but not expand its jurisdiction over matters that were more properly heard in the state
court system.1 3 Many of his published opinions on the federal district court involved petitions for remand of cases that had been
removed to federal court.14 Judge Sanborn frequently granted the
petitions and remanded the matters to state court. l 5 In those cases
179. Id. at 110.
180. Doyle v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 55 F.2d 708, 709 (D. Minn. 1932).
181. See id.
182. Id. at 709-10. Sanborn went on to note:
We are told, in effect, that we have a duty to try cases of which we have
jurisdiction .... There is something quite objectionable about assuming
jurisdiction of a case the prosecution of which has been lawfully
enjoined by a thoroughly respectable court of another jurisdiction. It
creates the feeling that this court is an aider and abettor in the violation
of the injunction and is in a sense in contempt of the court whose
injunction it helps the plaintiff to violate. However, the decisions of the
Minnesota Supreme Court are respectable authority for the proposition
that comity does not require that such injunctions be respected in the
state of Minnesota, and I find no federal cases to the contrary. I reach
the conclusion that I am without power to refuse jurisdiction or to
dismiss upon any of the grounds urged by the defendants.

Id.
183. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 201-02.
184. See infra note 185 (citing examples of Judge Sanborn's opinions with
petitions for remand of cases removed to federal court).
185. See, e.g., Beaudin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 52
F.2d 811, 812-13 (D. Minn. 1931); Enger v. Northern Fin. Corp., 31 F.2d 136, 142
(D. Minn. 1929); Nelson v. Arcade Inv. Co., 30 F.2d 695, 696 (D. Minn. 1929);
Noethe v. Mann, 27 F.2d 451, 452 (D. Minn. 1928); Moulton v. National Farmers'
Bank, 27 F.2d 403, 406 (D. Minn. 1928); Geffers v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
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that were "not free from doubt," he resolved the doubt in favor of
granting the petition for remand. 1 16 In his mind, the removing
party could not be unfairly prejudiced by remand if there was no
basis for federal jurisdiction in the first place:
Where no injury will be done to any one, where the
federal court has been asked for no relief, where no actual consent to its jurisdiction has been obtained, and
where there has been nothing but mere delay, without
any showing of prejudice resulting therefrom, I am of the
opinion that a party who has improperly removed such a
case as this can have no just cause for complaint if it is
sent back to the court where it was commenced. He is
simply required to forego some real or fancied advantage
in the matter of jurisdiction to which he was not entitled
under law."17
At the same time, he did not believe the right to proceed in
federal court should be denied for arbitrary reasons. In Moulton v.
National Farmers' Bank,"" Judge Sanborn acknowledged the incon-

gruity of a rule wherein a receiver was not a necessary party in the
lawsuit even though "he is a very necessary party when it comes to
the payment of the claims established against the bank.' ' 81 9

Al-

though he was compelled under the law to remand the case, he
wrote, "The situation appears to be one which might well be called
to the attention of Congress."' 90
In Glynn v. Krippner,'9' Judge Sanborn wrote a remarkable
opinion that demonstrated how his powerful logic and strong sense
of pragmatism could - and did on at least one occasion - overcome

his otherwise strict obedience to superior authority and binding
precedent. 92
' Glynn was a personal injury action arising from a twocar collision in which Judge Sanborn believed the plaintiff was conR.R. Co., 25 F.2d 774, 775 (D. Minn. 1928); American Fountain Supply & Prods.
Co. v. California Crushed Fruit Corp., 21 F.2d 93, 94 (D. Minn. 1927); Thompson
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 14 F.2d 230, 231 (D. Minn. 1926).
186. See, e.g., Nelson, 30 F.2d at 696.
187. Noethe, 27 F.2d at 452.
188. 27 F.2d 403 (D. Minn. 1928).
189.

Id. at 406.

190. Id.
191. 47 F.2d 281 (D. Minn. 1931).
192. See Sanborn Decision Contradicts Ruling Of Supreme Court, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PREss, Feb. 22, 1931, at 5. It is possible that Judge Sanborn may have
been inspired in this case by his own - and seemingly uncharacteristic - habit of
driving automobiles at high rates of speed. See Telephone Interview with Kenneth
DeWirth, supra note 49.
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tributorily negligent as a matter of law.1 93 Consistent with his strong
belief that cases should be given to the jury, Judge Sanborn declined to grant a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of
evidence. 94 After the jury failed to find fault on the part of the
plaintiff,"" Judge Sanborn was restricted by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. 19 6 from entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 97 In this case, he
deemed the most prudent and reasonable course under the circumstances was expressly to depart from this clear authority:
I am fully aware of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States to the effect that judgment
notwithstanding the verdict cannot be granted by a federal court ....
In the trial of an action at law, the court,
at the close of the testimony, upon motion of one of the
parties, may direct the jury to bring in a verdict for him if
the law requires that course. The jury has absolutely
nothing to say about it. It is the equivalent to ordering
judgment.
Judge Sanborn accurately noted the absence of logic in a rule that
limited the trial judge to the difficult choice of either taking a case
from the jurors after they had heard all the evidence or risking the
chance of an improper verdict.' 99
Judge Sanborn's decision to deviate from Supreme Court
193. Glynn, 47 F.2d at 283.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 228 U.S. 364, 427-28 (1913).
197. Glynn, 47 F.2d at 283.
198. Id.
199. Id. Judge Sanborn explained his decision:
What possible justification is there for denying the court the right, after
trial and verdict, to grant the judgment which should have been granted
during the trial? The parties are the same; the record is the same; the
only thing that is lacking is the presence of the jury, which performs no
function whatever, so far as questions of law are concerned, at any time
either during or after trial....
To grant a new trial in this case will do no one any good. The question of the negligence of the defendants was properly submitted to the
jury and was determined adversely to them. That question ought not to
be relitigated, and they do not ask that it be relitigated. If my conclusion
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
is correct, the defendants are entitled to judgment against the plaintiff,
and they are just as much entitled to it now as they were when the jury
was present. If I am wrong, a reversal will reinstate the judgment for
plaintiff, and that will end the case.
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precedent was a calculated acknowledgment of the vital, everchanging composition of that institution.

°

Specifically, he ob-

served that the binding precedent in question had been issued by a
divided court several years before with Justices Hughes, Holmes,
201
Lurton, and Pitney joining in "clear and exhaustive" dissent.
Judge Sanborn went on to opine: "It seems to me very probable
that the Supreme Court of the United States as now constituted is
unlikely to hold again that the Constitution prohibits the granting
of judgment notwithstanding the verdict."202 Accordingly, he expressed his "hope that the Court of Appeals may see fit to certify
the question of the right of a federal court to grant such judgment
where the laws of the state permit that practice,
to the Supreme
203
Court of the United States for reconsideration."
The panel that reviewed the decision on behalf of the Eighth
Circuit - the court to which Judge Sanborn had been appointed by
the time this appeal was under consideration - assigned a district
judge sitting by designation to author the opinion reversing Judge
204
Sanborn's ruling. Writing for the panel, the Honorable Merrill
E. Otis of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri was surprisingly brash in dealing with Judge Sanborn's rulings on both the contributory negligence issue and the posttrial
motion.0 3 Judge Otis framed the initial issue by writing, "Can any
reasonable man conclude from the facts and circumstances in evidence that [the plaintiff] used the care an ordinary careful and
prudent man would have used?"20 6 He then noted, "That is the

question which the District Court twice answered in the affirmative
when it denied motions for directed verdict and finally in the negative when, upon fuller consideration, it sustained the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict."20 7 Judge Otis reviewed the
facts in the record and observed that the speed with which the
events occurred is
an element all too likely to be overlooked when the situation is viewed.., in the quiet of judicial chambers. He
who would decide whether another has used ordinary
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Glynn v. Krippner, 47 F.2d 281, 283 (D. Minn. 1931).
Glynn v. Krippner, 60 F.2d 406, 410 (8th Cir. 1932) (Otis, J.).
See id. at 407.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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care at a highway intersection should make that decision,
not in his library, not by the aid of diagrams and models
which he slowly moves by hand upon his diagrams,.. . but
in an automobile passing an intersection at 30, 40, or 50
miles an hour. 08
Continuing with this theme, Judge Otis admonished, "We do not
look into the books to determine whether one has used ordinary
care in a given set of circumstances but to the circumstances and to
the standards indicated by common experience and observation."2°'
Regarding Judge Sanborn's ruling on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Judge Otis wrote that "It]he
learned judge in his opinion calls attention to the fact that [Slocum]
21 0
was by a divided court and that four of the Justices dissented."
Otis continued:
The dissenting opinion in the Slocum case seems to us, as
it seemed to the trial judge, convincing. But it is a dissenting opinion. While laymen may think a decision of the
Supreme Court which is not unanimous is less authoritative than one that is, courts cannot give countenance to
that misconception."'
Concluding this line of thought, Judge Otis wrote, "When a question has been decided by the Supreme Court, it is, so far as
212 the inferior federal courts are concerned, a question no longer."
Although Judge Sanborn's suggestion to certify the question
was met with a frosty reception by the court of appeals, it was not
long before he was vindicated. In Baltimore & CarolinaLine, Inc. v.
Redman,13 the U.S. Supreme Court modified its earlier decision in
Slocum expressly to allow district judges to reserve ruling on motions for directed2 1verdicts
or questions of law until after the jury re4
turned its verdict.
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id.
210. Glynn v. Krippner, 60 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1932).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
214. Id. at 659-61. In Baltimore & CarolinaLine, the plaintiff brought an action in federal court in New York to "recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff through the defendant's negligence." Id. at 656.
The Baltimore court noted that there "was a well established practice of reserving
questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking verdicts subject to the
ultimate ruling on the questions reserved." Id. at 659. The court held that "in
view of the common-law practice and the related state statute, we reach the conclusion that the judgment of reversal for the error in denying the motions should
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Judge Sanborn served as a federal judge at a time when St.
Paul and the nation were facing a serious crime wave:
In the twenties in the District of Minnesota there existed a
general laxity in the enforcement of certain Federal
criminal laws. In a number of instances penal statutes
were enforced in a mediocre fashion or not at all. For instance, aliens were being hauled in truck loads across the
Canadian border with impunity. In the Twin Cities narcotic drug addiction and commercial peddling were widespread. Incidental to prohibition, so-called "rackets" were
flourishing. Upon his appointment to the Federal bench
in 1925, Judge Sanborn manifested an intense interest in
effective law enforcement. He heartened and endeared
himself to the then Federal prosecutors and law enforcement officers who were disposed to exert themselves in
the public behalf. Among other things, arrangements
were made whereby Judge Sanborn disposed of Federal
criminal matters not only in term time but out-of-term
time anywhere in the entire district in any kind of a strucpurpose.215
ture that was available for the
As a district court judge, Judge Sanborn ruled in the government's favor in every one of his published criminal cases. 6 His
analysis was always well-grounded in the established law of the time
and clearly consistent with the manner in which other district court
judges were handling these same issues.1 7
Many of his decisions in criminal cases reflect a presumption
of reasonable behavior on the part of law enforcement agents and
prosecutors, as well as a common sense approach that resisted the
imposition of unreasonable and impractical limitations on governmental authorities.2 ' For example, in United States v. Fogel,21 9 the
embody a direction for a judgment of dismissal on the merits, and not for a new
trial." Id. at 661.
215. Letter from George Heisey to Gunnar Nordbye, supra note 107. "Out
of term" decisions occur "[a]t a time when no term of the court is being held; in
the vacation or interval which elapses between terms of the court." BLAcK's LAW
DIcTIONARY 1102 (6th ed. 1990).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Minn. 1931);
United States v. Kennedy, 45 F.2d 433, 435 (D. Minn. 1930); United States v. Pleason, 26 F.2d 104, 106 (D. Minn. 1928); United States v. Wiggins, 22 F.2d 1001,
1002 (D. Minn. 1927); United States v. Carlson, 17 F.2d 628, 630 (D. Minn. 1927);
United States v. Fogel, 22 F.2d 823, 825 (D. Minn. 1926); United States v. Fogel,
22 F.2d 826, 826 (D. Minn. 1926).
217. See Whittaker, supra note 17, at 198-99.
218. See, e.g., Wiggins, 22 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134,
136 (D. Minn. 1926).

https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4

32

1997]

HONORABLEJOHN
B. SANBORN,R
Boyd: THE
The Life
and Career of the Honorable
John B. Sanborn, Jr.

defendant faced the presumption of probable cause created when
he was indicted by the government for violation of the National
Prohibition Act.

220

Although the defendant was a former police-

man and the head of St. Paul's "Purity Squad," and Judge Sanborn
himself believed that he was not guilty of the charge, the judge still
upheld the indictment and extradited the defendant for trial in
federal court in Ohio.22'
In United States v. Wiggins,

Judge Sanborn upheld an arrest

warrant that had been issued in a prohibition case involving a large
still located on a farm near Rosemount, Minnesota.223 The prohibition agent who made the arrest and conducted the subsequent
search that turned up a "bottle of intoxicating liquor" had been
advised that a faded blue Buick had been seen approaching and
224
The agent had arrested persons who drove
leaving the farm.
onto the property in a vehicle meeting this description. 25 In upholding the arrest and search, Judge Sanborn stated, "It would
seem reasonable to assume that no one would come upon those
premises, except some one who had to do with the still or the operations of the distillery."2

26

Moreover, he observed, apparently re-

ferring to the business suits worn by the defendants when they were
arrested, "[I] t might be said that the appearance of the defendants
themselves was sufficient to indicate that they were not there for
any purpose connected with agriculture." 7
Judge Sanborn was critical of criminal defense counsel who
would spring new defenses at the eleventh hour with the hope of
catching the prosecution off guard and, at the very least, creating
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

22 F.2d 826 (D. Minn. 1926).
Fogel, 22 F.2d at 826.
Id.
22 F.2d 1001 (D. Minn. 1927).
Wiggins, 22 F.2d at 1002.
Id.

225. Id.
226. Id. Judge Sanborn pointed out:
The agent's attention had been directed to a certain kind of automobile
which was making trips to and from the farm. If the defendants had
been upon the farm, and a strange automobile, with strange men in it,
had been seen turning into the driveway, there is no doubt but they
would have had reasonable grounds to believe, and would have believed,
that it contained prohibition agents. It seems reasonable that the
prohibition agent should have believed, under the circumstances, that
the car which drove up to the house, while he was there, contained those
who were either transporting liquor or engaged in operating a distillery.
227.

Id.
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an appealable issue in the event of a conviction. In United States v.
Siegel,228 for example, defense counsel waited until the government
had rested in a narcotics prosecution before asserting an entrapment defense.22 9 Defense counsel took exception when Judge Sanborn allowed the government to reopen its case to offer evidence
to establish that the federal agents acted in "good faith" in making
the arrest. 230 The basis for the initial stop was "hearsay" information indicating defendant's involvement in a narcotics transaction."" The defense opposed the admission of this evidence as inadmissible hearsay.2 2
Judge Sanborn refused to allow the
defendant to raise a defense and then attempt to limit the government's ability to respond.233 In rejecting the defense's arguments,
Judge Sanborn noted that "[th]e Supreme Court of the United
States has apparently never become unduly excited about the defense of entrapment."234 He continued:

Furthermore, in this case, it seems to me that the defendant actually invited the introduction of this evidence by
the motion which he made for a directed verdict at the
close of the testimony. He pointed out that the government had failed to show that the agents had any right to
suspicion the defendant prior to using Lang to make this
buy. The government accepted his challenge and proved
what reasons the agents had to suspicion him. Under the
circumstances, he is in no position to complain. 35
While Judge Sanborn was clearly committed to the strict enforcement of the "dry laws," 23 6 he was neither a crusader nor a
228. 16 F.2d 134, 135 (D. Minn. 1926).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 137. Judge Sanborn reasoned:
It is commonly known that, in the illicit drug trade, the retail dealers'
business is selling to addicts, that the business is carried on with the utmost secrecy, and that the sales are made only to those who are known to
be victims of the drug habit. If hearsay testimony is not a sufficient basis

for a reasonable belief on the part of the officers charged with the enforcement of the Narcotic Act, it will be seldom, if ever, that they can use
a decoy, without such use constituting an unlawful entrapment.

Id.
234. Id. at 136.
235. United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134, 137 (D. Minn. 1926).
236. See Letter from Andrew J. Volstead, Administrator, U.S. Prohibition
Service, to Mabel W. Willebrandt, U.S. Assistant Attorney General (Mar. 19, 1929)
(on file with author).
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zealot. As revealed in a 1929 interview, he proposed sensible and
constructive punishments for "bootleggers" and the like:
If the federal government would buy a tract of say
10,000 or 20,000 acres of northern Minnesota cut-over
lands for reforestation experimental purposes, convicted
bootleggers might be profitably employed in grubbing as
well as in planting trees, instead of lolling their time away
at Leavenworth.
The state of Minnesota owns hundreds of thousands
of acres of lands suitable for reforestation. Prisoners sent
to county jails now might well be sent to stockades built in
the cut-over country, live wholesomely in log cabins during their period of incarceration, and at the same time do
work that will repay the state a hundred-fold in the days to
237
come.
In 1931, Sanford Bates, U.S. superintendent of prisons, announced the establishment of a federal prison farm in Sandstone,
Minnesota. 2 8 The local press acknowledged "[t]he prison farm
plan for Federal Prohibition law violators ha[d] been advocated for
several years by Federal Judge John B. Sanborn." 23 9 As a result, "the
237. Judge Sanborn Would Put Convicted Bootleggers on Reforestation Work

ST.

PAUL DAILY NEws, June 26, 1929, at 1. Judge Sanborn was quoted as saying:

While my experience on the bench leads me to believe that considerable
advance has been and is being made in the matter of enforcing the dry
laws, I believe more rapid progress could be made and the ends of justice and humanity better served by employing the man convicted in labor that will be of benefit to all in the future. I have long been interested in the problem of conservation of our natural resources and in
reforestation as one of the solutions of the problem from the forestry
angle. Both the federal and state governments are apparently seeking
ways and means of promoting reforestation to assure a supply of timber
products for the future.
Violators of the liquor laws are now sentenced, presumably to hard
labor, either to the federal penitentiary or to some county jail, but the
authorities have difficulty, under existing laws, to provide labor for their
prisoners. Most of the men sentenced to county jails have nothing to do
except to help clean up the jail or perhaps mow the courthouse lawn.
The sheriffs don't know what to do with them to keep them busy....
[T] his idea is probably too sane and sensible to be appreciated or to
be acted on.... But I still think and insist that convicted bootleggers
can do more to pay their debt to society by helping solve the reforestation problem than by playing pinochle in a county jail for three or six
months.

Id.
238. See C.D. Johnston, Plan Disclosed For U.S. Prison Farm In State,
15, 1931, at 1.
239. Id. The St. Paul PioneerPress reported:

ST. PAUL

PIONEER PRESS, June
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Sandstone federal correctional institution was born. 24 °
Judge Sanborn was always conscious of the effect prison sentences had on the families of convicted defendants. He often dealt
with the needs of their families directly, and once said, "You know I
have to be sort of a 'father-confessor' and even food provider to
241
families of some of the men I have had to send over the road.,
On one occasion, he reluctantly suspended the sentence of a convicted offender who was the father of seven children. 242

"That

probably is better treatment than you deserve," Judge Sanborn told
the convicted man, "but I hesitate to load your children on the
community, though the chances are that if the community had
warned you you would not be in this trouble."2

43

He pointed out

that one of the problems in society is that communities allow violators to continue perpetrating crimes without warning them or taking action. 24 "Then the minute the Federal Government steps in
24
everyone in the community wants leniency extended."

In contrast to Judge McGee, who had been driven to exhaustion and collapse by the heavy docket, Judge Sanborn seemed to
thrive on his work on the federal district court bench. In 1929,
cases in the federal district court had increased by more than
twenty-five percent over 1928.246 "There are several reasons for
these increases," Judge Sanborn explained:
Criminal cases have increased because of the expansion of
the staff of L.L. Drill, United States district attorney here,
[Sanborn] has contended that the burden of prison upkeep on the
taxpayers could be lessened by establishment of such a method of
handling Prohibition law violators, putting them to such work as would
defray the costs of their maintenance and the maintenance of the prison.
He also contended that prohibition law violators should not be
imprisoned with other criminals of the desperate type such as bank
robbers, bandits, gangsters and narcotic dealers, because they often leave
prison with more anti-social tendencies than they possess when they
enter.

Id.
240. Louis H. Gollop, Judge Sanborn - "Retiring"But Not Retired, ST. PAUL
24, 1959, at 10A.
241. Judge Sanborn Would Put Convicted Bootleggers on Reforestation Work, supra
note 237, at 1.
242. See Dy Laws Not Well Enforced, Sanborn Avers, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Nov.
24, 1930, at 1.
PIONEER PRESS, May

243.
244.
245.
246.
at 13.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See U.S. Judge Praises St. PaulDry Squad, ST.
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and because of the activities of the Northwest prohibition
department ....
Furthermore, all classes of litigation have increased.
This is caused partly by the new war risk insurance cases
and the number of major condemnation proceedings
growing out of such projects as the Lake of the Woods,
the Hastings lock and dam, and the new Federal building
here.247
Despite this heavy workload, Judge Sanborn enjoyed a collegial and
friendly relationship with members of the bar, as well as court personnel.2 8*
In 1931,Judge Sanborn andJudge Gunnar Nordbye, who had
been appointed to the federal district court earlier that same
year,' 49 presided over a matter in which a juror in the W.B. Foshay
trial was tried for criminal contempt of court. 2 ° The evidence presented demonstrated that the juror, Mrs. Genevieve A. Clark, improperly withheld information concerning previous business dealings she and her husband had with Foshay and other defendants,
as well as evidence that she was predisposed to vote for acquittal
due to her sympathies for the defendants and her animosity toward
the federal government.2 5' Judges Sanborn and Nordbye pointed
out, "In a jury trial, if justice is to be even approximated, the jurors
must be absolutely impartial and fair-minded and be governed by
the evidence which is given by the witnesses sworn252and examined
before them, and by the law as stated by the court."
247. Id.
248. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105. Sanborn was
particularly complimentary of local Prohibition agents and prosecutors, claiming
that they made up what was "probably the best prohibition enforcement unit in
the county." U.S. Judge PraisesSt. PaulDry Squad, supra note 246. Notwithstanding
this public praise of law enforcement officials, Judge Sanborn did have occasion
to learn of and report on the indiscretions of St. Paul's police force during the
1930s. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Director, Re: Judge John B. Sanborn, U.S.
CircuitJudge for the 8th Circuit, Circuit Court of Appeals (Feb. 21, 1939) (report
prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning reports by Judge
Sanborn of bribery on the St. Paul police force).
249. See Judge Chosen for Elevation in U.S. Court, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Dec. 19,
1931, at 1.
250. See United States v. Clark, I F. Supp. 747 (D. Minn. 1931).
251. See id. at 749-50.
252. Id. at 750. The judges continued:
However, it must be kept in mind that all sorts of people are summoned
as jurors and required to serve, whether they wish it or not. Some of
them have never been in a courtroom before. Many have only the
vaguest notions as to what their duties are. What seems plain and simple
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As there was ample evidence to find Mrs. Clark had deliberately lied and acted improperly as ajuror, the court had no alternative but to convict her on the contempt charges. 53 However, evidence also suggested that Mrs. Clark acted at the prompting of her
husband and that she was unaware of the seriousness of her improper behavior as a juror. 4 Judges Sanborn and Nordbye were
called upon to make the difficult determination of an appropriate
sentence:
While her conduct was reprehensible, we must recognize
the fact that it has in a large measure carried with it its
own punishment. Mrs. Clark has brought upon herself
the contempt of the community in which she lives - not
because she voted for the acquittal of the defendants but because her vote was not believed to represent her
honest convictions based on the evidence and the law.
We realize that the past disappointments and misfortunes
of her husband in business may have created in her mind
some antagonism towards organized society. Her willingness to talk to strangers of her desire to serve as a juror,
which negatives to some extent the realization on her part
of the seriousness of what she was doing, coupled with her
unyielding attitude in the jury room, indicates to our
minds the probable domination of a will stronger than
her own. To these matters we have given consideration.... So far as Mrs. Clark is personally concerned, she
has already
paid a considerable penalty for what she has
55
done.

These comments reflectJudges Sanborn and Nordbye's great sensitivity to the peculiar circumstances and backgrounds of the individuals who came before the court in each criminal proceeding.
to us seems strange and complex to them. If we establish rules of
conduct for jurors which many might innocently disobey and thereby
subject themselves to the possibility of being charged with contempt and
fined or imprisoned, we will make jury service a very hazardous and
undesirable thing.

Id. at 750-51.
253. Id. at 752. The court sentenced Mrs. Clark to six months' incarceration
in the Ramsey County jail and ordered her to pay a fine in the amount of $1000.
Id. at 753. Mrs. Clark actually was released on her own recognizance during the
period of time in which it would take to perfect an appeal. Additionally, the court
waived the requirement of a supersedeas bond on any such appeal. See id.
254. Id. at 750.
255. Id. at 753. Tragically, Mrs. Clark committed suicide to avoid incarceration. See Clarks Kill Selves, 2 Sons; Found in Car, Dead 4 Days, MINNEAPOLISJ., Apr.
28, 1933, at 1,
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4
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Such concerns had to be balanced against the need "to maintain
the dignity of this court and its reputation as an institution. 256
Judge Sanborn served nearly ten years on the district court, as
both a state and federal judge. During his tenure on the district
court, Judge Sanborn demonstrated a keen grasp of bankruptcy law
- a field in which he would later develop a strong reputation as a
circuit courtjudge.2 57 He also wrote many opinions on commercial
law issues such as banking, insurance, probate, mortgages, intellectual property, business organizations, and shareholders' rights. 8
He considered his service as a district judge, "with the daily drama
of the courtroom, with its revelations of the weaknesses and of the
strengths in human character, with the successes and failures of
lawyers, with the awareness that each day could bring forth the unexpected.., among the happiest days of his long judicial life." 59

256. United States v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Minn. 1931).
257. As a district judge, over a quarter of his published opinions involved
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., In re O'Brien, 40 F.2d 554 (D. Minn. 1930); In
re Ruthkowski, 39 F.2d 969 (D. Minn. 1930); In re Miller, 39 F.2d 919 (D. Minn.
1930); In reYesner, 34 F.2d 978 (D. Minn. 1929); In re West Hotel, 34 F.2d 832 (D.
Minn. 1929); In re Kolsrud, 34 F.2d 831 (D. Minn. 1929); In reJohnson-Hart Co.,
34 F.2d 183 (D. Minn. 1929); In re Stronge & Warner Millinery Co., 33 F.2d 1001
(D. Minn. 1929); In re Horwitz, 32 F.2d 285 (D. Minn. 1929); In re Hanover Milling Co., 31 F.2d 442 (D. Minn. 1929); In reWhite Satin Mills, Inc., 25 F.2d 313 (D.
Minn. 1928); In re Bisenius, 23 F.2d 967 (D. Minn. 1927); In re Von Ruden, 22
F.2d 860 (D. Minn. 1927); In re American Range & Foundry Co., 22 F.2d 558 (D.
Minn. 1927); In re Shanks, 19 F.2d 796 (D. Minn. 1927); In re Walt, 17 F.2d 588
(D. Minn. 1927); In re Elston, 17 F.2d 495 (D. Minn. 1927); In re Boomgaarden, 17
F.2d 149 (D. Minn. 1927); In re Kraemer, 17 F.2d 110 (D. Minn. 1927); In re Hurley, 18 F.2d 363 (D. Minn. 1926); In reWilson, 18 F.2d 108 (D. Minn. 1926); In re
Hanson, 18 F.2d 440 (D. Minn. 1926); In re Frey, 15 F.2d 871 (D. Minn. 1926); In
-eSkurat, 14 F.2d 490 (D. Minn. 1926); In re American Range & Foundry Co., 14
F.2d 466 (D. Minn. 1926); In re American Range & Foundry Co., 14 F.2d 308 (D.
Minn. 1926); In re Wolff, 11 F.2d 293 (D. Minn. 1926); In re Community Book Co.,
10 F.2d 616 (D. Minn. 1926).
258. See Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 16; see also, e.g., Andresen v.
Thompson, 56 F.2d 642 (D. Minn. 1932) (banking); Charlton v. Van Etten, 55
F.2d 418 (D. Minn. 1932) (insurance); In re McDonald's Estate, 42 F.2d 266 (D.
Minn. 1930) (probate); Prideaux v. Des Moines Joint-Stock Land Bank, 34 F.2d
308 (D. Minn. 1929) (mortgages); and Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, 10 F.2d 375 (D.
Minn. 1926) (shareholders' rights).
259. Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 16.
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SERVICE ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Appointment to the Bench

When Judge Sanborn joined the federal district court, he inherited Judge McGee's former secretary. 26° The secretary was a
spiritualist who soon informed him that she had been in touch with
Judge McGee and that the deceased judge did not approve of the
way Judge Sanborn was deciding cases. 2 1 Among the living, however, and particularly the local bar, Judge Sanborn enjoyed near
unanimous respect. 26 2 He also developed an excellent reputation

throughout the circuit for his work on the trial court and service
as
263

ajudge appointed to sit by designation with the Eighth Circuit.
260.

See HISTORY OF THE U.S.

DISTRICT COURT FOR MINNESOTA, supra note

1, at

13.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., Letter from George W. Morgan, Attorney at Law, Davis,
Severance & Morgan, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Solicitor General, Dep't of
Justice (May 12, 1928) (on file with author).
263. See id. During his approximately seven years as a federal district judge,
Judge Sanborn sat with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on over
one hundred cases. In 1927, the two Sanborns, John B. and Walter H., sat on the
same panel. See Southern Sur. Co. v. United States, 23 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1927).
During his tenure, he authored 48 majority opinions, no concurrences, and only a
single dissent. See In re Trimble, 55 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1932) (bankruptcy);
Hunter v. Commerce Trust Co., 55 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1932) (bankruptcy); Fred
Harvey, Inc. v. Crooks, 54 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1931) (tax); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. A.B. Jones Co., 54 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1931) (bankruptcy); Zenith Milling
Co. v. Lucas, 41 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1930) (tax); Hard & Rand v. Biston Coffee Co.,
41 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1930) (appeal and error); Harrow-Taylor Butter Co. v.
Crooks, 41 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1930) (appeal and error); Clements v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1930) (insurance); Edson v. Lucas, 40 F.2d
398 (8th Cir. 1930) (tax); Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa Loan & Trust Co., 38 F.2d
608 (8th Cir. 1930) (municipal corporations); Hauser v. Callaway, 36 F.2d 667
(8th Cir. 1929) (bankruptcy/mortgages); Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584
(8th Cir. 1929) (prohibition/criminal law); Schevenell v. Blackwood, 35 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1929) (state bonds/appeal and error); Drummond v. United States, 34
F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1929) (Indian law); Walker v. Traylor Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 34 F.2d
748 (8th Cir. 1929) (appeal and error); Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489 (8th Cir.
1929) (prohibition); Cook v. United States, 33 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1929) (criminal
law); Dean v. United States, 33 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1929) (habeas corpus); Saxton v.
United States, 33 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1929) (criminal prohibition); Nave-McCord
Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1928) (corporations/equity); Self
v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 28 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1928) (Indian law); Christian v.
United States, 28 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1928) (prostitution); Slick v Hamaker, 28 F.2d
103 (8th Cir. 1928) (constitutional law/workers' compensation); Jensen-Salsbery
Labs v. Salt Lake Stamp Co., 28 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1928) (patent law); Sullivan v.
Union Stock Yards Co., 26 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1928) (constitutional law); Blair v.
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Judge Sanborn was recommended for appointment to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on at least three occasions."' The first such instance occurred when his cousin, the
Honorable Walter H. Sanborn, died on May 10, 1928.65 As when
he was considered for the district court, Judge Sanborn's age,
health, talent, and reputation as an experienced judge favored his
appointment to the Eighth Circuit.266 However, despite many recommendations for Sanborn, President Coolidge promptly selected
the Honorable John H. Cotteral, a federal district court judge from
Oklahoma, to fill the Eighth Circuit vacancy left by the elder Judge
Sanborn.267
In 1928, Congressman Walter Newton of Minnesota introduced legislation to divide in half the Eighth Circuit, both in size
and caseload.266 When this legislation was enacted in 1929, the
White, 24 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1928) (habeas corpus); Dickerson v. United States,
20 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1927) (customs law); Woods Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yankton
County, 21 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1927) (mandamus); Hirschmann v. Bank of Dassel,
21 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1927) (interpleader/insurance law); Drainage Dist. No. 1 v.
Rude, 21 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1927) (contract law); Drake v. Missouri State Life Ins.
Co., 21 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1927) (insurance law); Miller v. United States, 21 F.2d 32
(8th Cir. 1927) (criminal procedure); Farmers' Union Grain Co. v. Hallet & Carey
Co., 21 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1927) (bill of exceptions); Mulane v. United States, 20
F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1927) (customs law/prohibition); Hussey Tie Co. v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 20 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1927) (insurance law); Edwardsville Coal
Co. v. Crown Coal & Coke Co., 20 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1927) (contract law); Self v.
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. 19 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1927) (real estate law/Indian law); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. City of Glenwood Springs, 19 F.2d 225 (8th Cir.
1927) (municipal corporations); Denver Live Stock Comm'n Co. v. Lee, 18 F.2d
11 (8th Cir. 1927) (appeal in error); W.A. Hover & Co. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,
17 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1927) (commercial carriers); Roark v. United States, 17 F.2d
570 (8th Cir. 1927) (criminal law); Bronstein v. United States, 17 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.
1927) (criminal law); Businessmen's Assurance Co. v. Scott, 17 F.2d 4 (8th Cir.
1927) (insurance law); Buder v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1927) (tax
law); Kokesch v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 16 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1926) (master
and servant); Lemieux v. United States, 15 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1926) (Indian law);
Buchanan v. United States, 15 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1926) (federal jurisdiction/Indian law/prohibition); American Range & Foundry Co. v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 7 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1925) (bankruptcy law). But see Ely & Walker Dry
Goods Co. v. United States, 34 F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1929) (Sanborn, J., dissenting).
264. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 52.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 32.
268. See id. at 45. When Judge Sanborn was appointed to the district court
in 1925, the Eighth Circuit covered a territory that "extended from Canada almost
to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains."
Judge John B. Sanborn, Address at Minnesota State Bar Association Proceedings,
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states of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa,
Missouri, and Arkansas were left in the Eighth Circuit, and
69 the remaining states made up the newly-created Tenth Circuit.
With this reorganization came the creation of an additional
judgeship designated for the Eighth Circuit. 270 Judge Sanborn's
many friends and colleagues in Minnesota, as well as prominent
members of the bar throughout the circuit, soon endorsed him for
this position. 27' The Honorable Wilbur F. Booth of the Eighth Circuit wrote to the new U.S. Attorney General and Judge Sanborn's
former colleague in practice, William D. Mitchell, to endorse Judge
Sanborn's proposed nomination:
He is a man of fine legal ability, and in addition is possessed of remarkably fine judgment. He is also a hard,
conscientious worker. Both on the District Court and in
the Circuit Court of Appeals, where he has been quite
frequently called to sit, his work has been of the highest
grade.272

Andrew J. Volstead, the former congressman who had sponsored
the Volstead Act and who was at the time the prohibition administrator for Minnesota and the surrounding states, also supported the
nomination:
He is in the prime of life, capable of and doing an immense amount of work. From conversations I have had
with him, I know that he sincerely sympathizes with President Hoover's desire to see some reform of our antiquated court procedure that would make the administration of law less technical and more expeditious and
effective. He does not only believe in the enforcement of
Annual Meeting, in 17 MINN. L. REv. 83, 88 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Sanborn
MSBA Address]. The thirteen states that made up the circuit at that time included Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. The
court sat in St. Louis, St. Paul, Denver, and Oklahoma City. See id.
269. See FETER, supranote 8, at 45-46.
270. See id. at 45.
271. See, e.g., Letter from Gardner Cowles, Publisher, The Register and Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Mar. 19,
1929) (on file with author); Letter from Chester L. Caldwell, Secretary, Minnesota
State Bar Association, to Herbert C. Hoover, President of the United States (Mar.
18, 1929) (on file with author); Letter from William C. Michaels, Attorney at Law,
Meservey, Michaels, Blackmar, Newkirk & Eager, to Herbert C. Hoover, President
of the United States (Mar. 1, 1929) (on file with author).
272. Letter from Wilbur F. Booth, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Mar. 5, 1929) (on
file with author).
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the prohibition laws, but is in favor of the policy. His appointment would, I am sure, give us a very good man on
the circuit bench.273
Despite these letters of support and a report that U.S. Attorney
General
Judge"William
274 Mitchell personally favored the nomination of
judge Sanborn, the Honorable Archibald K. Gardner of South
Dakota, a 61-year-old railroad lawyer, ultimately was appointed to
fill the newly created judgeship. 75
Consistent with the old adage, the third time was a charm for
Judge Sanborn. In late November 1931, rumors surfaced about the
possible retirement of Judge Wilbur Booth.276 Instantly, a letter
campaign began in support of Judge Sanborn's succession to this
post.2 7 7 Just as he had supported Judge Sanborn's candidacy for
federal district court, Senator Thomas D. Schall strongly favored
his nomination to the Eighth Circuit.278 Judge Sanborn's supporters praised him for his "energy and persistence" in keeping the district court current despite its understaffing due to illness and vacancy.279
His colleagues described him as "always calm and
273. Letter from Andrew J. Volstead to Mabel W. Willebrandt, supra note
236. Perhaps the most revealing Sanborn recommendation came from Krikor A.
Keljik, an oriental rug dealer from St. Paul, who wrote to Attorney General William Mitchell in support of the proposed nomination:
As a humble citizen of St. Paul, I could not pass unnoticed the enclosed
item of news which informed me that our beloved Judge Sanborn is considered by your office to be promoted for a more worthier elevation.
I take this occasion to say that Judge Sanborn is one of the worthiest
high charactered man [sic] to be considered for the position.
I happened to serve as a Federal juror last fall for forty days in his
court, and when I left him I had a living and lasting impression that
Judge Sanborn is one of the highest type of an American that I know.
Therefore, I wish from the bottom of my heart to see him promoted.
Letter from Krikor A. Keljik, President, Keljik's Oriental Rugs, to William D.
Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Mar. 22, 1929) (on file with author).
274. See Sanborn Urged For Eighth Circuit Post, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar.
21, 1929, at 1.

275. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 50.
276. See Booth Will Retire As FederalJudge, MINNEAPOLIS

TRIB.,

Dec. 4, 1932, at

8 ("The report thatJ. Booth is ready to retire created keen interest in official circles.").
277. See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Judge Chosen for Elevation, supra note 249; see also Letter from
Charles Bunn, Attorney at Law, Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, to William D.
Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Dec. 3, 1931) (on file with author) (alluding to
rumor of Judge Booth's pending retirement and Senator Schall's recommendation thatJudge Sanborn succeed Booth).
279. Letter from James C. Otis, Attorney at Law, Boyesen, Otis & Faricy, to
William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Nov. 30,1931) (on file with author).
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Both his relative

youth and his reputation as a federal district judge favored his appointment.281
On December 18, 1931, Attorney General William Mitchell
formally recommended Judge Sanborn's nomination to President
Herbert Hoover, observing that "Judge Sanborn's services as
United States District Judge have been able and outstanding, and
have won for him the approval of the members of the bar and the
public generally throughout his district. His promotion to the Circuit Court is highly deserved. 2 s2 Upon receiving news of the
nomination Judge Sanborn acknowledged, "It is a very great
honor, and of
course I am delighted beyond words to receive the
28
nomination."

His confirmation as a circuit judge, however, was delayed by
accusations of wrongdoing. Just days after the nomination was
made public, Senator Norris, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, received a twenty-five-page letter from A. J. Hertz, an
insurance agent from Milwaukee and former St. Paul attorney who
had been disbarred from the state and federal courts in Minnesota,
asking for an opportunity to present charges against Judge Sanborn. 4 In his letter, which contained only general statements,
Hertz indicated "that he had known Judge Sanborn most of his life
and considered him unworthy of so important a judicial appointment. 2 8 5 Senator William E. Borah, who was chairman of the subcommittee overseeing the Sanborn nomination, announced he
would hold hearings on the matter and place Hertz under oath.2 6
"It is generally known here that Judge Sanborn, for a period of several years, performed the work of at least two judges without a vacation or let-up, and in addition he was called upon to sit quite often in the Circuit Court of Appeals." Letter
from Alexander E. Horn, Attorney at Law, O'Brien, Horn & Stringer, to William
D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Nov. 30, 1931) (on file with author).
280. See Letter from James D. Shearer, Attorney at Law, Shearer, Doyard &
Trogner, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Dec. 1, 1931) (on file
with author).
281. See Letter from M.M. Joyce, Counsel for Receiver, Law Department,
Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co., to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Dec. 4, 1931) (on file with author).
282. See Letter from William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General, to Herbert
C. Hoover, President of the United States (Dec. 18, 1931) (on file with author).
283. "Delighted Over Honor,"Judge Sanborn Says, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Dec. 19,
1931, at 1.
284. See 2 Solons Voice Objections ToJoyce As Judge: Fight On Sanborn Looms, ST.
PAUL PIONEERPRESS, Dec. 24, 1931, at 1.
285. Id.
286. See Solons to Hear Sanborn Charges, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 27,
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However, neither Hertz nor anyone else came forward to testify,
and the charges were denounced as "trumped up" and "scurrilous"
and were dismissed. 7
After receiving the uniformly positive endorsement of all persons who offered testimony, the subcommittee unanimously approved Judge Sanborn.2 8 The Senate then approved the nominaSanborn became President Hoover's last judicial
tion, and Judge
89
appointment.
1931, at 1.
287. Charges Denounced As Trumped Up, Scurrilous; Ordered Out Of Record, ST.
PAUL DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 1932, at 1. The St. PaulDispatchreported:
The sensational disclosures had to do with the other complainant, L. M.
Wolfe. She was identified as Mrs. Lillian M. Wolfe, mother of Franklin
T. Wolfe, convicted of contempt of court on charges of having taken
money from a Minneapolis bootlegger by falsely representing influence
with authorities.... The statements concerning Franklin Wolfe, alias
Fred Wolfe, harked back to the fight made last autumn to displace M. L.
Harney of St. Paul, as Northwest prohibition administrator.
A letter to the Senators from L.L. Drill, district attorney, alleging
that Wolfe through his connections with the Anti-Saloon League in
Minnesota, instigated the drive against Mr. Harney, caused the greatest
stir at the hearing.... Drill's letter in referring to this agitation said:
"Wolfe (Franklin Wolfe) has been unable for a number of years past
to obtain any audience with the local federal authorities as he is
regarded as wholly unreliable and unscrupulous.
On account of this situation, Wolfe last year through his AntiSaloon League connections, succeeded in having M. L. Harney, the
present prohibition administrator in this region, investigated,
Wolfe's apparent plan being to frame Mr. Harney and obtain the
appointment of some one in his stead with whom he (Wolfe) could
carry on his nefarious activities .... "
The three Senators dismissed the complaints against Sanborn, in the
light of the political activities and connections of the witnesses against
him, with contempt....
In the light of the high admiration expressed for Judge Sanborn by
the Senators, particularly in dealing with those who used the weapons
against him revealed to have been employed, speedy confirmation of his
nomination is considered now a foregone conclusion.
Id.
288. See id.
289. See Sanborn Given Senate O.K. as CircuitJudge, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Jan. 20, 1932, at 1. Judge Sanborn was appointed to the Eighth Circuit to take
over the judgeship previously held by Judge Wilbur F. Booth, who had taken senior status. See id. A close friend and colleague to the younger Judge Sanborn,
Judge Booth swore him in as a circuit judge in 1932. See id. In that same year,
while speaking at the annual meeting of the Minnesota State Bar Association,
Judge Sanborn described Judge Booth as "one of the outstanding judges of this
country" and noted that "[b] oth on the trial bench and on the appellate court, he
has rendered most distinguished service." Sanborn MSBA Address, supra note
268, at 91.
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Judge Sanborn was, of course, preceded on the Eighth Circuit
by his cousin, the Honorable Walter H. Sanborn. 290 Judge Walter
H. Sanborn served on the Eighth Circuit from 1892 to his death in
1928.291 During his thirty-six-year tenure, he authored more than
1200 opinions and developed a national reputation as one of the
country's finest federal circuit judges.9 Pierce Butler, Associate
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, referred to him as the "Dean of
the Federal Judiciary of the West" and said that "[t] he dignity of
the law is personified in him."293

290. See Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 19-20.
291. See Boyd, supranote 20, at 27.
292. See id. at 22, 26-27.
293. Devitt, supra note 6, at 2. Judge Walter Sanborn gained a national profile at the turn of the century as a panel member and frequent author of opinions
originating from the Eighth Circuit in antitrust law. See Martin J. Sklar, Sherman
Antitrust Act Jurisprudence and Federal Policy-Making in the Formative Period, 18901914, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 791, 806 & n.46 (1990). Walter Sanborn was wellknown for his decisions in Reynolds v. Great Northern Railroad, 69 F. 808, 809-13
(8th Cir. 1895), and the breakup of Standard Oil Trust, 173 F. 177 179-92 (8th Cir.
1909). See Boyd, supra note 20, at 26-27. His opinions also were cited frequently
in other areas such as strict liability. See, e.g., Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903).
Judge Walter Sanborn was considered a more liberal judge than his younger
cousin. For example, he wrote an opinion criticizing the government's attempts
to levy criminal sanctions through civil prosecution:
Now, if the government enacts a statute which provides that a case in its
nature criminal, whose purpose is punishment, whose prosecutor is the
state, and whose successful prosecution disgraces the defendant, and
forfeits his property to the state as a punishment for crime, may be
brought in the form of a civil suit, does that change the rule of evidence
that ought to be applied to it? If a state provides that all proceedings for
the punishment of crime shall be conducted in the form of civil suits,
does that change their nature, or the amount of evidence that ought to
be required to convict the defendants of the crimes? Is a wolf in sheep's
clothing a wolf or a sheep?
United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126, 129-30 (8th Cir. 1893). As suggested by the
manner in which the question was posed, Judge Sanborn concluded that the wolf
in sheep's clothing is a wolf. See id. at 130-32.
In Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921), Judge Walter Sanborn
condemned efforts by government authorities to entrap a pathetic and desperate
drug addict on narcotic transportation and sale charges. In that instance, Judge
Sanborn noted:
[As] the first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to
punish crime[,] ...

it is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and

to the established law of the land to punish a man for the commission of
an offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, either in
thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of if the
officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured him to
attempt to commit it.
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Judge John B. Sanborn greatly respected his older cousin. 294
Obviously, the feeling must have been mutual as Judge Walter H.
Sanborn had recommended the younger Sanborn to the U.S. Attorney General for appointment to the U.S. District Court in
Nonetheless, Judge John B. Sanborn was always aware of
19 2 5 .
the Sanborn name's association with the Eighth Circuit and was
sensitive to any criticism of an alleged Sanborn "dynasty. '' 96 HowId. at 38.
Perhaps most notable and enduring is Judge Walter Sanborn's dissent in
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 186 F. 966, 977 (8th Cir. 1911)
(Sanborn, J., dissenting). This case involved the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
law that in his opinion defied the spirit, defeated the purpose, and violated the
express prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 983. Specifically, the
law required every railroad company doing business in Oklahoma to provide
separate coaches or compartments for the accommodation of white and black
passengers. Id. at 968. While the Oklahoma Legislature had attempted to craft
the language in a manner that could be construed as consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540-51 (1896),
Judge Sanborn was not taken in by these efforts. See McCabe, 186 F. at 980-89. Believing that the Oklahoma law clearly violated the Fourteenth Amendment, he
wrote:
As I understand the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, the
purpose of its enactment, its express terms, and its legal effect are to
prohibit the conditioning of the privileges and immunities of citizens
and the equal protection of the laws by the respective conditions and
circumstances in which citizens may find themselves, and to secure to
those suffering under adverse conditions and unfavorable circumstances
the same civil rights and the same protection of the laws that the more
fortunate and prosperous enjoy. Citizenship, and citizenship alone,
under this amendment to the Constitution, entitles every man, white or
black, to all his civil rights and privileges unabridged by the action or
legislation of any state and to the equal protection of all the laws. Before
the law, by the express terms of the fourteenth amendment, all citizens
are equal in their civil rights, and the humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. It regards a citizen as a citizen, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights, as guaranteed by this
the supreme law of the land, are involved.
Id. at 978.
Judge Walter Sanborn's independence and intelligence won him praise, respect, and a national reputation. Although he was never appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, he was nonetheless a "perennial prospect" and served his circuit
and his country with eminent distinction. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the ProgressiveEra, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 444,
486 (1982); Telephone Interview with Thomas Lovett, supra note 157; Telephone
Interview with Kenneth DeWirth, supra note 49.
294. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supranote 105.
295. See Letter from Walter H. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 26,
1925) (on file with author).
296. Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
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ever, he need not have been concerned:
Each of the Judges Sanborn established a national reputation as an able and learned judge.... [T]hey earned, and
deserved, the highest standing at the Bar and among their
brethren on the Bench. To this day a Sanborn judicial
opinion is highly respected as the sound judgment of an
eminent jurist.
The Judges Sanborn were good men who practiced
the principles of honor, truth, integrity and fairness in
their personal and judicial lives. They possessed wisdom,
keenness
of mind, sound judgment and mastery of the
297
law.

B.

Service on the Bench

When Judge Sanborn joined the district court in 1932, the
Eighth Circuit was headquartered in St. Louis, where the court
heard cases in the "strange and fortresslike Post Office and Federal
Courts Building." 298 Less frequently, the court would sit in Kansas
City, Omaha, and St. Paul. 99
Judge Sanborn referred to the members of the Eighth Circuit
as the 'Judicial family."' 0 In underscoring this point, on at least
one occasion he quoted the more seniorJudge Kimbrough Stone:
The association of a Court of this character, among its
members, is unique. It requires great trust and confidence in each other. Our relations are closely confidential. It requires also that there shall be cooperation and
helpfulness, but at the same time without loss of individuality. It requires that brothers should differ frankly and

297. Devitt, supra note 6, at 3. At the time of Judge John B. Sanborn's
death, his colleague and then-ChiefJudge HarveyJohnsen of Nebraska remarked:
[F]rom the creation of the Court, down to the death of Judge John B.
Sanborn, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has borne a
Sanborn identification, by which it has in large measure been
symbolized.... It is only rivalled, but not surpassed, by the service,
identification and distinction which have been given to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit by the two Hands, Judge Learned Hand
andJudge Augustus Hand.
Sanborn Memorial,supra note 2, at 19-20.
298. Judge Thomas Memorial, supra note 129, at 15. Judge Sanborn later remarked, "I always felt that those who designed that building must have anticipated
the outbreak of a second Civil War." Id.
299. See Sanborn MSBA Address, supra note 268, at 89.
300. Judge Thomas Memorial, supra note 129, at 15.

https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4

48

Boyd: THE
The Life
and CareerJOHN
of the Honorable
John
HONORABLE
B. SANBORN,
JRB. Sanborn, Jr.

1997]

sometimes strongly in the conference room, and yet
emerge therefrom with no loss, and even with an increase
of respect and affection. It seems to me the work which
comes nearest to describing that relationship is that of

"family.",301

Judge Sanborn was always courteous, kind, and considerate to
•
305
304
303
302
fellow judges, attorneys, court staff, parties, and law student.3

00

He never belittled or berated attorneys who came before

the court. °7 He was professional and tactful in his constructive
criticism of the clerk's office.30 s Years later, Judge Devitt wrote: "We
loved John B. Sanborn, the person, because of his warmth, his
friendliness, his genuine humbleness. His door was always open to
a fellowjudge, a lawyer, or a courthouse custodian, or anybody who
citation to a case or the wise counsel of a trustworthy
needed 0the
9
3

friend."

During oral argument, Judge Sanborn was cordial and respectful to counsel.1 0 Indeed, Judge Sanborn was known for setting a
tradition of civility and courtesy on the Eighth Circuit bench.3 1
When Judge Sanborn was the presiding judge, counsel always knew
301. See id. at 16 (Judge Sanborn quotingJudge Kimbrough Stone).
302. See Telephone Interview with Earl Larson, supra note 131.
303. See Telephone Interview with William S. Fallon, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney (Jan. 10, 1994) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Clay
Moore, clerk for Edward J. Devitt, Circuit Judge, U.S. District Court, District of
Minnesota (Jan. 4, 1996) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Thomas
Lovett, supra note 157; Letter from Michael J. Galvin to Thomas H. Boyd, supra
note 162; Interview with Frank Hammond, Attorney at Law, Briggs and Morgan
P.A. (June 3, 1997) (on file with author).
304 See Neff, supra note 162.
305. See Interview with the Honorable John Connolly, Ramsey County DistrictJudge (July 9, 1997) (on file with author).
306. See Telephone Interview with Sidney Lorber, Attorney at Law, Leonard,
Street and Deinard (July 26, 1994) (on file with author); Telephone Interview
with Robert Tucker, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit (Jan.
4, 1994) (on file with author).
307. See Interview with Terrance Doyle, former appellate attorney with the
U.S. Department ofJustice (june 5, 1997) (on file with author).
308. See Telephone Interview with Sidney Lorber, supra note 306; Telephone Interview with Robert Tucker, supra note 306.
309. Edward J. Devitt, Memorial to Judge John B. Sanborn, Mar. 28, 1964
(on file with author).
310. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105; Telephone Interview with Floyd Gibson, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
(Jan. 31, 1995) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Sidney Lorber,
supra note 306; Telephone Interview with Robert Tucker, supra note 306.
311. Interview with Terry Doyle, appellate lawyer, Civil Division, Dep't of
Justice from 1961 to 1964, in Mpls., Minn. (June 5, 1997) (on file with author).
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they would be treated fairly.1 2 Nonetheless, Judge Sanborn did
prefer advocates who got to the point sooner rather than later.-13
For example, late one afternoon in the midst of a lengthy hearing,
a long-winded attorney asked the members of the court if they
would mind if he "trespassed" further upon their time so as to
complete his argument. Judge Sanborn responded, "Sir, you
may
31 4
trespass on the Court's time, but do not trespass on eternity."
While always mindful of his power as a federal judge, Judge
Sanborn never took himself too seriously. For instance, one disgruntled advocate, who appeared before a panel that included
Judge Sanborn, stated in consternation before leaving the courtroom, 'Judge Sanborn: Once a man, now ajudge! 31
" 5 Having made
the statement, the attorney quickly departed. While others in the
courtroom were shocked by the remark, Judge
Sanborn smiled
316
broadly and was obviously quite amused by it.
Judge Sanborn was always well prepared for court.317 When reviewing briefs, he marked them up at length. 38 In conference, he
was not reticent to give his opinion - which was usually quite convincing - but he would not force his point of view on his colleagues. 3 9 As the presiding judge, Judge Sanborn was a "person of
great fairness in assigning cases - he would regularly take more
than his share" of assignments. 3 20 Once the assignments were completed, Judge Sanborn would immediately go to work writing out
his opinions in pencil on a yellow legal pad.3 2' He would also do
much, if not all, of the legal research that went into these opin322
ions.
Judge Sanborn has been referred to as a "generalist" rather
than as a judge who had a particular strength or interest in a spe-

312. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
313. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70.
314. Interview with Samuel Morgan, Senior Attorney at Law, Briggs and
Morgan (Aug. 31, 1994) (on file with author).
315. Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
316. See id.
317. See id. "He never winged it." Id.
318. See id.
319. See Telephone Interview with Floyd Gibson, supra note 310.
320. Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
321. See Telephone Interview with George E. MacKinnon, supra note 3; Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70; Telephone Interview with Robert
Tucker, supra note 306.
322. See Interview with William S. Fallon, supra note 303; Telephone Interview with Clay Moore, supranote 303.
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cific area of the law. 21 As one who served on the circuit court for
nearly forty years - first as a district judge sitting by designation,
then as an active circuit judge, and finally as a senior circuitjudge Judge Sanborn literally studied
and 324wrote at length in virtually
•
•
every area of American jurisprudence.
Compared to his cousin, Judge Walter H. Sanborn, Judge John
B. Sanborn was considered a "conservative" jurist.32 5 "He did not
believe in departing from time-tested and time-honored principles
of law merely because they did not square with his personal views.
He felt strongly that the law should be followed as written regardless of whether he believed it to be a wise law." 326 Judge Sanborn

"thought it to be his duty to observe the rule of stare decisis, to respect the legislative processes, and rigidly follow and enforce the
law."327 Although he "followed the law religiously," 328 he was not a

strict3 29constructionist or a literalist who would allow absurd results.

As a federal circuit judge, Judge Sanborn understood that he
was bound to follow the decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 330 While he disagreed with some of the more expansive rul-

323. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105; Interview with
Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70.
324. See Telephone Interview with Floyd Gibson, supra note 310; Telephone
Interview with Robert Tucker, supra note 306. Judge Sanborn's knowledge of the
law was encyclopedic. See Telephone Interview with Clay Moore, supra note 303;
Lovett Telephone Interview, supranote 157.
325. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105; see also supra
note 293 (providing overview ofJudge Walter Sanborn's career).
326. Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 10; see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Bass, 252
F.2d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 1958) (Sanborn, J., concurring) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of an enjoinment action in a Fair Labor Standards Act violation
case, despite his "serious doubts" about the fairness of the decision); NLRB v.
Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1939) (Sanborn, J., concurring) (affirming the district court's enforcement of an NLRB order while disagreeing with
the opinion's reasoning).
327. Whittaker, supra note 17, at 199.
328. Telephone Interview with George E. MacKinnon, supra note 3.
329. See Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 10 ("[T] echnicalities of the law he
freely cast aside in order to avoid an injustice."). But see Hamburg Bank v.
Ouachita Nat'l Bank, 78 F.2d 100, 107 (8th Cir. 1935) (Sanborn, J., concurring)
("The application of correct rules of law to the facts of this case leads to an unfortunate result, which there is apparently no way to avoid.").
330. See, e.g., Voss v. United States, 259 F.2d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1958) (following the Supreme Court's ruling on the knowledge of right and wrong as the test
of criminal responsibility); Hickman v. United States, 246 F.2d 178, 182 (8th Cir.
1957) (following the Supreme Court's ruling on errors of law or fact that occur
during trial);Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1954) (following
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ings rendered by the Court,33 ' Judge Sanborn was thoroughly familiar with the Court's decisions and applied them to their full extent.3 32 For example, Judge Sanborn recognized that the laws relating to search and seizure "are judge-made rules"3 3 3 and that "[t]he

Supreme Court of the United States has the power to limit or expand them."-3 4 As a circuit judge, he believed that "a federal trial

judge who follows the teachings of the United States Supreme
Court 5...cannot justifiably be held to have committed an error of
law."

33

Judge Sanborn also felt that the circuits should have a consensus of decisions to establish clarity in the law and the orderly administration of justice. 336 In particular, in interpreting federal statutes, such as the tax laws, he urged that "[s]o far as
possible ...there should be uniformity of decision among the circuits" unless the court "were convinced and could demonstrate that37
the cases [from the other circuits] were incorrectly decided."
Judge Sanborn applied the same rule with regard to decisions
made by other panels within the Eighth Circuit. "It is a longestablished rule that judges of the same court will not knowingly
review, reverse or overrule each other's decisions. The necessity of
such a rule in the interest of an orderly administration of justice is

the Supreme Court's ruling on the admissibility in state court of evidence obtained by improper search and seizure).
331. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70; Telephone Interview with Clay Moore, supra note 303; see also, e.g., Mitchell, 252 F.2d at 519 (expressing doubt that good cause existed for the production of witness statements);
Conley v. Cox, 138 F.2d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 1943) (expressing skepticism of a petitioner's "fantastic" story while acknowledging the need to follow the Supreme
Court's ruling on petitioner rights); Crowe Coal, 104 F.2d at 641 (expressing doubt
that the case was of national concern or posed a menace to interstate commerce).
332. See Telephone Interview with Clay Moore, supra note 303.
333. Jones, 217 F.2d at 383. Realizing the U.S. Supreme Court was likely to
change procedural rules on unlawful searches and seizures, Judge Sanborn applied existing law while pointing out that the parties might apply to the Court for
certiorari. See id.
334. Id.
335. Voss, 259 F.2d at 703; see also Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151
F.2d 543, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1945) (Sanborn,J., dissenting) (focusing on the lack of
Supreme Court precedent in arguing against the appellate court's ruling that
Iowa's statute of limitations was unconstitutional).
336. See Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956).
337. Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1955); see also
United States v. Armature Rewinding Co., 124 F.2d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 1942)
(pointing out need for uniform circuit decisions regarding administration of taxing statutes).
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clear."'

During his next thirty-two years as a circuit judge, Judge Sanborn sat on some 2400 cases and authored approximately 900
opinions.
In most cases, Judge Sanborn joined in the majority
panel opinions. His apparent aversion to writing separate concurrences or issuing dissents is evident in those instances where he
wrote a majority opinion with which he expressly disagreed.
Throughout his long career in the Eighth Circuit, he wrote only
seventeen dissents 341 and seventeen concurrences. 42 Each of these

338. Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1942) (citations omitted); see also May Dep't Stores Co. v. Reynolds, 140 F.2d 799, 800 (8th
Cir. 1944) (paraphrasing the same rule).
339. See Duane Galles, Sanborn - The Man Behind the Portrait,WM. MITCHELL
OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 1974, at 6.
340. See, e.g.,
Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. L.J. Marcotte Ins. Agency,
314 F.2d 470, 478 (8th Cir. 1963) (disagreeing with the majority opinion, which
he authored); Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 1960) (expressing
his disagreement with the majority opinion, which he authored).
341. See Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d 655, 661 (8th Cir.
1963) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Hopper Bros. Quarries v.
Peerless Cas. Co., 255 F.2d 137, 146 (8th Cir. 1958) (Sanborn, J., dissenting);
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 575 (8th
Cir. 1958) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Wackerle v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 219
F.2d 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1955) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Thompson v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 218 F.2d 166, 173 (8th Cir. 1954) (Sanborn, J., dissenting);
Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1953) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Constr. Co., 199 F.2d 511,
516 (8th Cir. 1952) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. Josephs, 168 F.2d
233, 237 (8th Cir. 1948) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1945) (Sanborn, J.,dissenting); Pines v. United
States, 123 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1941) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Beim Co. v.
Landy, 113 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1940) (Sanbom,J., dissenting); American Sur.
Co. v. Normandy State Bank, 108 F.2d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 1940) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 1938) (Sanborn, J.,
dissenting); DeParcq v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 81 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir.
1936) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Bovay v. Townsend, 78 F.2d 343, 347 (8th Cir.
1935) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 34
F.2d 429, 432 (8th Cir. 1929) (Sanborn, J., dissenting, written while district judge
sitting by designation).
342. See Willis v. United States, 289 F.2d 581, 585 (8th Cir. 1961) (Sanborn,
J., concurring); Harris v. United States, 288 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1961) (Sanborn, J., concurring); Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 1958) (Sanborn,J., concurring); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Clinton Mach. Co., 247 F.2d 397,
400 (8th Cir. 1957) (Sanborn,J., concurring); United States v. Kelly, 236 F.2d 233,
237 (8th Cir. 1956) (Sanborn, J., concurring); Kiewel v. United States, 204 F.2d 1,
7 (8th Cir. 1953) (Sanborn,J., concurring); Gillespie v. Fort Dodge, Des Moines &
S. Ry. Co., 203 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1953) (Sanborn, J., concurring); Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 491, 497 (8th Cir. 1945) (Sanborn, J., concurring); NLRB v. Laister-Kauffmann Aircraft Corp., 144 F.2d 9, 17 (8th Cir. 1944)
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separate dissenting and concurring opinions - like most of the
opinions he wrote for the majority - were short, direct, and to the
point. These separate opinions were devoid of the hyperbole and
dramatic tone that would occasionally appear in the opinions written by his brethren. 3
Several of his early dissents seemed to be the product of his
experience and approach to issues as a trialjudge. 34

For example,

in numerous cases he stated how he would have decided a particular case had he been the district judge presiding below,

45

thus re-

flecting his empathy for the work of the trial judge. His separate
opinions also demonstrated his tendency to reflect continuously on
the issues before the court and his willingness to change his mind
after reflection, notwithstanding his initial impression. 346 In each of
these opinions, Judge Sanborn was gracious and collegial to the
other panel members.

C. JudicialApproach on the Bench
1.

FederalJurisdiction

As a circuit judge, Judge Sanborn continued to hold the same
view of federal jurisdiction that he held as a federal district judge.
(Sanborn, J., concurring); Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F.2d 234, 240
(8th Cir. 1940) (Sanborn,J., concurring); Ochs v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
111 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1940) (Sanborn, J., concurring); United States v. Donaldson Realty Co., 106 F.2d 509, 518 (8th Cir. 1939) (Sanborn, J., concurring);
NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 1939) (Sanborn, J., concurring); Roosevelt v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 1935);
Hamburg Bank v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank, 78 F.2d 100, 106 (8th Cir. 1935) (Sanborn, J., concurring); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 77 F.2d 405, 414 (8th Cir. 1935)
(Sanborn,J., concurring); Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768, 771 (8th
Cir. 1934) (Sanborn,J., concurring).
343. Compare the brief and direct tone of Judge Sanborn's separate opinions, see, e.g., Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 547 (Sanborn, J.,
dissenting), with that of Judge Gardner in Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695, 70919 (8th Cir. 1932) (Gardner,J., dissenting).
344. See, e.g., Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1941) (Sanborn,
J., dissenting); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1938) (Sanborn, J.,
dissenting); DeParcq v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 81 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1936)
(Sanborn, J., dissenting); Bovay v. Townsend, 78 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1935) (Sanborn,J., dissenting).
345. See Pines, 123 F.2d at 831; Walker, 93 F.2d at 796; DeParcq,81 F.2d at
781; Bovay, 78 F.2d at 347.
346. See, e.g., Roosevelt, 78 F.2d at 762 (Sanborn,J., concurring); Ely & Walker
Dry Goods Co., 34 F.2d at 432 (Sanbom,J., dissenting).
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While understanding the broad authority of the federal judiciary,
he recognized that its powers should be exercised only to the extent authorized by federal law.347 Judge Sanborn believed that
Congress intended the terms of its legislation "to be taken and understood in [their] plain, ordinary, and popular sense." 34 He
steadfastly refused to exercise jurisdiction where it was clear that
Congress did not intend to create federal jurisdiction,3 9 even when
others on the court disagreed with his position regarding the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.5 °
In determining whether Congress had intended federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction in any particular instance, Judge Sanborn
applied common sense rather than elaborate arguments regarding
legislative history. For example, in Western Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Beverforden,351 the district court had dismissed the action because
the plaintiff had failed to join all interested parties. 52 judge Sanborn wrote an opinion reversing the district court's decision and
permitting the plaintiff to pursue relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.3 5 3 Sanborn pointed out that "the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act contains no express requirement that all
interested parties must be joined, and we think there is no language
354
in the act from which such a requirement could be implied."
As he had done on the district bench, Judge Sanborn continued to scrutinize carefully the facts relating to diversity jurisdiction.
In Martineau v. City of St. Paul,35 for example, an out-of-state guardian sought to sue the city of St. Paul in federal court.3 56 Judge San-

347. See Whittaker, supranote 17, at 201.
348. Woodward v. United States, 167 F.2d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1948).
349. See, e.g., Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 104 F.2d 1, 7-9 (8th Cir. 1939)
(construing bankruptcy jurisdiction); Kern v. Standard Oil Co., 228 F.2d 699, 701
(8th Cir. 1956) (denyingjurisdiction for lack of diverse citizenship).
350. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly
Garment Co., 121 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1941) (Woodrough,J., dissenting).
351. 93 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1937).
352. Id. at 168.
353. Id. at 169.
354. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). Sanborn explained:
If Congress intended that a declaratory judgment should only be
entered in a case after all interested parties had been joined, it is fair to
assume that it would have inserted in the act a provision to that effect.
Not having done so, this court does not feel justified in imposing any
such condition upon the maintenance of this statutory proceeding.

Id.
355. 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir, 1949).
356. Id. at 778.
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born held that diversity jurisdiction did not exist because the minor for whom the guardian
was appointed and the defendant were
3 57
citizens of Minnesota:

We think that a Probate Court of Minnesota, by appointing a nonresident as a guardian of a Minnesota minor,
cannot transmute what is purely a local controversy into
one between citizens of different states, or confer jurisdiction of the controversy upon the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.
Judge Sanborn had a view of limited venue similar to his view
of limited jurisdiction. Attempts by plaintiffs' personal injury attorneys to stretch venue provisions beyond reason irritated Judge
3 9
Sanborn.
1

He was opposed to forum shopping and selection

based on convenience for counsel, and he felt that cases should be
filed and tried where the accident or central transaction occurred. 36° He thus respected the district courts' discretion to transfer cases for trial to36 the district where the case originally should
'
have been brought.

Not surprisingly, Judge Sanborn did not address the constitutionality of a statute unless it was absolutely necessary. Instead, he
encouraged litigants to petition the U.S. Supreme Court to answer
constitutional issues. 3 62 The few concurrences filed by Judge Sanborn illustrate his belief that the court of appeals should limit its
rulings by the most narrow scope of review and refrain from deciding issues unnecessarily."'
357. Id. at 780.
358. Id.
359. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70.
360. See id.
361. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Hyde, 245 F.2d 537, 538 (8th Cir. 1957)
(denying review of a district court order transferring a personal injury action to a
district where the action could have been brought); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Hyde, 238
F.2d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1956) (denying review by prohibition or mandamus of a
district court order transferring an action to a district in which the action could
have been brought).
362. See, e.g., Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1960) ("If the
[National Firearms] Act, insofar as applicable here, is to be declared invalid, that
should, we think, be done by the Supreme Court on certiorari . . . ."); Stockstrom

v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 491, 497 (8th Cir. 1945) (Sanborn, J., concurring)
(expressing concern over the Supreme Court's "vague and indefinite" doctrine on
taxable trust income).
363. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 289 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1961);
Harris v. United States, 288 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Kelly,
236 F.2d 233, 237 (8th Cir. 1956). But see Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112
F.2d 234, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1940) (describing his view of the burden of proof in
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Judge Sanborn's sensitivity in this regard is evident in the redistricting cases in which he participated while he was circuit
judge. 64 For example, in Magraw v. Donovan,6 5 a three-judge panel
made up of Judges Sanborn, Bell, and Devitt, sitting on the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota, addressed the "substantial inequality" that existed in the composition of Minnesota legislative districts at that time. 366 Over the half century since the 1913

reapportionment law had been passed, the shift of population from
rural to urban areas in Minnesota had created serious imbalances
in legislative representation. 67 While the federal court had jurisdiction in this case due to the assertion of federal constitutional
claims, the panel believed that the matter would be better decided
by the state legislature than the federal court:
Here it is the unmistakable duty of the State Legislature to
reapportion itself periodically in accordance with recent
population changes. Early in January 1959 the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature will convene, all of the
members of which will be newly elected on November 4th
of this year. The facts which have been presented to us
will be available to them. It is not to be presumed that the
Legislature will refuse to take such action as is necessary
to comply with its duty under the State Constitution. We
defer decision on all the issues presented (including that
of the power of this Court to grant relief), in order to afford the Legislature full opportunity
to "heed the consti36
tutional mandate to redistrict. ,

2. Right to "Day in Court"
In contrast
dictional issues,
ants to proceed
risdiction. In

to the strict scrutiny with which he reviewed jurisJudge Sanborn was committed to allowing claimwith actions in which federal courts clearly had juLeimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.3 6 1 for

trial and appellate court).
364. See, e.g., Hedlund v. Hanson, 213 F. Supp. 172, 173-74 (D. Minn. 1962);
Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 187-88 (D. Minn. 1958).
365. 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
366. Id. at 187.
367. See id. at 186-87.
368. Id. at 187 (citations omitted). "The federal courts are disinclined to
rule on matters peculiarly and primarily of state concern. A healthy respect for
the division of powers between the central government and the states is conducive
to harmonious and effective government on all levels.. . ." Id.
369. 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940).
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example, he observed that the court had traditionally "disapproved
the practice of attempting to put an end to litigation, believed to
be without merit, by dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of
statement."370 He viewed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
embodying the spirit of this tradition in offering "no justification
for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except
where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled
to no relief under37any state of facts which could be proved in sup'
port of the claim."

Judge Sanborn's strong belief in the court system is apparent
in Union Transfer Co. v. Riss & Co. 372 where he wrote:
A surmise, no matter how reasonable, that a party "is unlikely to prevail upon a trial, is not a sufficient basis for refusing him his day in court with respect to issues which
are not shown to be sham, frivolous, or so unsubstantial
that it would obviously be futile to try them."7
After viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs
in Union Transfer,Judge Sanborn determined that trying the claims
would not have been futile. 74 Indeed, he went further to state,
"The claim asserted by the plaintiffs may be groundless, as the District Court thinks it is, but, if so, its groundlessness does not, in our
opinion, so clearly appear as to make a summary judgment an appropriate means of terminating the case. "1375
Significantly, Judge Sanborn did recognize the legitimacy of
dismissing a claim for want of prosecution. In Newport v. Revyuk,376
Judge Sanborn wrote an opinion affirming a decision by District
Judge Roy L. Stephenson37 7 to dismiss such a case.7 8 Judge Sanborn
acknowledged that "[t] he duty rests upon the plaintiff to use dili370. Id. at 305.
371. Id.at 306.
372. 218 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1955).
373. Id. at 554 (quoting Sprague v. Vogt, 150 F.2d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 1945)).
374. Id. at 555.
375. Id.
376. 303 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1962).
377. After many years of able service as a district judge on the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Judge Stephenson subsequently was appointed to the Eighth Circuit, where he served with great distinction from 1971 to
1982. See Special Ceremonial Session in Commemoration of the Hon. Roy L. Stephenson,
696 F.2d LXXXI, LXXXVII (Nov. 17, 1982).
378. Newport, 303 F.2d at 28. "[T]he case had been old and had been productive of nothing for years except motions, countermotions, and Clerk's docket
entries.... They reflect the adroitness of counsel, but no real progress toward
the termination of the litigation." Id.
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gence and to expedite his case to a final determination. "379 Where
the plaintiff fails to do so, the district court has "the inherent
power, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to dismiss a
°
cause for want ofjurisdiction. " 38
In balancing the competing concerns of limited jurisdiction of
federal courts and the need to ensure that parties had their day in
court, Judge Sanborn resolved doubts in favor of allowing a party
to proceed.381 For example, in Sparks v. England,382 the district court
had dismissed a complaint on the ground that it failed to disclose
an amount sufficient to confer jurisdiction in a diversity case. 3 In
reversing the judgment, Judge Sanborn wrote:
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a plaintiff shall plead to every fact essential to his right to recover
the amount which he claims.... This Court has consistently disapproved of the practice of terminating litigation, believed to be without merit, by the dismissal of
complaints for informality or insufficiency of statement.
If it is conceivable that, under the allegations of his complaint, a plaintiff can, upon a trial, establish a case which
would entitle him to the relief prayed for, a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of statement ought naught [sic]
to be granted.3 4
Even though the parties differed on such issues as the plaintiff's
right to damages, the proper measure of those damages, and the
sufficiency of the averments of the complaint, Judge Sanborn determined that this "would not affect the jurisdictionof the court to
the controversy between the parties as to
hear and to determine
3 85
the facts and the law."

379. Id.
380. Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Anderson, 129 F.2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1942)).
381. Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
382. 113 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1940).
383. Id. at 580.
384. Id. at 581-82 (citations omitted).
385. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Sanborn concluded:
Therefore, the court below was not without jurisdiction to try the case
and to determine the issues of fact and the issues of law upon the merits.
The question of the proper measure of damages is, we think, an issue of
law to be determined when the plaintiffs evidence is in. If it then
conclusively appears that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover the jurisdictional amount, the case will be dismissed for want
ofjurisdiction. The plaintiff may not, when her case is tried, be able to
establish her claim or to sustain her theory of the law as to damages, but
it cannot be said, from the face of the complaint, that to a legal certainty
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At the same time, Judge Sanborn recognized the unfairness
involved when a defendant is not given adequate notice of claims
that are to be litigated and adjudicated. He set forth his thoughts
on this principle in Sylvan Beach v. Koch:3s6

A court may not, without the consent of all persons affected, enter a judgment which goes beyond the claim asserted in the pleadings. Unless all parties in interest are
in court and have voluntarily litigated some issue not
within the pleadings, the court can consider only the issues made by the pleadings, and the judgment may not
extend beyond such issues nor beyond the scope of the
relief demanded. A party is no more entitled to recover
upon a claim not pleaded than he is to recover upon a
claim pleaded but not proved.387
Under the principle that has become known as the "Sanborn
Rule" in the Eighth Circuit, Judge Sanborn strongly discouraged
trial judges from granting a motion for directed verdict at the close
of a plaintiffs case unless the proof of the plaintiff was totally without merit or otherwise frivolous.388 In Barnett v. Terminal Railway

Ass'n,"Judge Sanborn wrote:
It is safe to say that in a case such as the one before us, it is
unwise for a trial judge to direct a verdict at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence. We think that, even though the
trial court is of the opinion that the evidence will not support a verdict for the plaintiff, the court should ordinarily
reserve its ruling on a motion for a peremptory instruction until after verdict. That course will usually hasten the
ultimate termination of the litigation and best serve the
interests of both parties. The jury's view of the sufficiency
of the evidence may coincide with that of the court. If it
does not, the court, despite the verdict, can enter judgher claim is without substance or that it is made in bad faith.

Id.
386. 140 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1944).
387. Id. at 861-62 (citations omitted). Judge Sanborn continued:
The foregoing rules are all fundamental and state nothing more than
the essentials of due process and of fair play. They assure to every
person his day in court before judgment is pronounced against him.
They cannot be circumvented by allowing amendments to pleadings to
change a cause of action after judgment or by giving notice of the entry
ofjudgment or by entertaining motions to vacate a judgment after it has
been entered.

Id.
388.
389.

See Barnett v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n, 200 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1953).
Id.
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ment for the defendant. An appeal from such a judgment, entered after verdict, will usually terminate the controversy one way or the other, and avoid a retrial with its
resulting delay, trouble and expense and the possibility of
a second appeal.3 90
The Eighth Circuit has long adhered to this rule and its judges
have regularly felt it appropriate to reiterate the rule "for emphasis
to avoid recurrence of the problem." 39'
3.

The Factfinder

As a circuit judge reviewing findings made either by the district court or an administrative agency, Judge Sanborn recognized
his role was not to retry the facts.3 92 He believed strongly in the importance of the initial factfinding and adjudicating body, and was
disinclined to provide advisory opinions on the applicable law until
after a matter had been fully tried by the factfinder 9 3 He wrote, "It
is only when the evidence is all one way or so overwhelmingly one
way as to leave no doubt as to what the fact is, that the issue becomes one of law," which the court of appeals may then determine
without deference to the factfinder. 394 In his often-cited opinion in
Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,39 5 Judge Sanborn articulated his

for and deference to the trial court as "the trier of
strong respect
96
the facts":

This Court, upon review, will not retry issues of fact or
substitute its judgment with respect to such issues than for
that of the trial court. The power of a trial court to de390. Id.
391. Kuchenbecker v. Northern Wyo. Drilling Co., 647 F.2d 836, 839-40 (8th
Cir. 1981). For examples of cases citingJudge Sanborn's rule on directed verdict
motions, see Morfeld v. Kehm, 803 F.2d 1452, 1454 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986); Kirsch v.
Picker Int'l, 760 F.2d 183, 183-84 (8th Cir. 1985); Hladyshewski v. Robinson, 557 F.2d
1251, 1255 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977); and Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1972).
392. See, e.g., Apex Mining Co. v. Chicago Copper & Chem. Co., 306 F.2d
725, 731 (8th Cir. 1962).
393. See, e.g., Burndy Corp. v. Cahill, 301 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir. 1962).
394. Weiss v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 152, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1955).
395. 139 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1943). For cases citing Cleo Syrup Corp. v. CocaCola Co., see Christiansen v. Great Plains Gas Co., 418 F.2d 995, 998 n.3 (8th Cir.
1969); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1969); St. Louis
Testing Laboratory v. Mississippi Valley StructuralSteel Co., 375 F.2d 565, 567 (8th Cir.
1967); and Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Valley Savings Bank, 343 F.2d 634, 644
n.4 (8th Cir. 1965).
396. Cleo Syrup Corp., 139 F.2d at 417.
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cide doubtful issues of fact is not limited to deciding them
correctly. In a nonjury case, this Court may not set aside
a finding of fact of a trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, unless it is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or
unless it was induced by an er97
roneous view of the law.3

In Pendergrass v. New York Life Insurance Co.,3

98

judge Sanborn
reiterated his strong belief in the context of appellants who sought
de novo review of findings made by the district court in a nonjury
trial. 99 In considering this type of request for relief, Judge Sanborn
wrote that there is no
warrant for the belief that we can retry doubtful issues of
fact upon a cold record, and substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court with respect to such issues, or that a
district court, in non-jury cases, is to act as a sort of special
master for this Court, to report testimony, to make advisory findings, and to enter an advisoryjudgment.
There is no logical reason for placing the findings of
fact of the trial judge upon a substantially lower level of
conclusiveness than the fact findings of a jury of layman,
or those of administrative agency, which m0 be set aside
only if unsupported by substantial evidence.
397. Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted); see also Bros Inc. v.Browning Mfg. Co.,
317 F.2d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 1963) (stating that the district court's decision, based
upon an issue of fact, is conclusive); Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware
Distrib. Co., 253 F.2d 568, 575 (8th Cir. 1958) (Sanborn,J., dissenting) (contending that questions of trademark infringement and unfair competition are questions of fact for the trial court).
398. 181 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1950).
399. Id. at 137.
400. Id. at 138. The opinion continued:
The findings of fact of a trial court should be accepted by this Court as
being correct unless it can be clearly demonstrated that they are without
adequate evidentiary support or were induced by an erroneous view of
the law. The entire responsibility for deciding doubtful fact questions in
a nonjury case should be, and we think it is, that of the district court.
The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or this Court is
the ultimate trier of fact issue in nonjury cases is, we think, detrimental
to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of
litigants and the public in the decisions of the district courts, and
multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.
The sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court's findings
and judgment is, of course, a proper question on review. Whether a
reviewing court thinks that it would or might have made different
findings of fact or have entered a different judgment, had it been the
trier of the facts, is a matter of no consequence. On review, this Court
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Judge Sanborn felt that those who appealed the factual findings and conclusions of the district court seeking review on a de
novo basis fundamentally "misconceived the functions of this
Court."'4°

By granting such review, the court of appeals would find

itself in the odd position of "directing the trial court to believe evidence which it did not credit or which it found to be unconvincto pass
ing."04 2 Judge Sanborn wrote, "This Court is without power
4
13
evidence.
weigh
to
or
witnesses
of
credibility
the
upon
findings.4
Judge Sanborn paid similar deference to agency
For example, in National Labor Relations Board v. May Department
Stores Co., 4°5 Judge Sanborn recognized there are instances where

Congress has expressly entrusted the administrative body, rather
than the court, with the tasks of judging the credibility of witnesses
and weighing the evidence.46 Judge Sanborn wrote that in those
instances "[w]hatever mistakes the [agency] may make in appraising the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence, and in
drawing inferences from conflicting or circumstantial evidence, are
errors of fact which, like similar errors committed by a jury, are not
subject to correction on review. °7 Accordingly, such findings
"upon issues of fact are conclusive on review, no matter how convincing may be the argument that upon the evidence the findings
should have been different." 4°8
However, Judge Sanborn's deference only applied where the
factfinder had drawn inferences adequately supported by the record.49 He was unwilling to affirm findings that represented nothshould refrain from exercising any of the trial functions conferred by law
upon the district courts.
Id.
401. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221 F.2d 695, 696 (8th Cir. 1955)
(quoting Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136 137-38 (8th Cir.

1950)).
402. Gilligan v. Barton, 265 F.2d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1959).
403. Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1960).
404. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wilson Concrete Co., 304 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir. 1962).
405. 162 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1947).
406. Id. at 249.
407. Id.
408. Id.; see also Frank Adam Elec. Co. v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co.,
148 F.2d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 1945) (giving deference to a special master, who tried
the case on the written transcript, because the special master "had no better opportunity to weigh the evidence than we have").
409. See Cupples Co. Mfr. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 100, 117-18 (8th Cir. 1939). In
Cupples,Judge Sanborn observed that evidence that is consistent with two competing hypotheses supports neither. Id. at 118; see also Pittman v. West Ins. Am. Co.,
299 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1962) (affirming trial court's decision to set aside jury
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ing more than accurate guesses. 4' ° He also was prepared to reverse

trial courts when they gave erroneous jury instructions that would
undermine the fact-finding process. 411
Finally, Judge Sanborn had little patience for parties who
sought to use Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
vacate an order or judgment as a substitute for direct appeal. 1 In
Hartman v. Lauchli,41 a party moved to vacate a ruling in a bankruptcy proceeding under Rule 60(b) on the grounds that the ruling was "erroneous., 414 Judge Sanborn wrote, "But if that were so,
what of it?" 41 5
Where jurisdiction properly exists, that

"U] urisdiction to decide is jurisdiction to make wrong, as well as
right, decisions., 41 6 He went on to point out that Rule 60(b) "was

not intended as a substitute for a direct appeal of an erroneous
judgment" and "[t]he fact that a judgment is erroneous does not
constitute a ground for relief under that Rule."'17
4.

TrialJudges

In describing the trial judge's role in litigation, Judge Sanborn
observed "that a trial judge ought to be something more than a
sort of honorary pallbearer during the trial of a lawsuit."41 Judge

Sanborn understood that many trial lawyers believed that trial
judges should "keep their noses out of the trial of lawsuits and let
the lawyers alone."4

19

However, he was guided by the general rule

that "a judge may use his nose to the same extent as an ordinarily
prudent lawyer
would use his under the same or similar circum42 0
stances. ,
verdict because evidence was too insubstantial to sustain finding).
410. See Cupples Co., 106 F.2d at 114.
411. See, e.g., Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1943).
412. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1962). Rule
60(b) sets forth the authority with which the court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
413. Hartman, 304 F.2d at 431.
414. Id. at 432.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Sanborn MSBA Address, supranote 268, at 84.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 85. Judge Sanborn went on to note,
We all know, of course, that almost any judge is capable of advising the
lawyers as to how to try their cases and conduct their business, while a
lawyer, if he amounted to anything at all and felt safe in doing so, could
explain to the judges how to improve their work.
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In Noland v. Buffalo Insurance Co., 1 Judge Sanborn warned that
"[a] ppellate courts should be slow to impute to trial courts a disre-

gard of their duties and responsibilities or a want of diligence or
perspicacity in evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of evidence."4 2 Judge Sanborn believed
that a federal [district] judge [should] be something
more than a mere umpire, a mere oracle of the law; that
he ought to have some force in conducting the course of
the trial, in the interests of justice, and to try to bring
about as nearly as he could a correct outcome of the litigation. 3
On the other hand, "a judge has no business to step out of his role
as a judge and become an advocate and make any argument to a
jury on a controverted question of fact, on questions that belong to
them."424 Accordingly, Judge Sanborn felt the circuit court of appeals must be "scrupulous in seeing that fair trials were
to comment upon evidence
had.., insofar as questions relating
4 25
and the credibility of witnesses."
As a former trial judge, Judge Sanborn not only recognized
and respected the role of federal district judges as fact-finders, but
he also understood and sympathized with the difficult and immediate pressures encountered by district judges in presiding over tri-

Id.
421. 181 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1950).
422. Id. at 739.
423. John Sanborn, Proceedings of the Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 13 MINN. L
REV. 110, 111 (Supp. 1928).
424. Id. In continuing his commentary, Judge Sanborn stated:
Of course if the people of the United States want their judges to be mere
umpires, mere oracles of the law, and merely sit up there and tell the
jury what the law is, without attempting to have anything to do with the
result which shall be obtained in the trial of the case, there is no reason
why they should not have that sort of judge. On the other hand, if they
want men who are supposed, at least presumed to know the law,
presumed to have experience and presumed to be able to point out to a
jury the things which they ought to take into consideration in arriving at
a determination as to whether certain witnesses have told the truth and
certain other witnesses haven't told the truth, or to sum up the evidence
to them, and to point out to them the claims of the parties, why the party
on one side claims the evidence supports his view, and why the party on
the other side claims it supports his, pick out certain inconsistencies in
the evidence and things of that sort, I think the present situation
probably should be continued.
Id. at 112.
425. Id. at ll l.
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als.426 Consequently, he was reluctant to find judicial misconduct as
a basis for reversal.427
In Goldstein v. United States,"8 for example, a criminal defen-

dant appealed his conviction by alleging that, among other things,
the trial judge had made improper comments to the jury during
the course of the trial.429 In his opinion affirming the conviction,
Judge Sanborn pointed out, "The question which we are called
upon to decide is whether these remarks during the progress of the
trial were actually prejudicial to the defendant." 3 Judge Sanborn
was quick to point out that while "[i] n his oral argument, counsel
for the defendant stated that he felt that they did his client no
good," the relevant question is instead "whether they actually did his
client any harm."43
Judge Sanborn frequently sat on panels that reviewed decisions made by federal district judges requiring the interpretation of

426. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 201.
427. See id. at 202.
428. 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1933).
429. Id. at 612-13.
430. Id. at 613.
431. Id. Judge Sanborn elaborated:
It is not always possible during the trial of a hotly contested case for a
judge, however impartial he may be, to maintain in the courtroom that
atmosphere of complete judicial calm which is so much to be desired.
We must not overlook the fact that the human element cannot be
entirely eliminated from the trial of lawsuits. While counsel owe to the
court, because of the position which he occupies, the utmost deference
and respect, and while the court owes to them an equal obligation of
courtesy and patience and consideration, nevertheless sharp differences
of opinion do arise in the heat of trial and things are said which were
better left unsaid. Such incidents are often regarded as trivial during the
trial of a case and are quickly lost sight of, but, when set forth in the
record and emphasized by counsel on appeal, they take on an
importance which they never actually possessed. It is impossible to
gather from the cold record, particularly when it is in narrative form, the
atmosphere of the trial itself, the manner in which the words were
spoken, or the probable affect [sic], if any, which they had upon the
merits of the controversy. Critical remarks of the court frequently cut
both ways, if they cut at all. Colloquies between counsel and colloquies
between the court and counsel as to the rules of evidence are not
ordinarily regarded by a jury as serious matters or of much concern to
them. An appellate court should be slow to reverse a case for the alleged
misconduct of the trial court, unless it appears that the conduct
complained of was intended or calculated to disparage the defendant in
the eyes of the jury and to prevent the jury from exercising an impartial
judgment upon the merits.
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open questions of state law.432 As both a former state district judge
and a former federal district judge, Judge Sanborn had extensive
experience interpreting questions unique to Minnesota law.4 3
Moreover, both before and during his career on the circuit court,
Judge Sanborn enjoyed a collegial relationship with state and federal district judges.434 He respected good judges who could ably
perform what he knew from firsthand experience was a very difficult job.435 He also assumed that federal district judges were quite
familiar with the law of the state in which they sat, due to their previous experience in practice and, in many instances, their earlier
service on the state district court bench.4 6 Thus, he generally extended great deference to federal district courts in reviewing the
interpretation by those courts of previously undecided state law
questions. 43
In Russell v. Turner,438 Judge Sanborn wrote, "The considered
opinion of a trial judge as to a question of local law may properly
be accorded great weight by this court. It will not adopt a view contrary to that of the trial judge unless convinced of error."4

39

He

then clarified his view regarding deference to local law:
This does not mean that an appellant, in order to obtain a
reversal of a judgment in a case such as this, must demonstrate error to a mathematical certainty, but it does mean
that this court will not overrule a decision of a trial judge

432. See, e.g.,
Homolla v. Gluck, 248 F.2d 731, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1957); Citizens Ins. Co.v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1955); Dierks Lumber &
Coal Co.v. Barnett, 221 F.2d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1955); Guyer v. Elger, 216 F.2d
537, 540 (8th Cir. 1954); Western Cas. & Sur. Co.v. Coleman, 186 F.2d 40, 43 (8th
Cir. 1950); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 315 (8th Cir. 1950); Pendergrass v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950); Russell v. Turner, 148 F.2d
562, 564 (8th Cir. 1945); Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709, 713 (8th Cir.
1943).
433. See Telephone Interview with Floyd Gibson, supra note 310.
434. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 203.
435. See Whittaker, supra note 17, at 201.
436. See, e.g., Guyer, 216 F.2d at 539 (commenting on the Honorable Henry
N. Graven's experience as a state district judge prior to his appointment to the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa).
437. See, e.g., Wackerle v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 219 F.2d 1, 8-10 (8th
Cir. 1955) (Sanborn, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 426-28 and accompanying
text. The Eighth Circuit was the first federal circuit to adopt this rule of deference. See Magill 133 F.2d at 713 (Sanborn, J.); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to
Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law,
73 MiNN.L. REv. 899, 990 (1989).
438. 148 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1945).
439. Id. at 564.
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upon a question of state law except for cogent and convincing reasons. All that this court reasonably can be expected to do in reviewing cases governed by state law is to
see that the determination of the trial court is not induced
by a clear misconception or misapplication of the
440
law.
Judge Sanborn recognized that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit was not a state appellate court and therefore "establishe [d] no rules of law for that State.""' Thus, he stated, "If a federal district judge has reached a permissible conclusion upon a
question of local law, we will not reverse, even though we may
think the law should be otherwise. "" '
On more than one occasion, Judge Sanborn admonished
plaintiffs-appellants who sought review of an adverse ruling that if
they desired a definitive ruling with respect to state law, they
should have brought the action in state court. 443 He pointed out
that if they had done so, they could have appealed any adverse ruling to the state supreme court."4 He further explained:
Having invoked the jurisdiction of the federal District
Court, the plaintiff can prevail on appeal only if it can
demonstrate that the determination of that court was induced by a clear misconception of the local law or a clear
misapplication of it to the evidentiary facts. A decision by
a federal court in a case governed by state law is necessarily largely a forecast of what in a similar case the supreme
court of the state would hold the law to be." 5

As such, "this Court has consistently refused to attempt to outpredict, outforecast or outguess a trial judge with respect to a doubtful
question of the law of his State. " 4
Despite his great sympathy for and understanding of the difficulties faced by district judges, Judge Sanborn recognized there
were situations where the trial court may lose control of the proceedings and an unfair trial may result. For example, in Kroger Gro440. Id. (citations omitted); see also Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 315 (8th
Cir. 1950) (citing Russell for the importance of relying on the trial court's construction of local law).
441. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Coleman, 186 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1950).
442. Id.
443. See, e.g., Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221 F.2d 695, 697 (8th
Cir. 1955); Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1955).
444. See Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 221 F.2d at 697.
445. Id.
446. Homolla v. Gluck, 248 F.2d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1957).
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cery & Baking Co. v. Stewart," 7judge Sanborn observed:
Unfortunately, the trial at times deteriorated into a sort of
brawl between opposing counsel, distracting to the court
and no doubt equally distracting to the jury. Under the
circumstances, it seems more probable that the jury's verdict represents its appraisal of the relative merits of the attorneys than a considered judgment of the8 merits of the
case based upon the evidence and the law.4
Judge Sanborn went on to state that, in the interest of an orderly
administration of justice, all that reasonably can be done will be
done to assure litigants that a trial in a U.S. district court "shall be
so conducted that the verdict of the jury fairly may be assumed to
be based upon an impartial consideration of the evidence and the
applicable law."" 9
5.

Evidence

Judge Sanborn firmly believed that "the purpose of rules of
evidence is to get at the truth; not to suppress it."450 He recognized

that the Federal Rules of Evidence "contemplate that every litigant
shall have a trial of his case upon its merits and in accordance with
the evidence and the applicable law. " 451 Consistent with this strong

belief that a trial should be an effort to determine the truth and
the corresponding principle that a trial should be based on the review of all available admissible evidence, Judge Sanborn opposed
arbitrary restrictions on the admission of relevant evidence.452
For example, Judge Sanborn believed attorneys should be
given wide latitude in the cross-examination of witnesses.4u In London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woee,45 4 he discussed a traditional
rule that unduly restricted an attorney in cross-examination.
Specifically, a party was not allowed to impeach its own witnesses by
showing they had previously made statements deemed contradic-

447. 164 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1947).
448. Id. at 844.
449. Id. at 845.
450. Woodward v. United States, 185 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1950).
451. Ettman v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 121, 127 (8th Cir. 1943).
452. See, e.g., Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha Ry. Co. v. Kulp, 102
F.2d 352, 358 (8th Cir. 1939); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83
F.2d 325, 332-34 (8th Cir. 1936).
453. See Nordbye, supra note 12, at 202.
454. 83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1936).
455. Id. at 332-34.
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456

tory of or inconsistent with their present testimony. Judge Sanborn pointed out that this rule, "in the interests of justice, has
457
come to be more honored in its breach than in its observance."
Judge Sanborn considered this rule arbitrary and counterproductive:
Viewing a trial as a sporting event in which only the parties have any interest, the rule might be adhered to, like
one of the rules of any game. The purpose of a trial,
however, is to seek for and, if possible, find the truth and
to do justice between the parties according to the actual
facts and the law, and any rule which stands in the way of
ascertaining the truth and thus hampers the administration ofjustice must give way. 458
Judge Sanborn's philosophy regarding the liberal admission of
relevant evidence was tempered by his concerns regarding the significant problems that could be caused by the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence. For example, in a rare dissent characterized
by the Honorable Gerald W. Heaney as one that "has withstood the
test of time and is supported both in logic and in human experience,"459 Judge Sanborn argued in Packineau v. United States

°

that

the district court properly had barred cross-examination of a rape
victim relating to her sexual activities prior to the time of a violent
and forcible rape.46' Injudge Sanborn's view, the evidence that the
defense sought to introduce was "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and had no bearing whatever upon any issue in the
case." 462 He contended that "lt] here is no sound reason why [the
victim] in a case such as this, after her direct examination in chief,
should be subjected on cross-examination to an attempted besmirching of her character for chastity by insinuation or innuendo."4 63 While the defendant may seek to demonstrate the victim
"was an immoral woman," the evidence is still irrelevant because
"[e]ven an immoral woman has some freedom of selection, and
consent obtained from such a woman by a stunning blow on the
456. See id. at 332.
457. Id. Judge Sanborn's observation in this regard was later noted with approval by his friend and colleague, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit.
See United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1957).
458. Woe~le, 83 F.2d at 332 (citations omitted).
459. United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 1978) (Heaney, J.).
460. 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953) (Sanborn,J, dissenting).
461. Id. at 688-89.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 689.
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jaw is no consent at all.,
Although Judge Sanborn and his predecessor on the bench,
Judge Walter H. Sanborn, held different political philosophies, the
two were in agreement with respect to the role of the jury. In
Woelfie, 5 Judge John Sanborn quoted with approval an earlier
opinion authored by Judge Walter Sanborn in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Field:
Under our system of jurisprudence it is the province of
the jury in actions at law to try and determine the rights of
parties according to the law and the evidence. It is the
duty of the court and of its officers, the counsel of the
parties, to prevent the jury from the consideration of extraneous issues, of irrelevant evidence, and of erroneous
views of the law, to guard it against the influence of passion and prejudice, and to assure to the litigants a fair and
impartial trial. An omission by court or counsel to discharge this duty, or a persistent violation
of it, is a fatal er6
ror, because it makes the trial unfair.4
Judge Sanborn believed that in bench trials, all evidence
should be admitted and then sifted through when the district court
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law.6 7 In Builders Steel
Co. v. Commissionerof InternalRevenue,4Judge Sanborn wrote:
One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received, and, since he will base his
findings upon the evidence which he regards as competent, material and convincing, he cannot be injured by
the presence in the record of testimony which he does not

464. Id.
465. London Guarantee & Accident Co v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.
1936).
466. Id. at 340 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Field, 137 F. 14, 15 (8th Cir.
1905)). The opinion continued:
The property of a defendant may not be lawfully transferred to a plaintiff
without an impartial trial of the controversies between them. A trial is
not fair and impartial in which a discussion of irrelevant issues, a statement of a persuasive but immaterial fact, or the assertion or insinuation

of an erroneous view of the law or of the wrong measure of damages by
counsel in his address to the jury, may have had an influence favorable
to his client.
Id.
467.
468.

See Easleyv. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 265 (8th Cir. 1985).
179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

71

William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 23,
[1997], Art. 4
WILLAM
MITCHELL
LAIss.
W2
REVIEW

[Vol. 23

consider competent or material.469
This common sense and pragmatic approach has, of course, withstood the test of time and continues to be followed by circuit
judges throughout the country.470
6

CriminalPracticeand Procedure

One of Judge Sanborn's ultimate concerns as a judge was that
the criminal defendant have his or her "full day in court" by way of
adequate representation, fair review of the facts, and accurate application of the law.47' He always recognized that a criminal defen-

469. Id. at 379. Judge Sanborn explained:
In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to
commit reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not .... On the other hand, a trial judge who, in the trial of
a nonjury case, attempts to make strict rulings on the admissibility of
evidence, can easily get his decision reversed by excluding evidence
which is objected to, but which, on review, the appellate court believes
should have been admitted ....
[E]ven if the trier of facts, by making
close rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, does save himself some
time, that saving will be more than offset by the time consumed by the
reviewing court in considering the propriety of his rulings and by the
consequent delay in the final determination of the controversy.
Id.; see also Willmark Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1963) (citing Builders Steel Co.; stating that the trial court could not have committed reversible error in receiving incompetent evidence). However, Judge Sanborn did admonish district judges that "findings of fact should be 'a clear and concise
statement of the ultimate facts, and not a statement, report, or recapitulation of
evidence from which such facts may be found or inferred.'" Brown Paper Mill Co.
v. Irvin, 134 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir. 1943) (citing Anglo-American Land, Mortgage
& Agency Co. v. Lombard, 132 F. 721, 734 (8th Cir. 1904)).
470. See, e.g., First Am. State Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 319, 328
(8th Cir. 1990) (Magill, J.); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682
F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1982) (Coffin, J.); Fields Eng'g & Equip., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,
651 F.2d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 1981) (Arnold, J.); Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320, 324 (8th Cir. 1976) (McCree, J.);
Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1975) (Thomsen, J.); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F. 213, 219-20 (6th Cir. 1970) (Brooks, J.);
Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 1956) (Sobeloff, J.); see also
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1201 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (Glasser, J.) (appraising the Builders Steel Co. approach to receiving questionable evidence).
471. See, e.g., Davidson v. United States, 312 F.2d 163, 167 (8th Cir. 1963);
Taylor v. United States, 308 F.2d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 1962); Bistram v. United
States, 283 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1960). Judge Sanborn once recounted a program
he had attended at an Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in Kansas City, where
certain judges discussed in public the American criminal justice system:
The first judge who spoke delivered some ideas with reference to
criminal practice and procedure, the substance of which was, in a
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dant was entitled to a fair trial - not a perfect trial. In reviewing
criminal convictions, Judge Sanborn would point out that "in order
to make a case for the jury, the government is not required to establish the guilt of a defendant to a mathematical certainty or beyond the possibility of a doubt"7 and "[w] hile the government had
47 4
the burden of proof, it was not required to make a perfect case."
He felt that "[t]he unsubstantial imperfections or irregularities
which occur in the trial of nearly every criminal case47 5are not, on review, to be raised to the dignity of reversible error.,

Judge Sanborn recognized the important role of the federal
prosecutor in ensuring fairness in the criminal justice system, keeping error out of the record, and thus preventing "the frustration of
the government's efforts to secure a valid conviction. "476 He likewise condemned defense counsel who attempted to manufacture
error by, for example, requesting certain jury instructions, "not for
the purpose of assisting the trial court, but for the purpose of having something to argue about in case of a conviction. 477 Judge
general way, that society in America didn't seem to be adequately
protecting itself against the underworld, and that the constitutional
rights of the criminal were being a bit overdone; that in Scotland
majority verdicts were permitted in criminal cases, and also in some
other foreign countries, and that in those places the violation of law
appeared to be less of an indoor and outdoor sport than with us. The
suggestion was that the decent people of this country, who are presumed
to be in a majority, might well examine some of the methods of
countries which seem to be having measurable success in dealing with
crime. What was said did not seem to me to furnish any particular cause
for excitement, but the next judge called upon took violent exception to
the remarks which had been made, and expressed himself as being
entirely satisfied that the American method of dealing with crime was all
that it should be. The gist of his remarks, as I gathered it, was that the
criminal was just as much entitled to constitutional rights as anyone else
and very much more in need of them, and, anyway, how did we know
that we had any criminals until a jury had informed us beyond a
reasonable doubt that we did have.... I may not have caught all that
was said, because I was trying to figure out some way to avoid becoming
involved in the hostilities which seemed iminent [sic]. Fortunately, the
next judge who was called upon said that he wanted it distinctly
understood that he disagreed with both previous speakers, and changed
the subject.
Sanborn MSBA Address, supra note 268, at 85.
472. See Interview with William S. Fallon, supranote 303.
473. Franks v. United States, 164 F.2d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1947).
474. Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1949).
475. Garner v. United States, 277 F.2d 242, 245 (8th Cir. 1960).
476. Schuermann, 174 F.2d at 401.
477. Id.
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Sanborn also was critical of defense counsel who sought reversal
for error that counsel failed to object to at the time of trial: "A trial
judge ordinarily should not be held to have erred in not deciding
correctly a question that he was never asked to decide." 478 Because

Judge Sanborn almost always held in favor of the government in
criminal matters,479 federal prosecutors breathed more easily when
Judge Sanborn was on the panel of circuit judges reviewing a
criminal conviction.4 °
As with civil proceedings, Judge Sanborn was a strong believer
in the jury system in criminal proceedings. He believed that the
guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant was a question of fact
for the jury, and not a question of law for the court. 48 It was not
for the court of appeals, in reviewing an appeal from a conviction,
to weigh the conflicting facts, circumstances, and inferences of the
trial proceedings.4 2
Judge Sanborn's guiding principle that criminal defendants
were entitled to a fair, not perfect, trial applied to jury selection as
well as all other aspects of a criminal trial. "The right to an impartially selected jury, assured by the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not entitle one accused of a crime to a jury he considers best
adapted to his peculiar needs.... A fair and reasonable4 way of securing an impartial jury is all that due process requires. 83
However, Judge Sanborn was aware of and concerned by the
influence pretrial publicity of particular types of crimes could have
on the fair selection of jurors. He pointed out that " [h] omicides,
rapes, assaults, jailbreaks and the like are grist to the mills of news
gatherers." 48 4 He wrote:

Whether ajudge, in a case [where there has been substantial pretrial coverage], may still act upon a belief that
qualified jurors are persons of integrity "fit to play the
part assigned to them by our law" and competent to perform their tasks in the administration of criminal justice
478. Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 1960).
479. See, e.g., Slocum v. United States, 325 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 1963);
Bronzin v. United States, 309 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir. 1962); Page, 282 F.2d at 813.
480. See Interview with William S. Fallon, supra note 303; Telephone Interview with Robert Tucker, supra note 306.
481. See Bronzin, 309 F.2d at 160.
482. See id. (citing Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 858, 868 (8th Cir.
1947)); see also Slocum, 325 F.2d at 468 ("The credibility of witnesses and the
weight of evidence is no concern of this Court.").
483. Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1963).
484. Id.

https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4

74

1997]

THE
HONORABLE
B. SANBORN,
Boyd: The
Life
and Career ofJOHN
the Honorable
John JR.
B. Sanborn, Jr.

in accordance with their oath, is debatable.4 5
Judge Sanborn acknowledged the point of view expressed by U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Robert Jackson and Felix Frankfurter that,
in some such cases, "the trial was but a legal gesture to register a
verdict already
dictated by the press and the public opinion which
48 6
it generated."

Judge Sanborn pointed out that a trial judge formulating a
charge to ajury
is entitled to use his own language and is not required to
let counsel for either party put words into his mouth. If
the charge is accurate and gives to the jury all of the law
which it needs in order to reach a verdict, that is enough.
A charge should be a concise statement of the claims of
the parties, the issues of fact which the jury must decide,
and the applicable law.487
Once the judge has made an accurate and correct charge, the extent of its amplification must rest largely with his discretion.
However, Judge Sanborn warned, "Frequently, to attempt to explain understandable language is merely to confuse. If the4 9instructions given cover the case and are correct, that is enough."

Judge Sanborn conceded that the rule concerning a trial
judge's comments in jury instructions are more easily stated than
applied. 490 Accordingly, the manner in which this rule "is applied
by a reviewing court seems to depend somewhat upon whether that
court regards a jury as composed of sensible, intelligent, responsible human beings or of rather spineless individuals of weak mental49
ity, easily led astray, and not overly familiar with the facts of life." 1
Judge Sanborn regarded jurors as having the former rather than
the latter characteristics.
Judge Sanborn also did not believe that leave to withdraw a
guilty plea should be readily granted to a defendant who voluntarily entered a guilty plea. 92 He believed that a guilty plea was not
485. Id. at 399 (quoting and agreeing with Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 249-50 (1910)).
486. Id. (quoting Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951)).
487. Wright v. United States, 175 F.2d 384, 388 (8th Cir. 1949).
488. See Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1960).
489. Id. (citations omitted).
490. See Garner v. United States, 277 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1960).
491. Id.
492. See Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 1952). Judge

Sanborn elaborated:
While the courts should, of course, do all that reasonably may be done to
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merely an admission of guilt, but "in and
49 of itself[,] a conviction
and as conclusive as the verdict of ajury."
7.

,

Civil Liberties and "Mob Rule"

49
In Sellers v. Johnson,
jJudge Sanborn wrote an opinion address-

ing freedom of religion under the First Amendment.49 5 The case
arose from a disturbance that occurred in the small town of Lacona, Iowa, and involved a group of Jehovah's Witnesses who had
attempted to hold a series of religious meetings in the Lacona public park. 96 In addition to efforts to stop these meetings through
political channels, the opponents also attempted to block these
meetings with physical violence. 7 Ultimately, the town sheriff dispersed the meeting and ordered the Jehovah's Witnesses to leave
the park.9 When they tried to hold another meeting the following
Sunday, the sheriff and approximately one hundred special deputies and some state highway patrolmen turned away the Jehovah's
Witnesses.499
Eventually, the Jehovah's Witnesses sought to obtain a preliminary injunction from the federal district court to restrain the
sheriff from preventing their assembly.509 The district court concluded that while the Jehovah's Witnesses had a constitutional right
to assemble in a public place for peaceful purposes, the court
would not issue the injunction because it believed the sheriff had
acted with the reasonable belief that stopping the Jehovah's Witmake certain that a plea of guilty represents the free and voluntary act of
the defendant who understands the nature of the offense charged
against him and the consequences of his plea, we think there is no
reason for the adoption of a soft and complacent attitude toward
permitting a withdrawal of such pleas. In the interest of proper law
enforcement and an orderly administration of criminal justice, one who
is accused of crime should be given to understand that he is at perfect
liberty to enter a plea of not guilty and to have a trial of the issue of his
guilt or innocence, but that if he enters a plea of guilty he will have to
abide whatever sentence the court lawfully may impose upon him.
Id. at 696-97.
493. Woodring v. United States, 248 F. 2d 166, 169 (8th Cir. 1957) (citing
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1927)).
494. 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947).
495. Id. at 877.
496. Id.
497. See id. at 879 ("There were numerous fist fights, with the usual results bloody faces, black eyes, broken glasses and teeth, and torn clothing.").
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. See Sellers v.Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778, 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946).
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nesses from meeting "was necessary in order to prevent riot and
bloodshed, and that in doing so he acted 'within the scope of
his
50
1
existed.'
then
it
as
situation
the
under
properly
and
authority
The court of appeals reversed the district court. Judge Sanborn, author of the opinion, and the other judges on the panel
were skeptical as to
whether State action which deprives a group of persons of
the fundamental constitutional rights of assembly, speech
and worship can ever be justified upon the ground that
the group is so offensive to the community in which it
proposes to meet that the only way to maintain order and
to prevent
bloodshed is to bar the group from the com53
munity.

Judge Sanborn indicated that the facts before the court in this
case certainly did not justify that type of state action and pointed
out that the "disorder" in the park "is fully as consistent with the
hypothesis that the disorder was due to the failure of the local and
State authorities to police the park as it is with the hypothesis that
the unpopularity of the Jehovah's Witnesses was so great that the
only means of maintaining order in the future was to deny them
access to the Town."5 0 4 He concluded:

The only sound way to enforce the law is to arrest and

501. Id. at 788. The district court further held that
the threat of mob violence in Lacona was apparent and real, substantial

and grave, and a clear and present danger to the peace and quiet of the
town and the situation warranted the sheriff in barring the [Jehovah's
Witnesses] from the town, even though it interfered with their right of
assembly and free speech.

Id.
502. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947). Judge Sanborn began
his analysis with the following statement:
The theory that a group of individuals may be deprived of their

constitutional rights of assembly, speech and worship if they have
become so unpopular with, or offensive to, the people of a community
that their presence in a public park to deliver a Bible lecture is likely to
result in riot and bloodshed, is interesting but somewhat difficult to

accept. Under such a doctrine, unpopular political, racial, and religious
groups might find themselves virtually inarticulate.
Certainly the
fundamental rights to assemble, to speak, and to worship cannot be
abridged merely because persons threatened to stage a riot or because

peace officers believe or are afraid that breaches of the peace will occur
if the fights are exercised.

Id. at 881.
503. Id. at 881-82.
504. Id. at 882.
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prosecute those who violate the law. The Jehovah's Witnesses were at all times acting lawfully, and those who attacked them, for the purpose of preventing them from
holding their religious meeting... were acting unlawfully
50 5
and without any legal justification for their conduct.
In 1934, Judge Sanborn sat on the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota in Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson,5 6 to determine whether Floyd B. Olson, the pro-labor Governor of Minnesota, could invoke martial law to quell violence that had arisen as a
result of the truck drivers' strike in Minneapolis. 7 In a per curiam
opinion, the panel declined to address the fundamental underlying
issue:
Whether in the state of Minnesota there can be martial
law or martial rule, in the sense of government by executive edict rather than law, while the courts are open and
while the civil authorities are still functioning, although
unable to cope with an outbreak of violence, is a question,
the final determination of which must rest with the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In the absence of the determination of that question by that court, we are not prepared to say that the Governor does not have that right
under the Constitution and the laws of this state. °8
The court was uncomfortable with the manner in which Governor Olson had handled this matter. Specifically, the panel
pointed out that there was substantial foundation for the truck
owners' belief that the Governor was using his powers to coerce
them to accept a plan by federal mediators that was acceptable to
labor but not management. 5°9 The panel further observed, "During
the entire history of the State, so far as we are advised, no chief executive has ever before found it necessary to declare martial rule or
to do more than assist the local authorities in times of emergency.,510
Nonetheless, the panel recognized that in the final analysis,
"the duty of enforcing the laws in Minneapolis, under the circumstances, was a duty which rested upon the Governor and not upon

505. Id. at 883.
506. 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934). District Judges Nordbye and MolyneauxjoinedJudge Sanborn on the panel. Id.
507. Id. at 866.
508. Id. at 868.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 869.
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the courts. The responsibility was his responsibility.... Military
rule."51 1
rule is preferable under almost any circumstances to mob
Accordingly, the court denied the applications for preliminary injunctions that would restrict or regulate Governor Olson's authority in this regard. 2
In 1936, Judge Sanborn was again called upon to address these
same issues when he sat on a three-judge panel on the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota in Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson.51 3 In that case, business owners sought to require Governor Olson to call out troops to protect Strutwear Knitting's business operations and property against possible damage and violence by its
514
In another per curiam opinion, the panel
striking employees.
observed that "[i] t is as much the duty of the state to protect property from destruction by mob violence and to preserve the liberty
of the citizen to use his property lawfully as it is to protect the same
property from theft or arson."515 The panel went on to hold that
It]he fact that a large group of individuals may have a
grievance, just or unjust, against an owner of property will
511. Id. The panel pointed out that
the Governor must bear the entire responsibility for the type of
protection that he is affording to the citizens of Minneapolis and
Hennepin County. The federal courts have no troops at their command
and cannot police the city.... While we may personally disagree with the
Governor as to the manner in which he has handled the entire situation,
that will not justify nor permit the relief prayed for.

Id.
512. See Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D. Minn.
1934).
513. 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936). District Judges Nordbye and Joyce
joined Judge Sanborn on the panel. Id.

514. Id. at 385-89.
515. Id. at 390 (citing Sterlingv. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932)). The
panel wrote:
The rules of law which are in the main controlling are elementary and
are known to every intelligent citizen. The owners of homes, of
factories, of churches, of stores, of automobiles, and of every kind of real
and personal property, are by the Constitution of the United States
protected in their rights to possess their own property and to use it in
any lawful manner that they see fit. To guard them in the free
enjoyment of these rights guaranteed them by the Constitution is the
duty and one of the main purposes of organized government....
No official entrusted with the enforcement of the law can select the
laws which he will enforce or the citizens that he will protect. He has
sworn to enforce all laws and to protect all citizens, and there is no
escape for him "from the paramount authority of the Federal
Constitution."
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not warrant a resort to violence to remedy that grievance,

nor will the hazard, inconvenience, and expense involved
in suppressing the violence justify the state in refusing to
enforce the law or in depriving the owner of his property
or his right to enjoy it. To say that, because the lawful use
of property will incite lawless persons to commit crimes
and to destroy life and property, such lawful use must be
suppressed, is to say that the will of a mob, and not the

Constitution of the United States, has become the supreme law of the land. 516
The panel cited the earlier decision in Powers Mercantile Co. v. 01son5 17 to support the principle that the governor not only had the
authority, but also the responsibility, to exercise his powers to protect property and quell violent disturbances rather than to surrender to mob rule.'
In 1959, after taking senior status, Judge Sanborn sat with the
516. Id.
517. 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).
518. Strutwear Knitting Co., 13 F. Supp. at 391. The panel wrote:
That surrender to the demands of a public enemy in time of war or
accession to the demands of insurrectionists or rioters, at other times, is
one way of restoring peace and quelling disorder, no one will deny. It
has a direct, even though a dishonorable, relation to the maintenance of
order, but no relation at all to the preservation of law. It results in the
restoration of peace and order at the sacrifice of law. As the plaintiff has
aptly pointed out in this case, it does not require troops or police to
assist it in surrendering its constitutional rights to possess and use its
plant. It can do that for itself....
There could be but one final result, namely, a complete breakdown
of government and a resort to force both by the law-abiding and the
lawless. A rule which would permit an official, whose duty it was to
enforce the law, to disregard the very law which it was his duty to
enforce, in order to pacify a mob or suppress an insurrection, would
deprive all citizens of any security in the enjoyment of their lives, liberty,
or property. The churches, the stores, the newspapers, and the channels
of communication and of trade and commerce, and the homes of the
people themselves, could be closed by the civil authorities under such a
rule, in case the owners had in some way offended a sufficiently large
group of persons willing to resort to violence in order to close them.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the rule would result in the civil
authorities suppressing lawlessness by compelling the surrender of the
intended victims of lawlessness. The banks could be closed and emptied
of their cash to prevent bank robberies; the post office locked to prevent
the mails being robbed; the citizens kept off the streets to prevent
holdups; and a person accused of murder could be properly
surrendered to the mob which threatened to attack the jail in which he
was confined.
Id. (citations omitted).
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U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota on a final threejudge panel dealing with a governor's imposition of martial law. In
Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 9 Governor Orville Freeman had declared
martial law to quell the violence that had erupted in Albert Lea,
Minnesota, as a result of a strike by organized labor at a non-union
meat packing plant. 2 ° The panel - which also included Judges Devitt and Nordbye - acknowledged the governor's implicit authority
to declare martial law in instances where "the duly constituted government is usurped and overcome by the insurrectionists or
mobs." 52 The panel went on to note, however, that even where a
"disturbance caused by a strike or otherwise presents a situation
with which the local police or other law enforcement agencies are
not able to cope, it does not follow that, without more, the drastic
and oppressive rule of martial law can be imposed on any community."522 On the contrary, "the basis for martial law assumes that local government has completely broken 5down
and is, or is about to
23
bel[,] taken over by the forces of a mob."
The panel went on to review and discuss the particular facts in
Wilson & Co.,524 finding that "[t]he Governor possesses no absolute

519. 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
520. Id. at 523-24.
521. Id. at 525.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 526. The panel observed:
At the time the Governor declared martial law, the local government of
the City of Albert Lea and the County of Freeborn was functioning. The
courts were open, the citizens were moving freely in and about their
daily pursuits without danger, except those who desired to continue with
their work for plaintiff. The District Court of Freeborn County had
issued restraining orders against mass picketing and violence, and
contempt citations by reason of the violation of such orders had been set
for hearing before the court, but without any attempt to call out the
National Guard in aid of the civil authorities in maintaining peace and
order in the suppression of mob violence, the Governor summarily
declared martial law for the City of Albert Lea and the entire county of
Freeborn. The rights of the courts to proceed against members of the
mob by way of contempt were enjoined. The workers who desired to
return to their work at the plant were forbidden to return, and plaintiffs
right under the Federal Constitution to operate its plant was abrogated
by the decree of the military.
We are not unmindful of the discretion which must necessarily rest
in the Governor of a State in determining whether martial law, with the
resulting deprivation of constitutional rights, shall be imposed upon any
community.
Moreover, we recognize that courts should proceed
cautiously before interfering with the acts of a Governor of a sovereign
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authority to declare martial law. Military rule cannot be imposed
upon a community simply because it may seem to be more expedient than to enforce the law by using the National Guard to aid the
local civil authorities." 52 5

The panel also demonstrated its great

concern for the adverse consequences of martial law:
[W]e cannot subscribe to the principle or doctrine that a
Governor of a State may bow to the demands of a lawviolating mob that a plant under strike shall be closed
when neither the local nor State authorities have used all
the means available to them to suppress the mob by involving enforcement of the laws of the State enacted to be
enforced under such circumstances. Peace and order may
be restored by acceding to the demands of the mob, but
at the sacrifice of law. Such expedient measures would
encourage and breed mob rule and law violations in every
labor dispute. No citizen would be secure in the peaceful
possession of his property ....
A declaration of martial law connotes the disintegration of the local and State Government which has been
created to maintain peace and order under civil rule.
Under martial law, all constitutional rights could conceivably be abolished. There could be no freedom of the
press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure, and all courts
could be abolished except the military courts established
by the military.526i
The panel concluded that
[u]nder the factual presentation [in Wilson &. Co.], it
would be a shocking reflection on the stability of our State
Government if the State could not quell the mob action in
State in determining that martial law is necessary in the State of which he
is the chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the
State. We are also mindful of the necessity of preventing bloodshed and
that property rights must at times be sacrificed in order to prevent the
spilling of blood. But a free people do not surrender to mob rule by the
expediency of martial law until all means available to the City, County
and State to enforce the laws have proved futile. The imposition of the
drastic action and the curtailment of constitutional rights of citizens of a
State resulting from a declaration of martial law, cannot be sustained
except in situations of dire necessity. We are convinced that that
situation has not as yet arisen in Freeborn County.

Id.
525. Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 526-27 (D. Minn. 1959)
(citing Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Minn. 1936)).
526. Id. at 527-28.
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Freeborn County without declaring martial law and decreeing the deprivation of constitutional
rights of those
27
who are the victims of the lawlessness.
Accordingly, " [ t]he abdication of our civil form of government to
military rule, with the seizure of private property in contravention
of Federal
constitutional rights, cannot be sustained on this rec528
ord."

8.

Habeas Corpus

5
In Byrd v. Pescor,'Judge
Sanborn pointed out that a defendant
in a criminal case in the federal courts needs to follow the regular
course of proceedings and exhaust all of the ordinary remedies before resorting to habeas corpus. 530 He believed that a hearing on
habeas corpus "is not in the nature of an appeal nor is it a substitute for the functions of the trial court; and that this is true with respect to both issues of law and fact."2 1 Judge Sanborn embraced
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes' words as accurately reflecting
his own beliefs and understanding with regard to the then-existing
law of habeas corpus:
It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus
is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is
no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired. The rule
requiring resort to appellate procedure when the trial
court has determined its own jurisdiction of an offense is
not a rule denying the power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus when it appears that nevertheless the trial court
was without jurisdiction. The rule is not one defining
power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise
of power. It has special application where there are essential questions of fact determinable by the trial court. It is
applicable also to the determination in which ordinary
cases of disputed matters of law whether they relate to the
sufficiency of the indictment or the validity of the statute
on which the charge is based. But it is equally true that
the rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy af-

527. Id. at 528.
528. Id.
529. 163 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1947).
530. Id. at 779-80.
531. Id. (citations omitted).
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forded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.5 3 2
In applying the doctrine that requires the exhaustion of
remedies, Judge Sanborn recognized that federal courts must respect the rights and authority of the states in the first instance to
review and correct, if necessary, any errors or injustices that may
have occurred.533 Moreover, he understood that the federal circuit
court was not to be used as a shortcut to "overrule the decision of
the State Supreme Court and vacate the judgment and sentence
imposed by the State trial court which had jurisdiction
of the ap'5
pellant's person and the offense charged against him." 4
On occasion, Judge Sanborn may have become frustrated with
petitioners who sought the writ based on facts that seemed patently
unbelievable.535 Nonetheless, he recognized that these petitioners
had the right, under law, to a hearing on their petition. 36 For example, in Conley v. Cox, 53 ' a prison inmate appealed the dismissal of
his petition by a district court in which the prisoner had alleged his
guilty plea had been coerced by a federal law enforcement officer.53 8 In reversing the district court, Judge Sanborn wrote, "There
may not be a word of truth in what the petitioner says, but the fact
that he says that he was thus coerced raises an issue which apparently entitles him to a hearing upon his petition."53 9 Judge Sanborn
went on to write that "[n] o doubt, to an experienced trial judge,

532. Id. at 780 (citations omitted) (citing Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19,
26-27 (1939) (Hughes, C.J.)).
533. See Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1950); Flansburg v.
Kaiser, 144 F.2d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1944); Guy v. Utecht, 144 F.2d 913, 916-17 (8th
Cir. 1944).
534. Flansburg,144 F.2d at 918; see also Guy, 144 F.2d at 916-17 (refusing to
vacate judgment and sentencing where petitioner failed to exhaust court remedies).
535. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra note 70.
536. See Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1952). Affirming the
lower court's dismissal of a pro se petitioner's writ,Judge Sanborn remarked:
The federal court should, we think, do all that reasonably and lawfully
may be done to dispose of petitions for habeas corpus, and kindred
proceedings, which are patently frivolous or obviously without merit, as
expeditiously and with as little trouble and expense to the respondents
as possible. While it is important that no prisoner be denied justice
because of his poverty, it is also important that the prison authorities,
government counsel, and the courts be not harassed by patently
repetitious, meritless, frivolous or malicious proceedings.

Id.
537.
538.
539.

138 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1943).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 787-88.
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the story of the petitioner upon its face seems fantastic and absurd,
but this court may not disregard the recent rulings of the Supreme
0
Court with respect to the rights of petitioners in such cases.'54
Over time, Judge Sanborn became concerned with the increasing trend of habeas petitioners to claim "ineffective assistance of
counsel" as a basis for seeking relief from their convictions:
It is unfortunate that reputable members of the bar who
are appointed to represent indigent defendants and who
do what can be done to protect and defend them, should,
after verdict, be charged with incompetence or worse.
The truth is, of course, that to the criminal mind no trial
is fair that does not result in an acquittal, no jury is impartial that does not return a verdict of not guilty, and no
counsel is effective if the defendant is convicted, notwithstanding the evidence against him.54'
Judge Sanborn was complimentary and appreciative of the defense
and representation 542that court-appointed counsel provided to
criminal defendants.

Despite the seeming regularity of frivolous and procedurallydeficient petitions, Judge Sanborn did recognize there were times a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. For example, in Mothershead v. King,545 a deaf inmate filed a petition alleging
that he entered a plea of guilty and received a lengthy sentence
"without knowledge of the accusations against him, without the assistance of counsel, without waiving the assistance of counsel, and
without any understanding of the proceedings which were taking
place." 544 Having exhausted his other remedies, the prisoner had
brought a petition before the federal district court alleging that he
had been denied a constitutional trial and deprived of his liberty in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 545 He also alleged that he had

540. Id. at 788.
541. Wolf v. Nash, 313 F.2d 393, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1963).
542. See, e.g., Bronzin v. United States, 309 F.2d 158, 159 (8th Cir. 1962)
(noting the court's indebtedness to petitioner's counsel's able representation);
Robinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 1962) (acknowledging
counsel's meticulous care and competence); Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381,
383 (8th Cir. 1954) (acknowledging counsel's able and free representation of defendant).
543. 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940).
544. Id. at 1005. The pro se petitioner, Mr. Mothershead, was unable to
read the lips of the person charging him with housebreaking and larceny. He was
sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment. Id.
545. Id.
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been deprived of the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. 546 In reversing the district court, Judge Sanborn
stated, "The conviction of a person whose infirmities are such that
he cannot understand or comprehend the proceedings resulting in
his conviction and cannot defend himself against 547
such charges, is
violative of certain immutable principles ofjustice.

In Bovey v. Grandsinger48 Judge Sanborn sat on a panel reviewing a petition for habeas corpus filed by a man convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to death for shooting and killing a
Nebraska state patrolman. 549

The evidence offered at trial was

overwhelmingly against the defendant. 5 0 The evidence included
both his confession and powerful physical evidence in the form of
bullet holes in the murdered officer's "Sam Brown" and pants belts
caused by a small-caliber bullet of the type the defendant had in his
possession when he was arrested 5
In his habeas corpus petition, the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the incredible events which
occurred after the close of evidence and prior to closing arguments.

55

1

Specifically, prior to the appearance of the jury on the

last day of trial, but after the exhibits had been brought into the
courtroom, the prosecutor discovered defendant's lawyer using a
dowel to enlarge the bullet hole in the pants belts worn by the slain
patrolman.
Following a conference in chambers, the prosecutor
-with the acquiescence of both the trial judge and defense counsel
- recounted defense counsel's "shameful act" and required defense
counsel to confess to it before the jury immediately prior to closing
arguments. 554 What had been an orderly trial "was perverted into a
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id.
Id. at 1006.
253 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. The court observed:

It is safe to say that, in view of the State's evidence, no man ever stood in
greater need of the effective aid and assistance of counsel than did [defendant] Lloyd Grandsinger at the close of the evidence. Apparently his
only hope was that the jury might convict him of manslaughter or might,
if it found him guilty of murder in the first degree, fix the penalty at life
imprisonment instead of death. The likelihood of his acquittal was virtually nonexistent.
Id. at 920.
552. Id. at 918, 920.
553. Id. at 920-21.
554.

Bovey v. Grandsinger, 253 F.2d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 1958).
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virtual legal lynching." 555 In his opinion, Judge Sanborn wrote:

Due process requires that a defendant on trial in a State
court upon a serious criminal charge and unable to defend himself shall not be denied or deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to the effective aid and assistance of counsel.
It is difficult to imagine how the effectiveness of a defendant's counsel could be more completely destroyed
than by causing him to confess before the jury, at the
close of the evidence at the trial, that he had been guilty
of gross misconduct in having tampered with the State's
evidence.556
In affirming the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, Judge Sanborn wrote, "Because of a deprivation of due process in his State
trial, [defendant] stands presently 'as a firebrand plucked out of
the burning' by the557Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States."

In those instances where prisoners attempted to use the writ
and other forms of relief to alleviate truly inhumane and miserable
prison conditions, Judge Sanborn was sympathetic but unable to
help. 558 The confinement, care, and treatment of federal prisoners
had "been conferred exclusively upon the Attorney General,
and... his determinations, made in the exercise of that authority,
5 59
[were] not subject to review in habeas corpus proceedings."
Likewise, the conditions of prisoners in state correctional facilities
were at that time solely within the discretion of state prison
authorities, and federal judges were strictly limited in their ability
to intervene.56 °
9. PatentLaw
Prior to his appointment to the Eighth Circuit, Judge Sanborn
had earned the respect of the members of the local patent bar. In
support of his candidacy to replace Judge Booth on the Eighth Cir555.
events on
556.
557.
558.

Id. at 917 (quoting District Court Judge Delehant's appraisal of the
the petition for habeas corpus).
Id. at 922 (citations omitted).
Id.
See Note, The Changing Social Vision ofJustice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV.

717, 733-34 n.104 (1983) (relating Blackmun's memory of the judiciary's inability
to intervene on behalf of prisoners when he clerked for Judge Sanborn).
559. Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951) (Sanborn, J.).
560. See Note, supra note 558, at 733-34 n.104.
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cuit, one member of that bar wrote Attorney General William D.
Mitchell,561 stating it was his opinion, as well as "the Patent Bar and
others very generally, that Judge Sanborn, because of his age, natural judicial temperament, general legal ability, ready understanding
of things mechanical and scientific, and habit of hard work, is eminently562qualified for any judicial position that may be open to
him.

Cases involving inventions and patent disputes fascinated
563
Judge Sanborn.
He particularly enjoyed learning about the
technical details of inventions and, on occasion, encouraged counsel in patent litigation to demonstrate inventions during oral argument. 64 He believed strongly that patentable56 ideas or improvements must rise "to the dignity of an invention. , 1

In reviewing patent cases, Judge Sanborn understood that
creative genius can be reflected in simple ideas as well as complex
inventions. "Simplicity alone cannot be relied upon as indicating
that an improvement [to an earlier invention] is the result of mechanical skill rather than inventive genius. ' 5 6 Judge Sanborn recognized that even when the inventor's creation was a simple thing,
if "the practical effect of what he did was to produce a new and useful result and product and to solve an old problem, 685 67 then that

creation could merit protection against infringement.1
On the other hand, Judge Sanborn recognized that merely'because a contribution to an art is new and useful, this did not necessarily mean that it is patentable.5

69

"The contribution must reveal

invention or discovery. No matter how useful one's contribution
may be, to be patentable it must reflect inventive genius and not
merely the expected skill of the calling."576
561.

Judge Sanborn was

See Letter from Frank D. Merchant, Attorney at Law, Merchant & Kil-

gore, to William D. Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General (Dec. 18, 1931) (on file with
author).
562. Id.
563. See Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supranote 70.
564. See id.
565. See, e.g., Frank Adam Elec. Co. v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 148
F.2d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 1945); Donner v. Sheer Pharmacal Corp., 64 F.2d 217, 222
(8th Cir. 1933).
566. Donner, 64 F.2d at 221-22.
567. Id. at 222; see also Willis v. Town, 182 F.2d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 1950)
("The simplicity of the plaintiffs' device does not negative invention.").
568. See Donner, 64 F.2d at 222.
569. See, e.g., FrankAdam Elec. Co., 148 F.2d at 502.
570. Id. Judge Sanborn believed that it is "as much the duty of the court in
a patent case to protect the public against having to pay tribute to a patentee who
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aware that "the public is a silent but important and interested party
in all patent litigation, and is entitled to protection against the monopolization of what is not lawfully patentable."571 Ultimately, as
with all other factual determinations, Judge Sanborn strongly deferred to the district court on questions of fact with regard to patent and trademark claims. 2
10. Business Law

Judge Sanborn approached commercial and business law cases
with his typical practicality. For example, in E.I. du Pont De Nemours
& Co. v. Claiborne-RenoCo., 57 3 he discussed a contract among sophisticated parties. 574 Judge Sanborn wrote that

[n]o special form of words... is necessary to create a
promise. All that is necessary is that a fair interpretation
of the words used shall make it appear that a promise was
intended.
Contracts are ordinarily to be performed by business
men, and should be given the interpretation which would
be placed upon them by the business world.575
While Judge Sanborn could be sympathetic when seeming inequities to a party arose due to unforeseen circumstances, he would not
permit the district court to rewrite the parties' negotiated contract.576

"There is much to be said in favor of requiring men to ad-

here strictly to their undertakings," he wrote. 577
Judge Sanborn believed the same rules of construction that
apply to the interpretation of contracts in general should also be
applied to the interpretation of insurance policies:
Perhaps the classical statement of the rule applicable to
the construction of contracts of insurance is that of Mr.
Justice Sutherland [who] said that... [c]ontracts of insurance, like other contracts, must be construed accordis not in any true sense an inventor or discoverer, as to protect the patent rights of

one who is a real inventor." Id. at 502-03.
571. Rota-Carb Corp. v. Frye Mfg. Co., 313 F.2d 443, 444 (8th Cir. 1963).
572. See, e.g., Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 253
F.2d 568, 575 (8th Cir. 1958) (Sanborn, J., dissenting) ("[W] hether the conduct
of the defendant infringed the plaintiffs trademark rights or amounted to unfair
competition was for the trial court to decide. I would affirm.").
573. 64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933).
574. Id. at 227-28.

575. Id.
576. See id. at 233.
577.

Id. at 227.
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ing to the terms which the parties have used, to be taken
and understood, in the absence of ambiguity, in their
plain, ordinary, and popular sense.578
Judge Sanborn was quick to point out that the established canons
of contract construction do "not authorize a perversion of language, or the exercise of inventive powers
for the purpose of creat57
ing an ambiguity where none exists.

9

In analyzing bankruptcy issues, Judge Sanborn was characteristically frank and straightforward. For example, in Price v. Spokane
Silver & Lead Co.,580 he cut through a variety of arguments concerning the legislative intent behind a federal reorganization statute to
hold that it "was not the intention of Congress... to place crutches
under corporate cripples, fit subjects for liquidation, and send
them out into the business world to be a menace to all who might
purchase their securities or deal with them on credit."581 Consistent
with this same pragmatic approach, he noted in Hartman Corp. of
America v. United States58 2 that "practical common 8sense
need not be
3
entirely divorced from bankruptcy proceedings.

In interpreting and applying federal statutory authority, Judge
Sanborn believed that generally "the plain language of the statute
discloses a clear intent on the part of Congress."58

4

With respect to

tax laws, for example, Judge Sanborn wrote:
It has... become increasingly apparent that the purpose
of a taxing act, the probable intent of Congress, the general statutory scheme of taxation set up, and the construction adopted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

578. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.Julius Seidel Lumber Co., 279 F.2d
861, 865-66 (8th Cir. 1960) (citations omitted). Judge Sanborn wrote:
It is true that where the terms of a policy are of doubtful meaning, that
construction most favorable to the insured will be adopted. This canon
of construction is both reasonable and just, since the words of the policy
are chosen by the insurance company; but it furnishes no warrant for
avoiding hard consequences by importing into a contract an ambiguity
which otherwise would not exist, or, under the guise of construction, by
forcing from plain words unusual and unnatural meanings.
Id.; see also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 204
F.2d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 1953) (construing insurance contract terms by their most
commonly understood meanings).
579. MassachusettsBonding &Ins. Co., 279 F.2d at 866 (citations omitted).
580. 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1938).
581. Id. at 247.
582. 304 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1962).
583. Id. at 431.
584. Maxwell v. United States, 235 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1956).
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and not rejected by Congress must all be given appropriate effect in determining what meaning
is to be accorded
585
a word or a phrase in such an act.
11. Desegregation

Prior to taking senior status, Judge Sanborn was assigned to
serve on the circuit court panels reviewing the Little Rock school
integration cases. In 1958, Judge Sanborn authored the circuit
court's decision in Faubus v. United States,5 86 enjoining Arkansas'
Governor Orval E. Faubus from using the Arkansas National Guard
to prevent eligible black children from attending the Little Rock
Central High School and from otherwise obstructing or interfering
with the constitutional right of these children to attend the
school.587 In a dispassionate and well-annotated opinion, Judge
Sanborn soundly rebutted each of Governor Faubus' arguments,
concluding that there was "[n] o merit in the appellants' argument
that the discretion of the Governor in using the National Guard in
derogation of the judgment and orders of the federal District
Court and in violation of the constitutional rights of the eligible
negro students could not be questioned." 88
585. United States v. Armature Rewinding Co., 124 F.2d 589, 591 (8th Cir.
1942).
586. 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
587. Id. at 797.
588. Id. at 806. In his discussions with the Department of Justice concerning
the possibility he might take senior status, Judge Sanborn expressed his desire to
retain his active status through the spring of 1959 to enable him "to dispose of the
hearing of two three-judge integration cases in Little Rock, Arkansas, to which I
have been assigned." Letter from John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to Lawrence E. Walsh, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
(Feb. 21, 1959). He explained that "[w]hile my retirement would not affect my
present commitments, the equilibrium of those involved in the Arkansas cases is
so easily disturbed that I should prefer to do nothing which might disturb it." Id.
In a different setting, Judge Sanborn joined in a per curiam opinion of a
three-judge panel sitting on the district court, which further articulated his views
regarding a specious brand of argument advanced by elected state officials such as
Governor Faubus. See Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 527 (D. Minn.
1959). The panel wrote:
Racial hatred... against so-called minority citizens moving into a
community, with the resulting demand that such citizens leave the
neighborhood, often incites mob action. If the violence could not be
suppressed by local authorities, a Governor could impose martial law
and the military could issue an order that the innocent citizens leave the
neighborhood because if they did so, peace and tranquillity would
prevail. Lawlessness in this manner could be suppressed, but it would be
obtained by compelling the victims of such lawlessness to surrender their
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VI. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED DUTIES

In 1944, Judge Sanborn was appointed to serve as chairman of
the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States on
Post-War Building Plans for the Quarters of the United States
Courts.9 Because World War II prevented all building construction and alterations for civil purposes, the quarters of the federal
courts had become seriously inadequate in many places. 5 °
Before being appointed to chair this committee, Judge Sanborn had expressed concern that the federal courts had actually
overbuilt and he had
pointed out that inefficiencies could be cor59
'
rected in the future:
It has been the policy of Congress since the earliest days
to try to make the federal courts as accessible to litigants
as possible. No doubt in the days of the stagecoach and
ox team it was logical that the court should go to the litigants, rather than the litigants go to the court, but one
may doubt the wisdom of that policy in these days of efficonstitutional rights so precious to all freedom-loving people.
Id.
Judge Sanborn also voted with the majority in the Eighth Circuit's en banc
decision in Aaron v. Cooper that reversed the district court and reinstituted a plan
to integrate the public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas. 257 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir.
1958). The district court had suspended the integration plan because of what it
viewed as the turmoil, chaos, and bedlam caused by the presence of the black students at Central High School. See Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 40 (D Ark.
1957). The Eighth Circuit viewed the situation differently, however, stating that
the evidence instead showed the violence had occurred because of the opposition
to the presence of these black students at the high school. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 39.
Judge Mathes, writing on behalf of the majority, acknowledged the difficult task
school officials were called upon to perform. Id. at 40-41. He pointed out that
the officials could take comfort in knowing they performed their duty as public
officers to support the Constitution and to respect the laws and courts of the federal government and the country's democratic ideals, regardless of their personal
convictions concerning the wisdom of school integration. Id. at 39. Judge Mathes
then pointed out that "[t]he issue plainly comes down to the question of whether
overt public resistance, including mob protest, constitutes sufficient cause to nullify an order of the federal court directing the Board to proceed with its integration plan." Id. at 40. The court rejected such a proposal: "We say the time has not
yet come in these United States when an order of a Federal Court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in the face of violent or unlawful acts of individual citizens in opposition thereto." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the majority's decision in Aaron in all respects. See Aaron v. Cooper, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
589. 1945 DIRECTOR Or THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 8 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1945].
590. Id. at 18.
591. See Sanborn MSBA Address, supranote 268, at 83, 89.
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cient transportation.... It would not be unreasonable to
suppose that a better plan would be to have some one
place, reasonably accessible from all parts of the circuit,
designated as the place where all terms of court should be
held, where the judges might have their permanent quarters and their library, and where they might live if they
saw fit to do so. It would seem that such a plan would
have a tendency to increase the efficiency of the court, to
reduce very materially the expense of maintaining it, and
to increase, rather 5than
to reduce, the convenience to
2
lawyers and litigants.

9

Judge Sanborn's committee was charged with addressing an
"urgent need for [the] enlargement and improvement"5 9 of existing federal courthouses through new construction as well as
through the "expansion, remodeling, and modernization of the
present quarters. " 59 4

Ultimately, the committee developed and

submitted a manual "setting forth general standards of design and
construction for federal court quarters in federal buildings hereafter to be constructed." 595

The Judicial Conference approved the

committee's report and recommendations in their entirety, and
copies of the manual were circulated throughout the federal judi592. Id. Judge Sanborn stated:
The system of multiplying the number of places in which court is held is
necessarily an expensive one. Libraries and quarters have to be
maintained at the several places of holding court, although they are used
for only a brief time each year. The judges are separated, except during
the periods when court is actually in session, and the government is
required to pay the travelling and living expenses of the judges while
they are away from home, and also the travelling expenses and per diems
of their secretaries and law clerks.
Id. He then quoted Judge John Carter Rose:
In some instances, a desire to flatter local pride, to help along a real
estate book, or to create a pretext for getting an appropriation for a
federal building, has led to legislation which entails inconvenience upon
the judges, delay to the litigants, and a burden upon the Treasury out of
all proportion to any good done.
Id. at 90 (quoting JoHN CARTER ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS 67 (1926)).
593. ANNUAL REPORT 1945, supra note 589, at 18.
594. Id.
595. 1946 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 24. The committee emphasized that the manual was submitted
solely for the purpose of serving as a general guide, pointing out, however, that,
in its opinion, the manual "if closely followed - except where variations were required to meet some local situation - would be conducive to a substantial increase
in the usefulness and efficiency of the facilities to be provided for the Courts." Id.
at 24-25.
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596

Judge Sanborn also served on the advisory committee for the
1948 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 97 The
official reporters of the amendments, West Publishing Company of
St. Paul, Minnesota, and Thompson Publishing of Buffalo, New
York, appointed Judge Sanborn to this post.59 " The federal rules
initially were created in 1937 in an attempt to establish uniformity
and ensure fairness in practice before the federal court.599

The

1948 amendments addressed many shortcomings of the original
rules, while furthering the basic original objectives of uniformity
and consistency. 6°°
In 1947, with the support of Representative EdwardJ. Devitt,
the amendments to the federal rules were introduced for consideration and debate. 601 Explaining the need for these amendments,
future Judge Devitt said:
Our Federal laws have long been in need of a thorough
revision in an accurate and convenient codification.
These two bills do that job for two of the most important
titles in the United States Code. I hope that your favorable action on these bills will be a forerunner to the eventual revision of the entire Code.
In these two bills the laws have been rewritten in direct and simple language.... If enacted[,] these bills will
make the contents positive law as distinguished from
prima facie evidence of the law. It will undoubtedly be to
the great benefit of the courts, lawyers, lawmakers, and
596. See id. at 25.
597. See Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R
1600 and H.R 2055 before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 8,
26 (1947) [hereinafter Hearingson HR. 1600 and H.R 2055]. The other members
of the advisory committee included Walter Armstrong, former president of the
American Bar Association; Professor James W. Moore of the Yale Law School;

John Dickinson, a former U.S. assistant attorney general, professor of law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School; the Honorable Floyd E. Thompson, for-

mer chief justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, who served as chairman of the
advisory committee; and the Honorable Justin Miller, a former member of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id.
598. See id.
599.

See 4 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT

& ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE §§ 1041-1050 (2d. ed. 1987) (discussing cumulative effect of the rules
and the 1948 amendments).
600. See id. § 1044. The rules contained hundreds of obsolete and irrelevant
provisions, resulting in much uncertainty and constant references to the Statutes
at Large. See Hearings on H.R 1600 and H.R. 2055, supra note 597.
601. See Hearings on H.R. 1600 and HR. 2055, supra note 597.
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the general public that these revisions receive congressional approval in order to make our statute law a systematic and orderly arrangement of congressional action. °2
Representative Eugene J. Keogh of New York, another sponsor
of the proposed amendments, described the work performed by
Judge Sanborn and the other advisors on the proposed amendments:
[T]he advisory committee itself spent nine full days in
conference with the editorial staff at intervals of several
weeks, considered every section in full meeting and challenged the wording of many of them, as well as chapter tities and chapter and section arrangements, upon which
the editorial staff had been busy as beavers during the intervening period of time. 3
Not surprisingly, the proposed amendments enjoyed the
strong support of Judge Sanborn, who sent the following message
to the members of the House Judiciary Committee:
I was a member of the advisory committee which re602. Id. at 3.
603. Id. at 12. Representative Keogh described the advisory committee's
process in amending the federal rules:
The procedure that ... was adopted was that the revisers in cooperation
with the members of the staff of the committee on revision of the laws
undertook the preparation of what we called preliminary drafts, which
were careful statements of the proposed title, with complete revisers'
notes under each section clearly pointing out the source of the section,
any changes that were effected, the reasons for the change, and any
other explanatory notes that the reviser felt would be helpful.
The committee on revision of the laws in the preparation of those
preliminary drafts sought to give them the widest possible circulation.
We made certain that every member of the legislature got one; we made
certain that they were sent to every United States attorney; that they were
sent to every member of the Federal Judiciary; that they were sent to the
appropriate committees of the leading State and local bar associations;
that they were sent to everyone who ever evidenced any interest in the
work at all.
As a result of the circularizing of the bench and bar and the public
with these preliminary drafts, the revisers and the staff of the committee
on revision of the laws received many suggestions.
The practice that was adopted was that in the preparation of these
preliminary drafts there would be arranged meetings of the advisory
committee and of the advisory committees in connection with title 28.
At those meetings of the advisory committee, which extended generally
for 2 or 3 days, the proposed preliminary draft was gone over section by
section, and any question that was raised by anyone was thoroughly
explored by this group of experts.
Id. at 8-9.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

95

WILLIAM
William Mitchell
LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. LA
23, W
Iss.REVIEW
2 [1997], Art. 4

[Vol. 23

viewed, section by section, the work of the revisors who
prepared the proposed revision. I attended all the meetings. The Revision constitutes an orderly restatement, in
concise and plain language, of the substance of present
statutes relating to the Federal Judiciary. Any departures
from the strict letter of existing statutes have been carefully noted by the revisers, and represent improvements of
a noncontroversial character. Printed drafts of the proposed revision, with the revisers' notes, have been distributed to the judges of the Federal courts and to other
members of the legal profession, and have been carefully
examined and reviewed. The proposed revision is a vast
improvement over the existing judicial code, which consists of miscellaneous statutes enacted at widely separated
intervals of time, many of which statutes were poorly
drafted and confusingly expressed. I earnestly recommend the adoption of H.R. 2055.04

The amended rules of civil procedure were adopted on December
29, 1948.6°s

In addition to his role in amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,Judge Sanborn also played a role in revising bankruptcy
rules. Sanborn had gained extensive experience in bankruptcy
matters as a district judge6 0 6 and was recognized nationally for his
expertise in bankruptcy law. 607 Because of his expertise, Sanborn
was assigned to serve on the Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States on Bankruptcy Administration and the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference.6 0 8 Edwin J.
Covey, "the chief of bankruptcy" for the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, recalled his association with Judge Sanborn during this time as both memorable and inspiring: "He was
always 'so right' and 'so sound' that he kept me on the right track

604. Letter from John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, 80th Cong. (Mar. 5, 1947), in Hearings on H.R. 1600 and H.9
2055, supra note 597, at 32.
605. S.REP. No. 1559, at 1 (1948), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORYOF TITLE
28, UNrITED STATES CODE (R. Mersky &J.Jacobstein eds. 1971).
606. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
607. Telephone Interview with Frank Kennedy, Professor, University of
Michigan, and expert in bankruptcy law (Dec. 2, 1996) (on file with author).
608. See Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 8; Telephone Interview with
Frank Kennedy, supra note 607.
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on many occasions when I might have made a mistake. "e"
Despite his twenty-seven years of service as an active circuit
judge, Judge Sanborn never became chief judge of the Eighth Circuit. Judge Archibald K. Gardner of South Dakota, who was appointed to the court in 1929, became chiefjudge in 1947 at age 79
and remained chief judge until 1959.610 In the meantime, Judge
Sanborn passed the age of 70 and was barred statutorily from serving as chiefjudge.
Judge Sanborn likely would have enjoyed the opportunity to
serve as chiefjudge. He certainly had his own ideas concerning the
operation and procedures of the court.612 However, it would have
been out of character for him to have been preoccupied by the
matter or to have disclosed any feeling of disappointment to his
colleagues.
He understood, appreciated, and enjoyed the collegiality of the court, and he never would have disrupted the court's
work with anything as potentially divisive as his personal ambition.' Judge Sanborn and Chief Judge Gardner enjoyed a peaceful coexistence as the most senior judges on the court, and they
regularly sat as presiding judges on separate panels.61 5

609. Letter from George Heisey to Gunnar Nordbye, supra note 107 (quoting Letters from Edwin L. Covey, Chief of Bankruptcy, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, to George Heisey, Chief Referee, Federal Bankruptcy
Court, Mpls., Minn. (Mar. 16, 1964, May 3, 1964)). Covey wrote that Sanborn
"was always such a 'down to earth' sort of person that any one could talk with at
any time and this I very frequently did on bankruptcy matters. His advice and
understanding were always available." Id.
610. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 53.
611. See id.; see also Act of Oct. 13, 1951, ch. 655, § 34, 65 Stat. 723 (barring
service as chiefjudge after age of 70).
612. See Sanborn MSBA Address, supra note 268.
613. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 53; see also Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2
(describingJudge Sanborn's character).
614. See generally Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 15-19 (describing Judge
Sanborn's personal characteristics).
615. Judge Sanborn joked that Judge Riddick always referred to the Second
Division, on which Judge Sanborn presided, as the "scrubs." Letter from John B.
Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to Seth Thomas,
CircuitJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (Apr. 25, 1956) (on file with
author). While the two men were never close friends, their relationship remained
cordial. Id. It bears noting that Judge Sanborn and Gardner's relationship may
have gotten off to a somewhat rocky start. After Judge Sanborn joined the court
in 1932, the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed his district court decision in
Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1933). Judge Gardner wrote a lengthy
and less than collegial dissent to the affirmance. See id. at 709 (Gardner, J., dissenting). However, there is no indication thatJudge Sanborn ever expressed any
dismay over the tone of the dissent.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997

97

William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 23,
2 [1997], Art. 4
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
LA Iss.
WREVIEW

[Vol. 23

VII. SENIOR STATUS

By correspondence dated May 7, 1959, Judge Sanborn formally notified President Dwight D. Eisenhower "that, having been a
judge of the United States continuously since I was forty-one years
of age and having attained the age of seventy-five, I am retiring
from regular active service, effective June 30, 1959, and assuming
after that date the status of a senior judge."1 6 Judge Sanborn continued:
I am doing this not because of any present or anticipated
inability to perform all of the duties of a judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, but
because of my firm belief that it will be advantageous to
that court and in the public interest to have some younger
man succeed me in regular active service.
It is my intention and wish, as a senior judge, to retain my chambers in St. Paul, Minnesota, and my secretary, and to undertake, so long as I am able creditably to
perform them, such judicial duties as may be assigned to
me.
It has been my great privilege and good fortune to
have served actively as a judge of the United States for
more than thirty-four years and during that time to have
met with unfailing courtesy and consideration from my
associates on the bench and from the members of the
bar.617
Harry A. Blackmun subsequently was nominated by President
Eisenhower and confirmed by the U.S. Senate to succeed Judge
Sanborn on the Eighth Circuit. Judge Sanborn administered the
oath to Justice Blackmun in St. Paul on November 4, 1959.618 A
decade later, during his confirmation hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee to become an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun recalled the occasion when he
"took that rather awesome oath" to become a U.S. judge. 619 "It was
616. Letter from John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States (May 7,
1959) (on file with author).
617. Id.
618. See Blackmun Takes Oath From His Predecessor,ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Nov. 4,
1959, at 3.
619. Nomination of Hany A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be AssociateJusticeof the
Supreme Court of the United States: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st
Cong. 34 (Apr. 29, 1970) [hereinafter Nomination of Hary A. Blackmun].
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administered to me by Judge John B. Sanborn, a man whom I revere in memory. I know what he thought of that oath and I hope
that I have been able
to fulfill its obligations in much the same
620
measure as he did."

Justice Blackmun's relationship with Judge Sanborn dated
back several decades. Upon graduating from Harvard Law School
in 1932, Harry A. Blackmun became Judge Sanborn's first law
clerk. However, the future Associate Justice nearly did not get the
job. This was because Judge Sanborn, who had not had a law clerk
as a district judge, believed that he could save the federal government much needed money in the midst of the Depression by leaving the law clerk's position vacant.621 Harry Blackmun was persistent, however, and called on Judge Sanborn every day until he was
hired.622 Blackmun clerked for Judge Sanborn from August 1,
1932, through December of 1933.623

Judge Sanborn certainly did not regret the decision to hire
Blackmun as his law clerk. Nearly thirty years later, he remarked to
one of his colleagues on the federal bench: "Harry is the best legal
scholar I have ever known. Every opinion or memorandum is a
treatise in itself. He is deliberate, courageous and moderate. He is
the single person who, I believe, would be the ideal appellate
judge."624
Following the completion of Blackmun's clerkship for Judge
Sanborn, the men maintained a close relationship, with Judge Sanborn serving as a mentor to the younger Blackmun. 6 2 ' During
Blackmun's clerkship, the Foshay debacle took place.626 As Judge
Sanborn retained his responsibilities for the case after he was elevated to the circuit court, the young clerk had the opportunity to
meet members of the Minneapolis bar, and the prominent Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey, Colman, Barker, Scott & Barber even-

620. Id.
621. SeeJudge Richard S. Arnold, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1994) (citing FETTER, supranote 8, at 72).
622. See id.
623. John E. McKendrick, Circuitjudge Blackmun Reflects Varied Background,
WM. MITCHELL OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.),Jan. 1964, at 2.

624. See Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 619 (quoting Letter
from Miles W. Lord, DistrictJudge, United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, to Hon. James 0. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
(Apr. 29, 1970)).
625. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.
626. See supratext accompanying notes 250-56.
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tually hired him.2 7 Judge Sanborn also facilitated Blackmun's appointment as a law instructor at the St. Paul College of Law, where
Blackmun taught from 1935 to 1941.628

After Blackmun moved to Rochester, Minnesota, to become
resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic and the Mayo Association, he
continued to dine periodically with Judge Sanborn.6 It was during
one such dinner in 1959 that Judge Sanborn asked Blackmun,
"Would you think seriously of succeeding me as judge on the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals?"630 While taken by surprise by the
suggestion and apprehensive at the prospect of leaving the financial security of a very successful career in private practice, Blackmun told Judge Sanborn he "would not close the door" on
the
631
prospect of succeedingJudge Sanborn on the Eighth Circuit.
Thereafter, Judge Sanborn traveled to Washington, D.C., to
discuss with Attorney General William Rogers his pending retirement and possible successors. 632 Following this visit, Judge Sanborn
corresponded with Deputy Attorney General Lawrence E. Walsh,
stating, "[T] here is no reason why you should not satisfy yourself as
633
to the best qualified person to succeed me upon my retirement."
However, he advised Deputy Walsh that he hoped "that political
considerations will not offensively enter into the selection of a successor," because "[i]f they should, there might be no vacancy to
fill.",6 34 Justice Blackmun was, of course, eventually nominated and
635

confirmed to succeed Judge Sanborn on the Eighth Circuit.
VIII. LIFE OUTSIDE THE COURT

Although he possessed a keen intellect and almost encyclopedic knowledge of the law, Judge Sanborn did not publish scholarly
articles or essays. Perhaps he felt it unwise for a judge to go on record - outside of his opinions - setting forth his thoughts on mat-

ters that could come before the court in the future. His reticence
may also have been due to his modesty and humility. He was cer627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.

See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supranote 105.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Letter from John B. Sanborn to Lawrence E. Walsh, supranote 588.
Id.

635. See Louis H. Gollop, Boss Backs Blackmun, ST.
1959, at 1.
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss2/4

PAUL DISPATCH,

Nov. 11,

100

19971

Boyd: The
LifeHONORABLE
and Career ofJOHN
the Honorable
John B.
Sanborn, Jr.
THE
B. SANBORN,
JR.

tainly reluctant to give speeches. Shortly after his appointment to
the Eighth Circuit, he told the Minnesota State Bar Association,
"The judges I have always admired the most were those who never
made speeches." 36 He preferred to be known as a judge who did
not talk all the time. 6-1 Accordingly, Judge Sanborn led a quiet and

unostentatious professional life.
A.

Commitment to William Mitchell College of Law

Outside of the federal judiciary, the institution to which Judge
Sanborn was most dedicated was the St. Paul College of Law. Fifteen years after graduating from law school and while he was a
Ramsey County district judge, Judge Sanborn taught insurance law
as a member of the law school's faculty.6 3 Although he taught insurance for only six years, 6 9 he continued for many years as, in his

words, "a sort of honorary member of the faculty."' °
In 1935, members of the faculty of the St. Paul College of Law
appointed Judge Sanborn to the school's board of trustees. 4 By
1935, the law school had moved into quarters on the corner of College Avenue and West Sixth Street in St. Paul.62 The law school
still billed itself as "The Lawyers' Law School." 43 While the school
had expanded the program to four years, classes continued to be
held only in the evening:
636. Sanborn MSBA Address, supra note 268, at 83.
637. See id. at 83-84.
638. See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1922-1923, at 3 (1922).

ST. PAUL COLLEGE

639. See id. at 16; ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAw, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL
COLLEGE OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1923-1924, at 3 (1923); ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW,
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1924-1925, at 3
(1924); ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF

LAw FOR THE YEAR

1925-1926,

at 3

(1925);

ST.

PAUL COLLEGE

OF LAW,

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1926-1927, at 3
(1926); ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF

LAW FOR THE YEAR 1927-1928,

at 3

(1927);

ST.

PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW,

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW FOR THE YEAR 1928-1929, at 3

(1928).
640. Letter from John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to W.H. Gurnee, Secretary, St. Paul College of Law (Mar. 7, 1935)
(on file with author).
641. See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT & BULLETIN OF
INFORMATION 2 (1936) [hereinafter ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAW ANNOUNCEMENT

1936]. The college was a nonprofit educational institution, whose management
was vested in the board of trustees. See id. at 3.
642. See id.
643. See id.
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It is generally recognized that the modern lawyer, to be
successful, must have a knowledge of business. The arrangement of our courses permits the students to be employed during the daytime, thus affording them not only
the opportunity to earn money, but to acquire actual law
and business experience as well. We feel that our graduates, on the whole, are well prepared for the practice of
law, from a practical as well as a theoretical standpoint. 64"
As when Judge Sanborn attended law school, the St. Paul College of Law faculty continued to include prestigious members of
the local bench and bar, such as future U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice Burger's law partner
Roland J. Faricy, and the Honorable Oscar Hallam and Honorable
Royal A. Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 645 Notwithstanding the school's claim that the faculty was made up exclusively of
St. Paul jurists and attorneys, the faculty also included at this time
young Harry A. Blackmun, future Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who was then practicing in Minneapolis. 646 Justice

Blackmun's appointment as an instructor exemplified Judge Sanborn's approach to faculty hiring during his initial tenure as a
member of the Board of Trustees. Judge Sanborn believed that
"greater use might be made of some of the young lawyers who have
recently graduated from prominent law schools throughout the
country, and who are perhaps more familiar with modern methods
of teaching than some of the rest of us."67 As a recent graduate of

Harvard Law School, Justice Blackmun fitJudge Sanborn's description perfectly.
Judge Sanborn served as vice president of the Board of Trustees from 1945 to 1949. He subsequently was elected president of
the board and served in this capacity from 1949 to 1956. 6" 8 In 1956,
the St. Paul College of Law and the Minneapolis College of Law
merged to create William Mitchell College of Law.' Judge Sanborn was reportedly quite active in the merger. 650 He served as vice

644. Id. at 4.
645. Duane Galles, Mitchell to Mark Diamond Anniversary, WM. MITCHELL
OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), April 1974, at 1.
646. See id. at 2.
647. Letter from John B. Sanborn to W.H. Gurnee, supra note 640.
648. See Kenneth Mitchell, Eighth Circuit Mourns Death ofJohn Sanborn, WM.
MrrCHELL OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), May 1964, at 7.
649. See Nordbye, supranote 12, at 200-01.
650. See Interview with Harry A. Blackmun, supranote 105.
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president of the William Mitchell College of Law Board of Trustees
until his resignation from the board in 1959.651

Judge Sanborn's fellow trustees greatly respected him. He
would listen carefully, thoughtfully, and often silently to the issues
and problems that would come before the board. 652 When he
spoke, his comments and actions had great influence over other
board 653members due to the high regard in which he was held by his
peers.

During commencement exercises in 1959, William Mitchell
College of Law presented to Judge Sanborn the first honorary degree ever conferred by the school or any of its predecessor institutions.654 Also, in recognition of his lifelong devotion of time and
energy to the former St. Paul College of Law and the newly-formed
William Mitchell College of Law, the school named its library (then
located on the campus of the College of St. Thomas) in his
honor.655 Judge Sanborn donated over 3000 books to the library, as
well as records and briefs from cases that he heard during his many
years on the federal bench. 656
Today, two oil paintings grace William Mitchell College of
Law's Warren E. Burger Library: one of Minnesota Supreme Court
Associate Justice William Mitchell and the other of Judge John B.
Sanborn. Lee H. Slater, then president of West Publishing Company, gave the portrait of Judge Sanborn to William Mitchell College of Law in 1962.657 The private gift was the result of "much diligence" by Mr. Slater and the dean of the school, Stephen R. Curtis,
"whose task it was to convince Judge Sanborn that being
photo65
graphed for the portrait was in the interest of propriety."
651. SeeNordbye, supra note 12, at 201.
652. See Telephone Interview with Cyrus Rachie, former board of trustees
member, William Mitchell College of Law (Jan. 27, 1994) (on file with author).
653. See Telephone Interview with Douglas Heidenreich, Professor and former Dean, William Mitchell College of Law (Jan. 27, 1994) (on file with author).
654. SeeJudy Gunderson, William Mitchell College of Law (1976) (unpublished undergraduate term paper, College of St. Thomas (St. Paul, Minn.) (on file
with Ramsey County Historical Society)).
655. See Library Named ForJudgeJohn B. Sanborn, WM. MrTCHELL OPINION (St.
Paul, Minn.), Nov. 1959, at 4.
656. See Carolyn Cochrane, Law School Enriched by Gifts From Jurists Sanborn,
Nelson, WM. MrrCHELL OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 1964, at 1.

657.

SeeJohn E. McKendrick, Judge John B. Sanborn PortraitHangs In School's

Front Foyer,WM. MrrcHELL OPINION (St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 1962, at 1.

658. Id. Characteristically, the modestJudge Sanborn was made uncomfortable by the honor. He later wrote, "While I am grateful to Lee Slater for making
it possible to have a portrait of me hung in the William Mitchell College of Law,
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RecreationalPastimes

Although Judge Sanborn devoted his life to the law, perhaps
his truest enjoyment in life came from spending time outdoors. As
a youngster, he was an ardent canoeist on the many lakes and rivers
along and beyond the boundary between Minnesota and Canada. 6 9
"There he paddled his canoe over the water routes of the early
French voyageurs for many, many miles, and as they did, portaged
his canoe and packsack far into the deep wilderness." 660 This love
of the wilderness continued throughout his life.
Judge Sanborn greatly enjoyed the camaraderie of hunting
and fishing trips with friends. 66' Although his tireless work schedule made it difficult for him to go on more than one hunting trip a
year and spend an occasional weekend at his camp on the St. Croix
River,' 2 he remained a gifted marksman. In fact, Judge Gunnar
Nordbye, a regular member of these hunting parties, remarked
that as66 a duck hunter Judge Sanborn's "prowess was almost legendary." 3
that project was kept secret from me. Personally, I should have been better satisfied if the money had been devoted to some more useful purpose." Letter from
John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to Edward
J. Devitt, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, Eighth Circuit (July 23, 1962) (on file
with author).
659. See Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 10.
660. Id.
661. Regular members of his hunting parties included Gunnar Nordbye,
Kenneth G. Brill, and Matthew M. Joyce. Judge Nordbye is still remembered today for his wonderful personality and respected by many as the greatest federal
trial court judge in America. See HISTORY OF U.S. DISTRIaC COURT FOR MINNESOTA,
supra note 1, at 15. Kenneth G. Brill, a Ramsey County district court judge and
law school classmate ofJudge Sanborn, was widely admired for his humility as well
as his accomplishments as a jurist. See ST. PAUL COLLEGE OF LAw ANNOUNCEMENT
1936, supra note 641, at 21; MOORE, COSTELLO & HART: A TRADITION OF LEGAL
SERVICE SINCE 1855, at 16-17 (1988). Matthew M.Joyce was a federal district court
judge who presided over the criminal trials of Roger Touhy and Arthur "Doc"
Barker, and who, "with his white hair ....looked and glowered like the fictional
federal judge, but.. . was an affable Irishman who worked hard at what he did."
HISTORY OF U.S. DISTRICT COURTIN MINNESOTA, supra note 1, at 14.
662. See May Be Able To Fish Now, supra note 40, at 1.
663. Judge Nordbye described an account related in September 1929 by a
lawyer and fellow hunter from Minneapolis:
Unusual achievements in those lines of human activity in which hunters
and fishermen indulge are generally discredited by one's auditors, unless
there is corroborative testimony. It is my observation that the Bench is
not put in any different category than the Bar or the laity in this respect.
Assuming my presumption to be correct, should you need any
corroboration as to your achievement at the Lake Emily Gun Club on
Saturday, the 21st day of September, I should be most happy to verify the
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During his busy years on the federal district court, Judge Sanborn's primary recreation was reading - particularly history, biographies, and the occasional detective novel. 6 4 15A student of the Civil
War, he had a library of books on the subject.
Perhaps Judge Sanborn's closest friend and companion was
George Heisey, who started his career as secretary to the Honorable Frank Kellogg, then a United States senator from Minnesota
and later the country's secretary of state and Nobel laureate.666 Heisey went on to achieve a fine reputation as a federal prosecutor,
general counsel for the railroads, bankruptcy referee, and special
667
master for the federal courts. Judge Sanborn and George Heisey
"spent many a week-end together hunting ducks, partridge, true
prairie chickens and pheasants in South Dakota, Western Minnesota[,] and in the Kettle River country back of Sandstone....
Those were the days before repeating shotguns came on the market and before fields became crowded with hunters."6 8 It was a
time for relaxation, friendship, and good-natured fun. 69
Judge Sanborn loved his cabin on the St. Croix River. 67' He
built the cabin himself from "deadheads," logs he had pulled from
occurrence that upon that day while you were shooting a twenty-gauge
double-barrel gun, on your first shot you killed four redheads, on your
second shot, two, and on the third shot, two, the birds being in flight at
the time of the occurrences.
I hope you appreciate that this letter is intended not as a reflection
upon your standing in the community, or your veracity, but is merely a
commentary upon the doubting qualities of human nature under such
circumstances.
Sanborn Memorial, supranote 2, at 11.
664. See May Be Able To Fish Now, supra note 40, at 1.
665. See FETTER, supra note 8, at 53; Interview with Walter N. Trenerry, supra
note 70.
666. See George Heisey, FormerAssistant U.S. Attorney, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Feb. 11, 1990, at 6B.
667. See id.
668. Letter from George Heisey to Gunnar Nordbye, supranote 107.
669. After one trip, Judge Sanborn and his compadres exchanged letters
written to and from a "Mr. Bacardi" debating the "Art of Broiling." Judge Nordbye wrote to "Mr. Bacardi" warning him, as "one who is so outstanding in culinary
artistry," not to "be misled by superficial considerations and by the apparent dicta
remarks of one 'J. Broiler Sanborn' for whose knowledge in dealing with knotty
legal problems and knotty pine I have the highest regard and respect, but whose
skill in boiling water successfully has never been demonstrated." Letter from
Gunnar Nordbye, DistrictJudge, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota,
to "Mr. Bacardi" (Mar. 17, 1949) (on file with author). In response, "Bacardi" declared that "[a]s a cook, ... I'll takeJohn." Letter from "Mr. Bacardi" to "PseudoExpert" (Mar. 19, 1949) (on file with author).
670. Sanborn Memorial, supra note 2, at 13.
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the bottom of the river.6 1 Throughout his life, he treasured his
time on the property, where he could go to hunt, fish, and work in
the woods. 672 At all times, the cabin property was a sanctuary for

judge Sanborn.
During his tenure as a federal judge, when he
received threats as a result of the criminal sentences he imposed,
Judge Sanborn would send his family to live at 674
this place on the St.
Croix for weeks at a time to ensure their safety.
Unfortunately, a fire destroyed the cabin in 1947 while the
Sanborns were vacationing in Arizona.6 75 The fire also destroyed
the adjacent library that housed many of his father's books, as well
as his own extensive collection.6 7 ' Despite the magnitude of this
loss, Judge Sanborn remained stoic: "The loss of the house was a
great misfortune to us but it is one of those things that there is no
677
use mourning
about."
He still" planned
to camp on the property
678
sked
rien s tojoin
and his
and asked his friends tojoin him.
Eventually, Judge Sanborn rebuilt the cabin and continued to spend time at his property on the

671. Interview with Samuel Morgan, supra note 314.
672. See Interview with Richard Gross, supra note 49; Interview with Samuel
Morgan, supra note 314.
673. Sanborn Memorial supranote 2, at 13.
There, along the river, through the winding trails in the heavily wooded
areas, he loved to walk and to work. He could swing an ax with as much
dexterity as a seasoned woodsman. He knew the names of every tree,
flower and bush. He delighted in walking along the river in the
springtime when the anemones, blood roots, and the Dutchman'sbreeches were first sending forth their dainty blooms to greet the
warming spring sun. He knew the hiding place of rare orchids deep in
the woods. The fiery red cardinal flowers blooming in the lowlands
along the river were his friends, and on one of the craggy, bare bluffs
along the river he would, with almost boyish enthusiasm, spot the dainty
blue Pasque flower, perhaps the earliest of all spring wildflowers in that
area. He loved to take this trip with his companions. He would lead the
way and approach the top of the wind swept cliff slowly and almost
reverently, taking pains that no one would carelessly step on the modest
little flowers, huddled in and sometimes hidden by the last year's grasses
still brown after the winter's cold and snow. There, he would stand
silently, admiring the brave little flowers, the first harbingers of spring.
Id.
674. Interview with Richard Gross, supra note 49.
675. See FErER,supra note 8, at 53.
676. See id.
677. Letter from John B. Sanbom, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to George Heisey, Chief Referee, Federal Bankruptcy Court, Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 27, 1943) (on file in George Heisey Manuscript Collection,
Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn.).
678. See id.
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St. Croix until the last days of his life.679
IX.

CONCLUSION

One of Judge Sanborn's closest colleagues on the Eighth Circuit was the Honorable Seth Thomas of Iowa. Judge Thomas was
appointed to the court in 1935, and he served until the time of his
death in 1962. 680 Judge Sanborn considered Judge Thomas to be
both an excellent circuit judge and a delightful companion.68 1 He
greatly respected Judge Thomas' intellect and scholarship on complex legal issues. 682 After Judge Thomas took senior status, Judge
Sanborn continued to cultivate their warm relationship and made
sure Judge Thomas always felt like a valued member of the court.63
In eulogizing Judge Thomas on behalf of the court in 1962,
Judge Sanborn described his colleague in words that could just as
easily have been used to describe Judge Sanborn himself:
He was a profound scholar and had as fine a judicial
temperament as any man I have ever known.... He was
possessed of complete intellectual honesty and the innate
courtesy and kindliness that endeared him to the members of the bar, to all his associates, and to the employees
of the Court. He was always patient, and always considerate of those arguing cases. He asked no caustic questions
of counsel, and never made unkind or sarcastic remarks
to or about anyone....
679. See Interview with Richard Gross, supra note 49; Interview with Samuel
Morgan, supra note 314.
680. See Judge Thomas Memorial, supra note 129, at 15.
681. See id. at 16-18. Judge Sanbom was also a great friend of young lawyers
who approached the Eighth Circuit for relief. See Interview with the Honorable
John Connolly, District Judge, Second Judicial District of Minnesota, in St. Paul,
Minn. (June 9, 1997).
682. See Proceedingsof the Minnesota State BarAss'n, 22 MINN. L. Rrv. 17 (1937
Supp.); see also Letter from John B. Sanborn, CircuitJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, to Seth Thomas, CircuitJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (Oct. 30, 1950) (on file with author) ("It seems to me you have demonstrated
to a mathematical certainty that the District Court was 100% wrong.").
683. In 1956, Judge Sanborn made a standing invitation to Judge Thomas:
If you reach the point where you want some work you are always welcome to any cases which are submitted to the Second Division on briefs
and if you ever feel like subjecting yourself to the unpleasant atmosphere of St. Louis, I'll be delighted to let you sit in my place on that Division.
Letter from John B. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to Seth Thomas, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (Apr.
25, 1956) (on file with author).
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He never became irritated with his associates over
differences of opinion. While he preferred peace and
agreement, he could not be induced to concur in an
opinion with which he was not in accord or which contained any distortions of the facts or of what he considered to be the applicable law. He filed few dissenting
opinions. In those he did file, he courteously but firmly
stated why he could not see eye-to-eye with his associates.
He wrote no slip-shod opinions, and never failed to do his
full share or more of judicial work. His opinions were
clear and logical and written in thoroughly understandable language....
Always he was cheerful and functioned in an atmosphere ofjudicial calm. 4
As a senior circuit court judge, Judge Sanborn continued to
serve as a mentor to younger federaljudges.
He was an excellent
resource because of his vast knowledge of the law, and he was an
extremely experienced and supportive counselor and advisor to
younger colleagues and associates. 6 When George E. MacKinnon
was mentioned as a candidate for several judicial posts, Judge Sanborn provided a characteristically brief and effective letter of recommendation on his behalf.8 7 The letter read, in its entirety: "To
Whom It May Concern: In my opinion, George MacKinnon is
qualified to serve as a judge on any court. [Signed] John B. Sanborn, Jr."68
Judge Sanborn also had a strong influence on his younger colleagues on the circuit court. For example, the Honorable Martin
Van Oosterhout of Iowa "admired Judge Sanborn more than any
other judge with whom he served."6 9 Judge Van Oosterhout's respect for Judge Sanborn was manifest "[t]ime after time in conference [when] Judge Van
would refer to him or to his opinions to
6 90
support his position.

The Honorable Edward J. Devitt, then chief judge of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota, referred to Judge San-

684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
Judgefrom
690.

See Judge Thomas Memorial, supranote 129.
See Telephone Interview with Earl Larson, supra note 131.
See id.
Telephone Interview with George E. MacKinnon, supra note 3.
Id. (letter quoted in interview).
Judge Gerald W. Heaney, Judge Martin Donald Van Oosterhout: The Big
Orange City, Iowa, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1, 30 (1993).
Id.
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born as "our grand seignior, our counselor, our friend," and said
that "[1] ong ago he set the pattern for court administration and judicial conduct" that his successors have followed, "not slavishly but
willingly, because the pattern was right and the course was wise. 69'
Judge Devitt continued:
We respected John B. Sanborn, United States Circuit
Judge, not because he was senior in age or superior in
commission, but because of his wisdom and ability and
industry - in a word, because of his great judicial competence.
We loved John B. Sanborn, the person, because of his
warmth, his friendliness, his genuine humbleness. His
door was always open to a fellow judge, a lawyer, or a
courthouse custodian, or anybody who needed the citation to a case or the wise counsel of a trustworthy friend.69
A wealth of knowledge and experience, Judge Sanborn was a vital
resource to newjudges in need of substantive advice and emotional
support.693
Judge John B. Sanborn died at the age of eighty on March 7,
1964. 694 He spent more than fifty years in public service to his state
and his nation. He served with distinction in the federal judiciary
in five decades. When he died, Judge Sanborn was one of the most
distinguished, respected, and accomplished circuit judges in our
country. He served America always and until the very end.
Judge Sanborn did not seek to be cast as an immortal jurist
who should be revered by future generations. He once wrote,
"There is nothing deader than a federal judge who has finally
handed in his 'dinner pail.' 69' 5 Judge Sanborn simply wanted to be
a good judge who did his job as well as he could.
Late in his life and in his service on the federal court, Judge
691. Devitt, supra note 6.
692. Id.
693. See Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, to George A. Heisey, Chief Referee, Federal Bankruptcy
Court, Minneapolis, Minn. (May 15, 1961) (on file with author); Devitt, supra note
6; Telephone Interview with Earl Larson, supra note 131.
694. See John Sanborn Dies at 80: Retired Judge, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 7,
1964, at Al; U.S. JudgeJ SanbornDies at 80, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 1964, at 1.
695. Letter from John B. Sanborn to Edward J. Devitt, supra note 658.
Judge Sanborn's wry sense of humor is well remembered by many who knew him.
For example, he once remarked, "The lowest form of conversation is reminiscence." Telephone Interview with Frank Hammond, Attorney at Law, Briggs and
Morgan (June 3, 1997).
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Sanborn wrote, "It takes more than mere intellect to make a good
judge; there must be patience, sound judgment, tolerance, humility, a willingness to endure boredom and drudgery, and a desire to
be helpful and fair in the solution of human problems."696 He believed that the greatest tribute that could be bestowed on a judge is
the sincere respect and admiration of his brethren.697
Shortly after Judge Sanborn died, his good friend George Heisey wrote:
I shall always remember Judge Sanborn as a quiet man
whose personal needs were minimal and to whom pretension of any sort was utterly foreign. Whenever he was duty
free, those who had the privilege of being with him always
found comfort and derived benefit in the companionship.
He seemed to have no personal problems. He was a
philosophic and sympathetic man and was invariably disposed to share your difficulties, if any you had....
Those of us, who survive him and who have had the
large privilege of companionship with him whenever occasion afforded throughout past decades knew the resources of his mind and heart and his capacity and unfailing willingness to expand them to the farthest boundaries
in aid of others and of institutions he deemed deserving.
In his quiet way he rendered services and encouragement
to numerous individuals and devoted a large amount of
time, wisdom and effort to organizing and reorganizing
private institutions. The greatness of Judge Sanborn as a
man is demonstrated by what he has left of himself with
others and will live on in those who knew him. Now that
he is gone, his strength and goodness remains in others as
strong and sure as ever.
Judge Sanborn served as ajudge of the state and federal courts
for forty-two years. Throughout that time, he was conscientious,
thoughtful, clear-minded, gracious, collegial, and fair. Judge Sanborn was an intelligent, talented, and warm man. He would have
been successful in many other fields and professions. Fortunately,
he chose to serve Minnesota and America as ajudge.

696. See Judge Thomas Memorial, supranote 129, at 16.
697. See id. at 18.
698. Letter from George Heisey to Gunnar Nordbye, supra note 107.
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